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ABSTRACT 
 
In the City, Out of Place: 
Dispossession and the Economics of Belonging 
 
 This dissertation analyzes everyday talk about livelihoods, or about the challenges 
of work and getting by, among displaced Kurds in the city of Diyarbakır in southeastern 
Turkey.  Over the past two decades, Diyarbakır has grown dramatically with the influx of 
tens of thousands of displaced and dispossessed rural Kurds uprooted by state policies of 
forced migration.  These policies were designed with two strategic aims in mind: 
eliminating rural support networks for the Kurdish armed rebellion (the PKK), and 
concentrating populations in less dispersed and thus theoretically more easily policed 
spaces.  However, it is argued here that while the former ambition has perhaps succeeded, 
the displacement and dispossession of rural Kurds throughout the 1990s, rather than 
suppressing dissent, has generated new fields and new forms of political struggle.  Based 
on two years of fieldwork in Diyarbakır, this study explores the ways in which ordinary 
talk about livelihoods, about how to make a living and pay the bills, is, in this context, 
about more than ‘the economy’ alone.  The interplay of people’s efforts to rebuild life 
and livelihood and the semiotic interpretation of these efforts is analyzed as a rich and 
under-appreciated site for the everyday practical generation of the political in Kurdish 
Turkey.  This study contributes to the anthropology of Kurdish Turkey and of the Middle 
East, as well as to theories of displacement and dispossession, evaluative discourse, and 
the pragmatics of political stance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In eight years, I visited nearly all of Anatolia, and of the cities I saw, Diyarbakır 
has no match.  You look at the grandeur of the walls and the good manners of its 
people and you say, like Rome, like Istanbul, here is a city that has always been 
home to a genteel population.  Then you see its new buildings, modern 
facilities…and its accommodation to change through an intertwining of 
scholarship, learning, arts, and culture, and you say, here is west...In terms of its 
liveliness and crowds, no city east of Gaziantep and Kayseri can measure up.  Its 
wide roads, rich trading houses, vineyards and gardens, and active markets are 
growing day by day, flourishing day by day. 
—Journalist and author Cahit Beğenç, Diyarbakır ve Raman, 1949 
 
Diyarbakır was, in its days of splendor, the shining star of the East, and, located at 
the crossroads of trade routes, was a center of history, culture, dialogue, business, 
and cuisine…[Today] it is a city where joblessness and the illegal tapping of 
electricity both push 70 percent. 
—MÜSİAD, Bölgesel-Sektörel Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, 2005 
 
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish state was engaged in armed struggle 
with Kurdish revolutionaries fighting for an independent state.  Among the most 
significant legacies of this period is the mass displacement of rural Kurds.  In the first 
half of the 1990s, some 3,000 villages and hamlets were forcibly evacuated, some by 
Kurdish guerrillas (Bruinessen 1999), and many more by the Turkish army (Jongerden 
2001; Mater 1999; Bruinessen 1995; Olson 1989; Amnesty International 1996).  An 
unknown number of rural Kurds—estimates range from official figures of approximately 
one million (HÜNEE 2006) to figures from civil society groups that place the number 
closer to 3 million (TİHV 2001) or, at the high end, 4 million (GÖÇ-DER 2009)1—were 
compelled to abandon life and livelihood in the countryside.  Cities across southeastern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See also Bilgin and Yükseker (2005) and HRW (2002, 2005) for a discussion of these discrepancies.  
The following chapter will explore this politics of numbers in more detail. 
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Turkey saw their populations rise dramatically with the influx of tens of thousands of 
displaced families.  And today, nearly two decades after the transformative events of the 
1990s, these cities are still struggling to address the social and economic effects of 
displacement. 
 At a very general level, this dissertation is devoted to exploring the aftermath of 
this recent history of displacement and dispossession through an ethnographic account of 
economic and political life in Diyarbakır—one of the largest cities in southeastern Turkey 
and a major magnet for forced migrants in the 1990s.   Specifically, I focus in this study 
on everyday talk about ‘livelihood’, or the challenges of work and getting by among 
displaced Kurds in Diyarbakır.  I will argue across the study that this talk is not only 
about how to make a living and pay the bills, but about the modes of power Kurds in 
Turkey are subjected to at this time in their history, and the forms of political dissensus 
(Ranciere 2010) emerging therefrom.  The aim of this introduction is to unpack this 
claim, both empirically and theoretically.  First, however, let us turn to a brief overview 
of the history and political economy of Diyarbakır. 
 
DIYARBAKIR 
 With a current population of a little under 1 million, Diyarbakır is located some 
70 miles north of the Syrian border, and approximately 180 and 300 miles, respectively, 
from the main border points into Iraq and Iran.  Its ancient city walls, delimiting the 
historic urban center, are built at the edge of a basalt plateau on the banks of the Tigris 
River, overlooking an impressive stretch of plain, a patchwork of fields of wheat and 
pulses.  In its denominational and ethno-linguistic composition, the city was, until the 
early twentieth century at least, remarkably varied.  Nineteenth-century population 
	   3	  	  
estimates, derived from Ottoman salnames and Armenian Patriarchate figures, differ 
widely, for reasons tied to the interests of compilers. Whatever the precise figures, 
though, the city’s historical heterogeneity is undeniable.  Sunni Muslims, Gregorian 
Armenians, Catholic Armenians, Syrian Christians, Jacobites, Chaldaeans, Protestants, 
Orthodox Rum, and Catholic Rum, Yezidis, Jews, and Gypsies—all appear in 
Diyarbakır’s 19th-century population estimates (Jongerden 2007:234-5, Yılmazçelik 
1995:115). As for its linguistic composition, a mixture of Turkish and Kurdish seem to 
have been used throughout much of the Ottoman period, though in addition to Kurmanji 
and Diyarbakır’s particular dialect of Turkish (closer in certain features to Baku than 
Istanbul), travelers also noted the use of Persian, Arabic, Armenian, Aramaic dialects, 
and the Iranian language Zazaki (Bruinessen 1988: 29). 
 In Diyarbakır today, constructions of the city’s past as one of cosmopolitan 
openness and peaceful coexistence (a fairly familiar trope in contemporary 
representations of Ottoman life) are easy to come across, both in everyday conversation 
and in the rhetoric of local politicians.  Nor is this trope entirely without substance.2  But 
here as elsewhere, under the right political circumstances, harmonious communal 
relations easily transformed into communal discord.3  By the end of the chaotic decades 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In a brief digression on Ottoman tolerance and the much-discussed millet system, Slavoj Zizek 
(2006)—an odd reference in Ottoman history, to be sure, but the passage merits attention—relays a 
fascinating account by a 15th century Italian traveler to Ottoman Istanbul who is repelled by the close 
coexistence of so many different religious and cultural communities.  Zizek underscores the irony here, at 
least when read from the 21st century: certain mainstream discourses in European politics tend to frame 
Islamic geographies as marked by problems of intolerance of religious and ethnic difference, yet here is a 
traveler from Europe in the heart of the Ottoman Empire, expressing disgust in the face of just such 
differences.  He goes on to suggest that, popular theories of age-old aggression or tribal sensibilities aside, 
it was not only local dynamics that prompted the great political disasters of the Anatolian early twentieth 
century and the Balkan late, but the influx of certain European-born ideas, namely nationalism and an 
ethnicized notion of nation and national people. 
3 It was a surprise to encounter the openness with which many of my fieldwork collaborators discussed 
their families’ direct involvement with the violent expulsion of the city’s Armenian population.  On this 
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around World War I, nearly all of the city’s significant non-Muslim population had either 
been exiled or killed, or had converted.4  This other, earlier history of forced migration in 
Diyarbakır, inaugurating the city into the new political form of the nation state, had 
lasting effects on not only the social composition of the city, but also on its economic life, 
as a vast majority of the city’s artisans and craftsmen were Armenian and Assyrian.  Prior 
to World War I, Diyarbakır, aided by its position on trade routes linking Mosul, Baghdad, 
Basra, Aleppo, Damascus, and Iran and the Caucuses to Istanbul and other Anatolian 
nodes, was an important regional center of trade and small-scale craft production, 
particularly in textiles—a craft mostly carried out by Armenians, who engaged in 
household production in and around the city (Barkan 1943, Quataert 1993).  Diyarbakır’s 
textiles were prized across Europe, as was its unique red leather (Bruinessen 1988:42).  
Leather came from pastoralists in the fertile hinterlands, the same lands that met Aleppo’s 
need for meat (Yılmazçelik 1995:13-5).  Further, taxes on caravans from Iran or from 
India via Baghdad, particularly on silk (Bruinessen 1988:36-7), collected in the city’s 
active customs house and sent to Istanbul, made Diyarbakır a significant source of 
revenue for the Ottoman state.  Other specialized crafts in which Armenians and 
Assyrians predominated include the production of swords and daggers and a range of iron 
and copper goods.  Relics of fortress gates, nails, and cannonballs crafted in Diyarbakır 
are found across contemporary Iraq and Syria (Murphey 1980).5   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
history as it touched down in Diyarbakır, see Joost Jongerden’s Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir 
1870-1915 (2012). 
4 For one of the few examples of a micro-historical approach to the violent events in and around 
Diyarbakır at that time, see Jongerden (2008, 2012).   
5 The urban space of the old walled city-center still shows signs of this deep history of trade.  
Impressive trading inns (hanlar), which one 17th-century traveler (Simeon 2007) estimated as having 
stables capable of housing 500 animals, elicited comparisons, in terms of economic vitality, to Istanbul.  
Also, a number of the markets and districts that grew up around long-standing crafts and trade specialties 
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 Yet as with many urban centers in Turkey that, historically cosmopolitan in 
composition, lost much of their artisan and craftsmen classes during the demographic 
transformations in the shift from empire to nation, Diyarbakır’s economy was severely 
impacted by the demographic transformations of World War I.  Sociologist Çağlar 
Keyder describes these economic changes with specific reference to eastern Turkey: 
Geographical differentiation had been an important feature of the Ottoman era, 
and agronomic differences among regions were probably always important, but 
there is justification to think that the nineteenth-century expansion of export trade 
added to the advantage enjoyed by more fertile areas. During the late century, 
commercial development seems to have spread to previously less fortunate 
regions in eastern Anatolia, whose cities evolved as secondary centres under the 
enrichment of especially the Armenian population. One gets the impression of a 
declining regional inequality in the decades preceding the Great War. Given the 
economic consequences of the radical population upheaval during the wars, 
however, it is likely that there was substantially greater regional inequality 
(roughly along east-west lines) in the early Republic than in the late Empire. 
[1987: 205-6] 
 
Population upheavals in the decades around World War I quite simply devastated 
Diyarbakır’s economy.  Forms of extreme social suffering, including near-starvation 
poverty and epidemics, marked this period, and though conditions in the early Republic 
(1923-1950) were an improvement on these conditions, in the subsequent decades, 
regardless of the optimism with which early Republican discourse,6 represented by 
Beğenç’s quote at the outset of the chapter, spoke about the riches and promise of the 
city, Diyarbakır never recovered its previous centrality as a site of industrial production 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are still evident, though in diminished form: jewelers, traders in herbs and dry goods, shoemakers, saddle 
makers, and other leatherworkers, textile merchants (in particular, scarves), blacksmiths, and carpenters. 
6 I read Begenç and other similar writers of the period in part for their records of city life in the early 
twentieth century, but more for a structure of feeling that can be described as ambition and optimism for the 
construction of a nationalist project of countermemory.  Biray Kırlı has compellingly described a broadly 
similar project in the context of Izmir, where in the wake of a great fire and the forced migration of nearly 
all of the city’s non-Muslims (and thus, there too, most of its craftsmen and merchants) the emerging 
nationalist ideology saw opportunity in disaster, initiating an “attempt to build places of (counter)memory, 
to open up a hollow landscape upon which the new nation's imprint, its Muslim and Turkish identity, could 
be carved” (2002: 21-22). 
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and export.  It rather re-emerged as a regional node of limited, small-scale trade and 
industry, much of it in textiles and the processing of agricultural goods.   
 In the early 20th century, a number of rural Kurdish families moved from the 
country to the city after World War I.  Some took over crafts previously dominated by 
Armenians (Mango 2004).  Others worked as small shopkeepers and merchants in 
agricultural goods, as public investments in the city’s infrastructure for storing and 
exporting agricultural yields and in agricultural mechanization in the 1950s led to an 
expanded production of commodity crops such as wheat and red lentils in Diyarbakır’s 
hinterlands, opening up more spaces for trade.  Yet the economic life of the city remained 
at a small scale across the twentieth century, with no large industrial development to 
speak of.  State-led industrial development policies in the 1960s, which tended to favor 
areas with some degree of infrastructural development and networks of businessmen with 
links to the state (Istanbul, İzmir, and the Çukurova Plain) for the most part bypassed 
Diyarbakır.   
 This process of marginalization not only intensified geographical inequities across 
Turkey.  It also seems to have played an important role in spreading popular perceptions 
of unequal development in Turkey (Keyder 1987:206).  The history of unequal industrial 
development persists in Diyarbakır today, both at the level of empirical materialities of 
industrialization and popular perceptions of inequality.  One widespread form of 
economic common sense that I came across frequently in my research interprets this 
history as one of intentional economic underdevelopment; limiting economic 
development, so the theory goes, is a means of both limiting the potential emergence of 
political power and maintaining a relation of exploitative extraction—what the 
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controversial sociologist İsmail Beşikçi (1969) analyzed in terms of internal colonialism.  
Yet it is also possible, and perhaps more plausible, to see the emergence of the present 
economic conjuncture as resulting from an assemblage of factors whose complexity 
exceeds the positing of an intentional state project of underdevelopment.  This equation 
includes existing infrastructure, historically embedded economic activities (in this case, 
largely small-scale subsistence farming and pastoralism in much of the countryside, 
interspersed by larger-scale farming of export crops, and in the cities, small-scale craft 
production and trade), and political histories of allegiance with and challenge to 20th-
century efforts to naturalize the nation-state form across Anatolia.  Though messier than 
the idea of state intentions, this would seem to provide a more careful framing of why 
Diyarbakır never was the site of significant capitalist development.   
 Such was the general economic context that forced migrants encountered when 
they began to arrive in great numbers in the early 1990s: a city of small-scale merchants 
and traders, and, on the whole, small scales of wealth.  Before migration, we find a city 
rendered, by its turbulent path through the twentieth century, an economically marginal 
urban space in a largely economically marginal region.7   
 It is hardly surprising, then, that high rates of joblessness and urban poverty have 
resulted from this history of disrupt and decline. Countless small shops now operate 
either entirely beyond or in a negotiated relationship with the rituals of economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 That said, for reasons that I shall try to illustrate below through ethnographic detail and analysis, 
marginality is not synonymous with of no consequence.  See Das and Poole (2004) for a collection of 
nuanced essays on how the margins of the state shape, in important ways, the center.  Specific to 
southeastern Turkey, Watts (2010) and Gambetti (2009) for studies of the extent to which political events 
and different eras of activism in Kurdish Turkey have reshaped the Turkish state. 
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formality.8  Street vendors and sidewalk sellers seize on busy intersections and trafficked 
spaces.  And a significant proportion of households rely on money earned from seasonal, 
temporary work in off-the-books spaces of labor: for men, construction work in western 
Turkish metropoles stands out; for women, cleaning; and for entire families, manual 
agricultural labor, in the Black Sea’s hazelnut groves, in Urfa or Çukurova’s cotton 
fields, or elsewhere across Turkey’s centers of commercial agricultural production. 
 If this suggests something of the social and economic trajectory of the city, 
another critical element, without which any portrait of Diyarbakır would be incomplete, 
involves Diyarbakır’s increasing identity, particularly after the 1960s, as a key regional 
center for Kurdish political activism and dissent.  (Though early twentieth-century forms 
of Kurdish politics, rebellions religious and separatist in character, took place in and 
around Diyarbakır (Olson 1989), here I am focusing only on those with a more direct 
genealogy to the contemporary contours of the city’s political life.)  This grew in part 
from the increasing popularity of leftist politics across Turkey in the 1960s.  Divisions 
over how to address the so-called Kurdish Question led to the emergence of groups that 
blended calls for economic and political equality with ideas of Kurdish rights and 
separatism (on this history, see Bila 2004, Bozarslan 2004, Jongerden and Akkaya 2011).  
A number of organizations and journals emerged from this period, where matters of 
Kurdish cultural and political aspirations were discussed with a degree of openness 
unmatched in previous periods.  By the end of the 1960s, Diyarbakır was an important 
center for the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths, a Kurdish socialist group that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 And to be sure, the ‘formal’ in invocations of economic formality should be appreciated as a 
fundamentally cultural question (Ferguson 2007, Guyer 2004), as instances of “fictions taken as reality” 
(Taussig 1984)—and fictions, crucially, inseparable from questions of the unequal distribution of power—
imposed on the human act of exchange. 
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influenced some of the PKK’s early ideas.   
 That discussions of Kurdish identity and aspirations, equality, rights, and justice, 
and state actions of discrimination and assimilation are as widespread in Diyarbakir as 
they are today is in part a consequence of the discussions initiated at this time. Today, 
Diyarbakır is a political city in still another sense.  Since the early 2000s, after two 
decades of struggle, leaders of the Kurdish movement have rejected the idea of an 
independent Kurdish state, and have instead been investing thought and effort in a project 
of democracy without the state—of building spaces of political experimentation at levels 
that, in line with its project of radical democratic autonomy, do not rely on a state for the 
realization of aims.  Neither an independent Kurdish state, nor recognition from the 
Turkish state animate contemporary politics in Diyarbakır.  Rather, the aim of creating or 
occupying existing spaces in local government or civil society organizations, where 
Kurdish political and cultural expression might be less encumbered.  And within this 
emergent project, Diyarbakır’s status is something of an unofficial political capital. 
 We will take up and add to this sketch of the city in the following chapters.  Let 
us now turn to describing in more detail the object of analysis central to this study.   
OBJECT OF ANALYSIS 
 “Poverty”, notes a prominent Diyarbakır-based NGO,  “has in recent years 
become one of the most visible, as well as most discussed and debated, facts of urban life 
in Diyarbakır” (Sarmaşık 2009:2).  In 2007, when I arrived in the city to commence two 
years of fieldwork, the ubiquity with which reflection on problems of joblessness, 
dispossession, and the economic obligations of the state to the welfare of its citizens 
filtered into everyday talk was a social fact that, it seemed, could not be overlooked, if for 
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no other reason than its sheer social pervasiveness.  Such talk seemed, in one form or 
another, to find a way into so many everyday semiotic acts, from chatter in corner stores 
and restaurants to headlines in the local newspapers, or to the ethnographic interviews I 
was carrying out (and in the instance of the latter, sometimes almost regardless, it 
seemed, of the questions I asked).  Displaced households I visited to collect family 
histories of migration and shifting livelihoods lamented in one breath the lack of factories 
in the city—bir fabrika olsaydı, if only there were a factory, is a phrase that surfaced far 
more times in my fieldwork than I could possibly count—and put forward, in the next, 
theories alleging a link between displacement and dispossession and contemporary 
national-governmental practices of food and fuel assistance, maintaining that both are 
part of a single, intentional strategy of depoliticization, first through impoverishment, 
then through forced dependency.  Young men I spent time with as they worked in 
neighborhood bakeries, markets, grills and other self-employment ventures common to 
the dispossessed accurately relayed statistics on the city’s unemployment rates as they 
shared their own stories of work in sites across Turkey’s seasonal and temporary labor 
geographies of dispossession, or lamented their precarious prospects for building a stable 
working future in Diyarbakır.  Small-scale merchants and traders I interviewed and spent 
time with, looking over their shoulder as they went about their daily business, compared 
the regular promises from Ankara, which tend to cluster around two master keywords in 
longstanding national-governmental discourses about economic development in the 
southeast—investment (yatırım) and development (kalkınma)—and accused the state of a 
lack of sincerity when it came to implementing effectual policies of economic 
improvement in its Kurdish geographies.  Bored bus drivers distracted themselves on 
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near-empty late buses by chatting up lone passengers like me, asking rhetorically how 
there could be such regional resource riches alongside such widespread poverty and 
joblessness—the implied answer having to do, in the perceptions of many people I met in 
the city, with a history of state neglect at best, intentional underdevelopment at worst. 
 There is nothing automatic or natural, I think, about the frequency with which 
matters of the economy were brought into daily speech.  This brings us to the object of 
analysis: the particularly widespread public discourse in Diyarbakır about the economy 
(or livelihood and economic privations) among displaced Kurds.  An important aim of 
this study is to grasp its contours.  Critically, though, I further argue that, in its pragmatic 
application in contemporary Diyarbakır, discourse about the economy is also a discourse 
about politics.  That is, discourse about livelihood has a primary referential meaning 
having to do with matters of economic life, but in its pragmatic application, is used, in a 
Rancierean sense of the politics of dissensus (2010), to stake out a stance of objection to 
the current state of affairs—an act of interpretation that then re-shapes what is being said 
as other than or more than economic.  In talking about high unemployment rates or the 
challenges of making a living after dispossession, in other words, people were raising 
fundamentally political questions: What is the state’s obligation towards its citizens? To 
what extent is the state (as opposed to the market) responsible for helping citizens who 
are undergoing privation—importantly, for reasons they perceive to be caused by state 
acts?  Can the state be relied on as an enforcer of justice?  Or should other political 
horizons be invested in? 
 To clarify this analysis, two points need to be addressed, one analytical, one 
theoretical.  Firstly, why approach politics through a discussion of economic life in the 
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first place?  There is no self-evident reason, after all, why economic matters provide the 
referential material for what Jacques Ranciere calls “litigious speech”, or acts of 
disagreement with a particular sociopolitical order of things (2010).  Secondly, how 
precisely does discourse about the economy matter politically?  This study’s focus on 
discourse about the economy stems from my conviction that all this talk is not ‘mere 
talk’, incidental to a somehow more real, more significant field of human action, but has 
an impact on how people understand themselves as political actors, and how they act on 
these understandings.  To explore this latter point requires a theoretical framework for 
thinking about the relationship between discourse and political stance.  But let us begin 
with the question: Why politics through the economic? 
 The reasons why discourses about the economy have become so widespread are 
fairly clear, and have to do with the nature of the state’s encounter with Kurds in the 
region over the past thirty years (the details of which we shall explore in more detail in 
the following chapter), and the overlap of this political history with a deeper economic 
history of geographical inequities, economic marginalization, and decline.  The forms of 
destabilized livelihoods and impoverishment resulting from this history seem to have 
acted as incitements to discourse (Foucault 1978).  Yet this still does not answer why 
people approach the political through economic matters.  A reader unfamiliar with this 
context may wonder, might this be an instance of playing it safe?  Might people be 
sticking to the subject of poverty and problems of joblessness because of state censorship 
that makes discussion and criticism of the Kurdish question difficult, if not impossible in 
public, and so people have to discuss it indirectly, the economy being the discourse at 
hand by which to do so?  The short answer is no.  Certainly, the history of state 
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censorship around Kurdish political and cultural expression contains many actions 
surprising in their reach and occasional absurdity.9  And while it is inaccurate to say that 
Turkey is now living in a post-censorship era with regards to how the state treats public 
expressions of Kurdishness,10 official restrictions on discussion of the Kurdish question 
have, over roughly the past decade, undergone some changes, even if these changes are 
frequently diagnosed as cosmetic and contradictory to the mass arrests of Kurdish public 
officials and the detention of hundreds of Kurdish youths.  If there were points in the past 
when Diyarbakırites were reticent to discuss the so-called Kurdish question openly, today 
the need to shroud discussion is less pressing.  One did not have to go far, in my 
comparatively brief stay in the city, to encounter vigorous political debate in everyday 
conversations in the city.  People criticized past policies denying the existence of Kurdish 
language and culture, diagnosed deep injustice in destructive state policies in Kurdish 
geographies, and scoured the latest news for signs of state sincerity (or lack thereof) in 
announcing a new economic development package or new promises of political reform.  
People attended political rallies and turned out to vote for the Kurdish party in large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The history of censorship is remarkable in its semiotic span.  The most infamous instance is the ban 
on the public use of Kurdish in education and broadcasting, in effect until quite recently in Turkey, and still 
in effect in de facto ways, such as the orthographic ban on the use of W, Q, and X, which do not exist in the 
Turkish alphabet.  Being caught, at a rally or in a police house raid, with a red, yellow, and green scarf—
the “national” colors of Kurds—can land one in trouble.  And, for similar reasons of color politics, twice 
during my research the police in Diyarbakır ordered the uprooting of flower beds planted by the 
municipality, in one instance because the colors (red and yellow flowers, green leaves) were perceived as a 
public display of Kurdish nationalist symbolism, and in the other, because a star-shaped arrangement of 
flowers in a roundabout reminded the police of a Kurdish flag.  (See Haber Diyarbakır 2008 and Evrensel 
2008 for wry commentaries on these events.)  One NGO worker I met with often recalled two instances 
where a bouquet of flowers landed her in trouble with the police, the red and yellow blooms taken as PKK 
propaganda.   In addition to flowers and orthography, preoccupation with toponyms (Today’s Zaman 
2012), clothing (Amnesty Internationl 1997), and cats (Los Angeles Times 2002) are also a part of the 
semiotic history of the aesthetics of politics in Kurdish Turkey. 
10 The question of recognition is far more complex than simply opening up discursive spaces for 
Kurds, such as the much-discussed Kurdish language television channel (TRT 6) opened by state 
broadcasters in 2009.  See Povinelli (2002) for a brilliant ethnographic and theoretical treatment of the 
concept of recognition in the context of multicultural Australia. 
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numbers.  Talk about the need for expanded political and cultural rights is a salient 
element of contemporary Kurdish public political discourse, and the question of who 
might be expected to ensure these rights—should people wait on the state for deep 
structural reforms, or should local government and civil society organizations begin 
mobilizing outside of sanctioned means?—is a regular feature of everyday life in 
Diyarbakır. 
 Rather than an instance of avoiding controversial subjects, talk of politics through 
matters of economic life might have more to do with the return of a neglected and 
misrepresented issue.  Questions of economic inequality in the Kurdish countryside and 
its cities played an important role in discussions among Kurdish leftist groups in the 
1960s and 1970s.  The PKK, too, in its early years in particular, made rural land reforms 
and the elimination of the region’s large landlords—whom the PKK framed as state 
collaborators, targeting a number of prominent landlords in their early attacks—a central 
part of its early strategy.  Yet in the changes that emerged across the 1990s, and more 
explicitly in the 2000s—from separatism to democratic autonomy, or what two scholars 
of the PKK describe as “radical democracy based on a rejection of the state” (Akkaya and 
Jongerden 2010)—only recently has there re-emerged sustained attention to re-thinking 
the economy.  As one Kurdish journalist recently noted, “In a period when the subject of 
autonomy has occupied the political agenda, it is quite troubling that discussion about the 
economy [at an official level] has not been as sufficient as it should be.  Since the 
foundation of the Kurdish movement, the field of least intervention has been the 
economy” (Pelda n.d.).   
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 The question of geographical economic inequalities has, in fact, been a point of 
discussion at times in local politics in the southeast, but in less than beneficial ways.  For 
at least three decades, official Turkish governmental discourse has favored an explanation 
of political instability in the southeast as a question not of ethnic or political problems, 
but economic underdevelopment (Marcus 2007:281).  The clear problem with such an 
approach is that it brackets the political production of contemporary forms of urban 
poverty in favor of a technical, apolitical vision of economic development and 
humanitarian aid (pace Referans Gazetesi 2008, see Day 2008).  This framing of things, 
however, has drawn plenty of critical attention.  The Kurdish party, not without its own 
shortsightedness and impasses in certain aspects of its approach to urban poverty in the 
southeast—for instance, are not the frequent calls of local government officials for more 
capital investment in a region (as those who voice these calls often note) with abundant 
cheap labor an invitation for capital to proletarianize the displaced and dispossessed?—
built an election in 2009 in part on the rejection of such a reduced framework for thinking 
about Kurdish politics as mainly a matter of hungry bellies, insisting instead that matters 
of identity and ethnicity were indispensable.   
 But with more consistency and articulateness, it is forced migrants who are 
responsible for sustaining questions of the politics of economic life in Kurdish Turkey.  
There are likely two reasons for this.  One is simply their constant, direct experience with 
the effects of displacement, dispossession, and regional economies structured on 
geographical inequity.  Another lies in the fact that, in many instances, Kurdish political 
activism has, since the 1980s, been a part of their lives, in one way or another.  I 
interviewed a number of older men who recalled with fondness how PKK guerrillas 
	   16	  	  
would descend from the mountains to their hamlets to convene small meetings in the 
name of consciousness raising and an effort to convince rural Kurds of the righteousness 
of the cause, a process that Aliza Marcus’s (2007) work describes as going against the 
widespread idea that the PKK relied mainly on coercion to gain support.  Moreover, 
people did not cut their relationship with the Kurdish movement upon coming to the city.  
The poor and displaced make up a very important part of the legal Kurdish party BDP’s 
electoral base, and turn out in large numbers in rallies and protests, discuss and digest 
political discourse from different sources, and vote in routinely high numbers.  It is 
perhaps not surprising that those experiencing economic strife most closely are those who 
sustain, as an element of public discourse, the economic angle of the political critique of 
recent Kurdish dissensus.  One point I try to make throughout this study is that, rather 
than see this through an alarmist lens—urban poverty plus political critique, will it equal 
political unrest?—the keeping alive of a political discourse of the economy, informed by 
the experiences of the displaced, can be seen as having the potential to inform the 
emerging discussions around urban poverty in contemporary Kurdish Turkey.  A 
grounded understanding of poverty, one informed by the dispossessed themselves, might 
inject new perspectives into tired calls for more factories, more investment, or better state 
incentive packages, and enrich discussions of building an “autonomous economy” (DTK 
n.d.).   But here we are already entering into theoretical questions we must address in the 
next section, in which we consider in more general terms how this ubiquity of discourse 
about the economy might matter politically. 
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CONCEPTS: MATERIALISM, DISCOURSE, POLITICS 
 Here we take up in more theoretical terms the claim that frequent discourse about 
the economy might play a role in how people understand themselves as political actors.  
Doing so requires us to consider the relations between material practice and the role of 
language—specifically, discourse—in the constitution of what I will refer to throughout 
this study as political stance.  I shall come to an explanation of why I am using the term 
stance rather than political subjectivity or consciousness, but first let us consider the 
relationship between materialism and discourse. 
 Marx’s materialism provides a framework for appreciating consciousness as a 
product of sensuous engagement with the world.  In a well-known passage in the German 
Ideology, criticizing methods that start with ideas and proceed to actual situations—
methods that “descend from heaven to earth” (1970:47)—Marx and Engels advocate 
another approach:  
We do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as 
narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh.  
We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process, we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-
process.  The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, 
sublimates of their material life-process…Life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life.  [1970: 47] 
In this sense of materialism, how we imagine or conceive of the world has, to a 
significant degree, to do with the nature or mode of our engagement with the world 
around us, with context—ideas as “echoes” of experience.  But Marx had relatively little 
to say in detail about the role of language as a link between material practice and the 
concepts we hold of the world.  It was other students of the methodological project he 
outlined who identified language as a critical medium between material context and 
mind. Bakhtin-circle theorist of language V.N. Volosinov insisted that language is not 
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best approached, pace Saussure, as an “abstract system of normatively identical forms of 
language” (1973: 70), but should be placed in actual contexts of usage.  And in so doing, 
he says, the analyst of language quickly sees the extent to which language is deeply 
inflected by context.  Furthermore, says Volosinov, language is, from the point of view of 
grounded speakers, a practical activity where meaning and evaluation are inseparable; 
thus Volosinov’s felicitous observation that all words have an “evaluative accent”  
(1973:80-81).  Language, he notes 
exists for the speaker only in the context of specific utterances, exists, 
consequently, only in a specific ideological context.  In actuality, we never say or 
hear words, we say and hear what is true and false, good or bad, important or 
unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on.  Words are always filled with 
content and meaning drawn from behavior or ideology.  That is the way we 
understand words, and we can respond only to words that engage us behaviorally 
or ideologically. [1973:70] 
 
 Language thus has  “the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, momentary 
phases of social change” (1973:19).  This echoes Bakhtin’s insights into the ways in 
which language (or languages within a language) encode “particular views of the world”.  
“All words”, Bakhtin wrote, “have the ‘taste' of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, 
a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each 
word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all 
words and forms are populated by intentions” (1981:293).  This study is framed by such 
an approach to language as both deeply inflected by—or in Bakhtin’s felicitous phrase, 
tasting of—its context, and also used as the main means for assigning value to that 
context.  Here, the focus is not on individual words or signs, however, but on longer 
chains of speech, discourse, through which evaluative stances vis-à-vis context are 
articulated.   
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 But how does this process link to politics?  How is the evaluative function of 
speech in context related to political life?  Volosinov’s framework does much to push the 
study of language beyond a Saussurean concern with language as a self-contained 
system, and towards an appreciation of language as fundamentally inextricable from 
social conditions, or from the “extraverbal milieu” (Volosinov 1986:96) in which he 
insists we must ground language.  But in theorizing politics, Volosinov’s approach does 
not open up much in the way of analytical space.  Politics is mentioned in Marxism and 
the Philosophy of Language either to refer to politics in the sense of government, or to 
the ways in which what Volosinov refers to as the “sociopolitical order” inflects language 
(where sociopolitical order is largely synonymous with the differentiation of society into 
distinct classes).  Here we need another thinker, one still operating within the framework 
of historical materialism, but presenting an approach to politics through discourse, 
through a more robust theorization of the political: Jacques Ranciere. 
 Ranciere’s theorization of politics begins with the distinction that he draws 
between police and the political.  The former designates, for Ranciere, a particular social 
order’s fixed “distribution of the sensible”, a phrase Ranciere uses across his work to 
suggest how power works to render certain voices or agents as relatively more audible 
and visible, and others as beyond the perceivable, sensible borders—this is his sense of 
“aesthetics of politics”—of what is recognized as intelligible speech about and legitimate 
participation in deciding on the shape of society or community.  Society and community 
are more or less synonymous in his conceptual vocabulary, and denote not a mediating 
element in the constitution of a political order, but the outcome of active disagreements 
and disputes about the shape that the social or communal should take.  Those rare 
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moments when the intelligibility of a particular arrangement of the social and the 
legitimacy of the assumptions it rests upon—particularly, who is qualified to contribute 
to its definition—are called into question are, for Ranciere, politics.  The political begins, 
he writes, “when the status of the subject able and ready to concern itself with the 
community becomes an issue” (Ranciere 2010: 43).  As an “intervention in the visible 
and sayable” (Ranciere 2001), politics “consists not in acts that preserve a political order 
or respond to already articulated problems, but in the disrupt of this order of the 
distribution of bodies” (Ranciere 2004: 99)—a distribution, again, that governs who can 
and cannot have a say in the making of a community, in the definition of a social order.  
Politics marks those moments—rare, their reasons for emergence not easily predicted, 
and their results provisional and precarious, says Ranciere—when “community is 
animated by the very conflict over what [community] means” (2010: 100), and when the 
arbitrariness of a particular distribution of power is laid bare and publicly thrown into 
question.   
 However rare, and however ambiguous and precarious their results may be—the 
interrogation of the intelligibility and legitimacy of a particular arrangement of things, 
however much it may rely on concepts of justice or equality, does not, even if the 
interrogators take power, necessarily result in the formation of a more just and egalitarian 
order—Ranciere nevertheless emphasizes that such acts of throwing the social order into 
question effect the broadening of who counts as a political actor, of those who count as 
“beings with names”, and those who take part in such acts of collective questioning, 
Ranciere suggests, find “through transgression…that they too are endowed with speech 
that does not simply express want, suffering, or rage, but intelligence” (Bennett 2010: 
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106).  Thus Ranciere presents a framework for appreciating instances where speech is 
tasked with making visible and sayable that which a particular configuration of power 
renders less available to the senses, less easily perceived.   
 “Litigious speech” being a phrase Ranciere often uses to condense his concept of 
the political, it is perhaps not surprising that responses to his work have questioned the 
limits of conceiving of political action as a matter of primarily linguistic action.  Is the 
political mainly a matter of speech?  When questioned on just this issue by political 
theorist Jane Bennett, Ranciere maintained his position that political life is indeed 
primarily about deliberation and disagreement—for Ranciere, a fundamentally linguistic 
act (2010:106).  Bennett’s own work offers a fascinating expansion on Ranciere’s 
approach, taking the political well beyond not only speech, but beyond humans: to 
electricity grids, food systems, and worm castings.  I am sympathetic to a line of thinking 
that stresses the importance of expanding our appreciation of the political beyond acts of 
language.  In that framework, particularly relevant to this research site, and a theme 
explored by a number of social and political scientists writing on Diyarbakır and its 
environs (Jongerden 2007, Gambetti 2009), is that of the role of space, and its status, 
following Lefebvre (2009) as both product of and agent in politics.  This is an indubitably 
important research focus.  And at an implicit level anyhow, the extra-verbal and extra-
human have a place in the ethnography that follows, where one can see evidence of the 
ways in which the political extends beyond speech to questions of land, fruits of the land, 
home interiors, and more.  That said, at least in this iteration of the fieldwork material,11 
the theoretical focus is more singularly devoted to the role of evaluative acts of language 
in the shaping of political stance.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See the conclusion for a return to the absence of matters of space and geography. 
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 Which brings us to a question we began with: why stance?  Why approach this 
material through that concept, instead of, say, more familiar terms such as consciousness 
or subjectivity?   
 In A Grammar of Motives, literary theorist Kenneth Burke, in an exploration of 
what he calls the stance family in Indo-Germanic languages, identifies a fascinating 
tension embedded in the idea of stance.  Although we use stance to point to what a person 
or thing is—where someone or something stands—its etymological roots in fact lie in an 
“attribute of the thing’s context…that which supports or underlies a thing”—namely, 
“scene, environment, situation, context, ground” (1969:23-5). Burke brilliantly identifies 
“how readily we shunt between an intrinsic and an extrinsic reference” in talking about 
stance, and it is this capacity of the term that I want to underscore.   Stance at a basic 
level points not only to the intrinsic qualities of the person standing, but also to the 
context by and in—or against—which she stands.   
 Stance has also been the focus of linguistic anthropologists (e.g. Jaffe 2012).  As 
Paul Kockelman notes (2005:129-31), in a brief but informative review, uses of the term 
stance in linguistic anthropology range greatly in terms of the object or focus of stance (a 
speaker’s stance to language use, to ethics, to the perceived truthfulness of a statement, 
and more) and the means for studying stance (grammatical categories, discourse).  Across 
the variation, though, he notes a common move away “from an emphasis on the private, 
subjective, and psychological…to an emphasis on the public, intersubjective, and 
embodied (stance)” (2005: 131).  This study is similarly concerned with a move away 
from the intrinsic to the shared and public.  Unlike Kockelman’s research, however—his 
study is concerned with language at the level of grammar, not discourse—I am mainly 
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concerned with public discourse wherein the economy (a shorthand here for questions of 
joblessness, livelihood precariousness, and related matters) is put to both moral and 
political use.  A framework combining Ranciere’s insights on the politics of dissensus 
with an appreciation, with Volosinov, of how “every utterance is above all an evaluative 
orientation” (1973:105), pushes us to an understanding of how, in everyday speech, 
political stances are staked out through instances of evaluation and conviction.  Talk 
about the economy, as I trace it across this study, acts in this context to index political 
events and histories, and to do so through an evaluative framework of right and wrong, 
just and unjust.  Ethnographic attention to stance, conceptualized in this way, seems at 
once more modest and demonstrable than the reshaping of subjectivities—by virtue of its 
being less concerned with interiority than with the public manifestations of the shunting 
between the intrinsic and extrinsic that Burke notes—yet of no less political and 
analytical import.   
 This framework suggests a way of appreciating the ways in which Kurdish forced 
migrants, rather than having been stripped of their political lives and made to barely live 
(Agamben 1998), have taken issue with the conditions of the post-dispossession city, and 
through it, are engaging in acts of dissensus that challenge the state of affairs.  We shall 
take up this framework across the following chapters.  First, though, a note on research 
methods and a brief overview of the chapters. 
 
METHODS 
 The analysis that follows draws on two years of fieldwork in Diyarbakır, from the 
summer of 2007 until that of 2009.  One component of fieldwork was semi-structured 
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interviews, conducted mostly in Turkish, though with a few in Kurmanji, and totaling just 
under 50 in number. The majority of these interviews were carried out with displaced 
newcomers, and included both one-on-one interviews (usually carried out in either 
teahouses or next to street stands, semi-legal shops, or other spaces of displaced self-
employment) and household visits.  The overarching aim of this part of my research was 
to collect oral accounts of forced migration and subsequent livelihood histories.  Standard 
questions included:  
o How did you get by in the countryside?   
o Describe a normal working day.   
o How often, if ever, did you come to the city, and if so, to do what?   
o Talk about how you came to Diyarbakır in the 1990s.   
o In the process of forced migration, what did you lose (how), what was 
destroyed (by whom), and what could you sell (to whom), and was 
anything seized (if so how?)  
o Describe life in the first year or two after migration.  That is, once in the 
city, how did you find a place to live, and how did you get by in those first 
few years?  
 
In time, I learned to let my interlocutors steer the conversation to where they wished.  
This led to unexpected data, only some of which I have been able to analyze here—
photographs of a picnic in the village or typical regional rural foodstuffs that would 
prompt a politics of nostalgic via the most modest objects of rural life; small shrines of 
sorts or photo albums devoted to disappeared, dead, or imprisoned family members; 
remarks on the physical structure of homes in the city versus the country; children’s 
drawings of Kurdish nationalist symbols; stories about ‘door psychology’.12  In addition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 One home visit involved sitting in a living room and listening to an older man narrate a long story of 
special forces showing up and banging on his apartment door before taking him away for detention and 
torture.  He was describing being thrown blindfolded into the back of a car, brought to the countryside, and, 
with a gun to his temple, told that the sound he heard was the digging of his grave, and as he told his story, 
his adult daughter was repeating in a low voice, “oh that door psychology, that door psychology”.  
Incredibly, at that very moment came a loud banging on the door.  The daughter ran to her room.  My 
research collaborator, who had arranged the interview and was there with me, grabbed our notebooks and 
threw them under the couch.  It turned out to be a neighbor complaining about something the man’s son 
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to interviews with newcomers, I also interviewed a smaller number of established 
Diyarbakırites, mostly small shopkeepers and traders.  While the chapter on small 
shopkeepers did not make the final cut, these interviews helped me to better discern 
which forms of discourse about the economy were particular to the displaced, and which 
were part of a broader, popular economic common sense.  
 Alongside and at least as important as these interviews, however, are two years of 
accumulated unstructured encounters.  The anthropological truism that interviews are 
secondary to ethnographic research certainly rang true for me by the end of this project.  
These countless everyday exchanges involved watching people going about their working 
days.  For instance, nearly every week, and for the better part of my fieldwork stay, I 
spent hours sitting in half a dozen small shops or street stands run by displaced and 
dispossessed ex-rural producers, who were kind enough to let me watch them go about 
their working day, settling running tabs with neighborhood customers, chatting about fair 
prices, inflation, credit card interest rates or loans gone awry, negotiating relations with 
the municipal commercial police (zabita), and so on.  In time, a few of these shopkeepers 
or self-employed vendors grew into research collaborators, recommending questions for 
my interviews, introducing me to potential interviewees, and explaining to me some of 
the more opaque aspects of their working lives.  
 I also spent time in the offices of a number of civil society organizations (sivil 
toplum kuruluşları or örgütleri) concerned with researching and addressing questions of 
forced migration and urban poverty.  I visited two organizations semi-regularly for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
had done while playing in the building.  The fear that a loud knock can inspire is a clear remnant of the 
frequent police house raids across the past few decades, and, as anthropologist Ömer Özcan once put it to 
me, the politics of the porosity of front doors in southeastern Turkey. 
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better part of the duration of my fieldwork.  Although the results of this phase of 
fieldwork, when it came to writing up, ended up largely on the cutting room floor, the 
experience of translating reports, sitting in offices and overhearing terminological debates 
that illustrated Volosinov’s sense of the ideological valence of linguistic signs (poverty or 
impoverishment? migration or forced displacement?), looking over the shoulder of 
employees as they interviewed aid applicants, and visiting soup kitchens—these helped to 
enrich my sense of the existing institutionalized forms of “poverty knowledge” 
(O’Connor 2001), and of some of the presuppositions, practices, and limits of organized 
action aimed at addressing the economic consequences of forced migration and 
dispossession—as well as the possibilities.  I also collected and read governmental and 
non-governmental reports, newspaper articles, and official documents on a range of 
subjects broadly related to forced displacement and its economic and social 
consequences, regional and Diyarbakır-specific economic dynamics, and national visions 
of economic development.   Finally, Diyarbakır being the site of regular conferences 
bringing academics and policy makers together on a range of subjects—regional 
economic development, cultural and linguistic diversity and linguistic rights, media 
representations of the southeast, entrepreneurship and banking, forced migration, the 
formation of the Mesopotamian Social Forum, and a trade fair focused on boosting 
commercial relations with nearby northern Iraq— I attended as many of these 
conferences as I could. 
CHAPTERS 
 The first chapter, “Displacement as Dispossession,” provides an overview of 
existing studies and reports—most of them surveys published in Turkish, largely of a 
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quantitative bent—on the socioeconomic consequences of forced migration in 
Diyarbakır.  Prefacing that overview is a section that returns to the political-economic 
sketch of the city initiated above and pushes it further, exploring in more depth the 
categories of wealth and work in the country and the city that constituted the backdrop 
for the transformation of livelihoods in the early 1990s.  At an empirical level, this 
chapter is meant to illustrate the specific, practical means by which, as the title suggests, 
forced migration and forced urbanization also involved dispossession and 
impoverishment, and to provide the reader with a more general sense of the nature and 
scope of dispossessed livelihoods.  I also begin to weave into this material this 
dissertation’s overarching theoretical interest in the politics of dissensus, which I do by 
suggesting, in the place of Agamben’s notion of bare life (1998), the cultural historian of 
labor Michael Denning’s concept of wageless life, and by relating this term to the 
overarching theoretical framework of stance and litigious speech. 
 Chapter two, “Dispossession’s Ethnography”, is thematically closely linked to the 
first. It aims to complement the quantitative surveys with selections from fieldwork, 
namely, oral accounts of forced migration and transformed livelihoods; in it, individuals 
and families (all of whom were adults or young adults in the 1990s) recount the means by 
which their ties to the countryside were severed and by which they have attempted to 
reconstruct life and livelihood in the city.  It is here that we begin to work through 
grounded discourses on livelihood, and to tie them more closely to concepts of stance and 
dissensus.  Comparing the first and second chapters also provides an occasion to consider 
some of the differences in written and oral accounts of events. 
 The third chapter, “Tomatoes This Big: Rural Idyll After Dispossession”, sustains 
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the previous chapter’s ethnographic focus on older migrants and the forms of loss of 
livelihood and ways of life that they experienced.  Here, I focus on the ways in which 
indexical signs of food and land are used by forced migrants not only to present an 
idealized, nostalgic construction of life in the countryside, but to evaluate and to 
condemn displacement and dispossession and their urban consequences as deeply 
immoral acts.  I try to understand how common rural objects and images are 
commandeered into a rhetorical politics of displacement and dispossession, in an effort to 
give more ethnographic depth to the overarching claim of this work that talk about 
livelihoods and economic life is involved in the practical staking out of political stance. 
 Chapters four and five share an ethnographic subject.  Whereas chapters two and 
three are based on fieldwork with relatively older forced migrants, these chapters shift to 
the ‘sons of migration’—that is, children who grew up, as one report on the aftermath of 
forced migration notes, “listening to stories of the village and of migration from their 
elders” and living “suspended between the neighborhood schools they attended, their 
struggles on the streets of Diyarbakır to see to their family’s livelihoods, and the cotton 
fields and hazelnut groves where they went with their families to work” (Kalkınma 
Merkezi 2006:3).  I follow the concern with discourses of livelihoods and the practical 
genesis of political stance by exploring the daily lives and acts of evaluation of a number 
of young men who came of working age in Diyarbakır, but focus specifically on a phrase 
a number of my interlocutors used, which was ‘working futures’—a term that 
encompasses both practical trajectories (establishing a viable livelihood, a working 
future) and the practices of meaning whereby they imagine and envision the forms of 
working life that lie ahead of them.  These chapters also sustain an implicit theoretical 
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thread running through this study: temporality.  If the previous chapters’ subjects were 
generally retrospective in their everyday temporal-imaginative orientation, these 
chapters’ subjects tended to be forward-looking and preoccupied with the future.  
Focusing ethnographically on the efforts of a few young men to establish a viable 
working life in a city marked by high rates of joblessness and deep structural problems in 
its educational system, I explore the ways in which they conceptualize and narrate, 
through their future-oriented work worries, basic questions of political and economic 
justice and belonging.  
  The hope is that in working through the details of these chapters—encounters, 
interviews, images—the reader will have a better sense of how the widespread public 
interrogation of the state of affairs of contemporary economic life in Diyarbakır (the 
legitimacy of the displaced’s uprooting in the first place, the justice of the working 
conditions they are subsequently compelled to enter into, and the debts and obligations of 
the state, fiscal or otherwise, to its citizens in the wake of injuries to livelihoods) might be 
seen to constitute an important mode of political stance-taking at this historical 
conjuncture.  I will return to this argument more explicitly in the conclusion.  Meanwhile, 
we turn to the details of the politics of displacement and dispossession. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DISPLACEMENT AS DISPOSSESSION 
  
 The main aim of this and the subsequent chapter is to provide context for 
understanding Diyarbakır’s radical transformation by displacement and dispossession in 
the early 1990s.  While in the next chapter I pursue this aim by focusing on narratives of 
the displaced, here I draw on a number of published reports dedicated to recording the 
social and economic consequences of forced migration in Diyarbakır.   
 Read together, these reports provide a documentary overview of forced 
migration’s means and aftermath.  But documentation is not the sole aim of the chapter.  I 
also raise here a number of theoretical questions having to do with the concept of bare 
life, as developed in the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998).   The picture that emerges 
across this chapter is one of a deliberate state counterinsurgency project resulting, 
whether intentionally or not, in widespread forms of urban impoverishment and (at first 
literal, later more figurative) homelessness, followed by years of the state turning a blind 
eye to these results.  In light of its practical consequences, does it not make sense to think 
of forced migration—envisioned by policy-makers as a means of first eliminating the 
PKK’s rural support network and then concentrating people into ostensibly more easily 
policed population centers (see Jongerden 2007:43-91)—as an instance of subjecting ex-
rural Kurds to a condition of barely living?   
 Agamben’s well-known concept of bare life argues that modern forms of power 
unite what Foucault (1978, 2010) had suggested were distinct: sovereignty, or the right to 
decide who lives and dies, with biopolitics, or “power as the administration of life”.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The last phrase is from an interview with Jacques Ranciere (2010) on his critical approach to the 
analytic utility of biopolitics. 
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This approach provides a critical framework for analyzing instances in which states 
exercise the sovereign power to decide when to withhold legal norms and produce entire 
populations kept barely alive—not marginalized, Agamben notes (as marginalization 
suggests something beyond or outside), but included within the space of state power 
precisely so as to be excluded from or stripped of political life and legal recourse, or what 
Agamben refers to, throughout his work, as “inclusive exclusion”.  Thinking through this 
framework, is it then fair to say that the violence the state committed in real physical 
terms is now perpetuated through turning, for the most part, a blind eye to the span and 
severity of existing poverty, while once in a while blinking and imposing the rule of law?  
In other words, are we seeing here the war against Kurdish political dissensus being 
carried out by other (namely, economic) terms, reducing people’s lives to the struggle to 
stay barely alive?  Might this explain why people keep talking about their loss and lack of 
livelihood in thinly veiled political terms?   
 Holding in abeyance a lengthier explication, the short answer is, no—or at least, 
not quite.  It seems important to keep in mind an image at the heart of Agamben’s work: 
the camp.  Part of Agamben’s project is a response to a Habermasian notion of politics as 
deliberation in the public sphere, with Agamben essentially noting that people in refugee 
or concentration camps are quite literally precluded from even entering that sphere; they 
cannot, as it were, even come to the table.  Yet in Diyarbakır, we find a rather different 
situation.  Whereas it is true that in some cases, as with the first man we shall meet in 
chapter two, that the forms of physical and temporal exhaustion brought about by 
dispossession and urban inclusive exclusion might be said to have worn lives down to a 
condition of barely living, in the majority of my fieldwork encounters, it was deep and 
	   32	  	  
vibrant political critique, even in the face of—or perhaps precisely because of—these 
conditions that marked the political lives of my interlocutors.  This is not a case of the 
stripping of all that makes us political, a reduction of human life to its barest biological 
conditions.  We begin, then, to see the limits of applying the concept of bare life too 
broadly (Comaroff 2007).   
 I will return to this point below, where, across this and the following chapters, I 
trace these questions across different ethnographic contexts in order to explore the 
potential analytical yields and limits of this way of thinking about politics in the 
aftermath of displacement and dispossession.  First, however, we need a more general 
background or context for understanding the mass transformation of lives and livelihoods 
in the 1990s.  This background comes in two sections.  The first is an expansion of the 
brief historical and political-economic sketch of the city provided in the introduction.  
The second is an overview of the available documentary evidence about displacement 
and dispossession in the 1990s.  After these sections, I return to the question of bare life 
and its conceptual limits, by way of transition to the next chapter. 
 
 “VILLAGERS WITHOUT VILLAGES, VILLAGES WITHOUT VILLAGERS”14 
 In order to appreciate something of the processes of the loss and lack of 
livelihoods, it helps to have a sense of the general features of village economies in the 
environs of Diyarbakır.  Prior to forced migration, what were the main forms of work, 
property, and wealth?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The phrase is from an interview with a Suriçi shopkeeper with a penchant for summing up his 
explanations of Diyarbakır’s contemporary socio-economic and political life through phrases that often 
brought to mind yellow journalism headlines.  Another favorite line of his was, “Three things are important 
in Diyarbakır today: economy, economy, and economy”. 
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 Southeastern Turkey’s rural economy depends almost entirely on farming and 
animal pastoralism.  Irrigation is not widespread in the countryside, such that most 
farmers rely on rainfall or, if they happen to live close to a stream or a river, natural 
irrigation.  Significant land inequalities are another important feature of rural livelihoods 
in the southeast, with powerful landlords or aghas, typically connected to tribes with 
historical links to the state—a pattern preceding Turkish rule, and rooted in Ottoman 
policies of local liaising (see Bruinessen 1988)—holding large plots and, before the 
mechanization of agriculture in the last half century, holding landless peasants in 
essentially serf-like work relationships.  A news piece in Le Monde from the late 1970s 
describes one such arrangement between landless tenant laborers and a large landowner, 
who  
would visit occasionally to reaffirm his authority and assign work.  This consisted 
mainly of labor on the cotton plantation of the Mesopotamian plain two hundred 
metres below.  All except the very old or very young would descend to the plain 
daily, to work an eleven-hour day.  For this the rates of pay were $1 for a child, 
$1.50, and $2 for a man.  Villagers reckoned they had a 30 percent mortality rate 
among the children. [McDowall 1996:419] 
Land reforms have occasionally been the subject of political debate in Turkey, but these 
have tended to favor the interests of landowners, as in Turkey’s 1926 implementation of 
the Swiss Civil Code, which codified landowners’ claims (Aydın 1986:32) or in 
subsequent reforms.  Aydın notes, in his monograph on two villages just outside of 
Diyarbakır, “land reform has been a protracted story of the Turkish Republic from its 
inception.  The existence of a strong landlord class in Turkey and their effective role in 
Turkish politics has not allowed the implementation of any extensive land reform 
programme” (1986:62; Aktan 1971).  Rates of inequality in landownership in the 
southeast have been historically quite high. Aydın’s own fieldwork found that 25 percent 
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of the people included in his two-village sample were landless, while the vast majority of 
families farmed plots to sustain a household, contrasted with a small number of landlords 
owning vast plots that made them quite wealthy (1986:117). 
 Generally speaking, landholding patterns can be mapped onto the two main 
geographies of rural settlement in the southeast: mountains and plains.  Mountainous 
settlements—villages, but more often hamlets; settlement in rural southeastern Turkey is 
quite dispersed (Jongerden 2007)—tend to have smaller plots and rely on a mixture of 
practices: small-scale market production in a few commodity crops such as wheat or 
(until recently) tobacco, subsistence farming of vegetables and fruits, and animals (with 
sheep and goats more common than cows).   Plains tend to feature far larger plots and 
more frequency of large landholdings devoted to large-scale commodity crop production, 
particularly in cereals (Bruinessen 1988:15-20).  On the matter of the degree of formality 
of property patterns, plains landowners, historically well connected to the state (and with 
significant interests, of course, in securing their assets), usually hold formal property 
documents.  Mountain farmers usually do not.  Furthermore, it is conventional for fathers 
to subdivide their land among their sons, an act of bequeathing that often goes 
unregistered—which, incidentally, is one of a number of aspects complicating the legal 
processes of compensation for war-related losses (see elsewhere in this study for more 
details about the so-called Compensation Law No. 5233). 
 Although the subject of merchants or traders in the countryside is, to my 
knowledge, minimally covered in the limited micrological literature, in both Turkish and 
English, on rural southeastern Turkey, what evidence I am aware of makes it clear that, 
by and large, farming is, and has been, the widest category of work across rural 
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southeastern Turkey.  That said, in addition to the categories of work listed above—rural 
landlords, agricultural small holders, and landless tenant farmers—large landowners 
sometimes invest their yields in other ventures: lending money on interest to landless or 
land-poor farmers, purchasing a transit vehicle to ferry villagers back and forth to nearby 
towns or cities, or opening a small store.  Some villages thus come to contain certain 
aspects of town economies, if on a smaller scale.   
 Because of the geography of the PKK’s guerrilla tactics, which favored the terrain 
of the mountains as conduit and shelter, forced migration policies touched down most 
acutely in those spaces.  And because most mountainous areas tend to feature more 
dispersed, small hamlets than villages or towns, forced migrants consequently 
overwhelmingly hail from rural economies of small-scale farming and shepherding.  
 Hamlets nevertheless have their own internal differentiations.  Those with land 
closer to a water source could naturally farm more.  Two older men whose house I visited 
on the outskirts of Diyarbakır, recalling their life of farming on a mountainous plot 
between two streams in a hamlet outside of the town of Kulp, frequently referred to 
themselves throughout our exchange as rich.15  Another middle-aged man I interviewed 
boasted of his large landholding and his status in the hamlet, noting that he was able to 
afford rare clothing and build his own stables (subsequently burned by the military) to 
enlarge his cattle holding.   
 Such distinctions aside, though, trade or other, non-agricultural categories of work 
were located mostly in villages and towns, not hamlets.  Many of the older forced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Contrasting those days to their present conditions, which the older of the brothers summarized by 
calling our attention to the tarp he used to patch the holes in his roof, both men wept and cursed the state 
for inflicting what they insisted was unjust injury. 
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migrants I met hinted at this fact when they described coming to towns or cities only 
rarely, in transit vehicles, to stock up on essentials such as flour and cooking oil.  Another 
indication of the absence of merchants and traders in mountainous geographies is found 
in the strategies employed by the PKK in the 1990s to feed its troops.  The fact that  
“there were no shops in these small settlements [meant that] it was impossible just to 
show up and order from—or raid—the local market”, notes Aliza Marcus (1970: 184-5), 
which compelled PKK tacticians to devise elaborate cross-country networks for trucking 
food into the countryside. My sense, drawn from the encounters and interviews informing 
this work, is that what differentiation might have existed across farmers in a hamlet or 
village—the difference in landholding between a small and a medium farmer—had 
limited bearing on their subsequent economic trajectories.   
 This general picture of “traditional” rural economic practices and arrangements in 
the southeast may, however, suggest more stability in the countryside than actually 
existed.  As we noted in the last chapter, the twentieth century history of country and city 
in the southeast was one of a string of radical political and economic transformations.  
One factor has been the normalization of migrant labor relations and rural-urban 
migration since World War II.  These demographic and economic forces were spurred on 
here, as elsewhere in Turkey, by the mechanization of agriculture, which rendered the 
labor of countless thousands of landless tenant farmers redundant.  Thus in Diyarbakır, in 
1950, the city’s population, by official counts, was just over 40,000, but over the next 
decade and a half, it grew by approximately 20,000 people every five years.  The post-
World War II period was one of steady urbanization as a clear result of rural 
dispossession by agro-technological change. 
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Table 1: Diyarbakır Population, 1945-1960, created by the author based on TÜIK data. 
 
Many newcomers sought work in the city’s existing markets, as Diyarbakır was then, as it 
is now, a small-scale commercial center for its surrounding provinces, by virtue of its 
size, location, and transportation links.  I met a number of small shopkeepers and 
merchants in carrying out this research whose families had come to the city at this time. 
 We have already seen, with Keyder (1987), that the social upheavals tied to rural-
urban migration, coupled with the perceived geographical inequities in the distribution of 
development capital, led, across the 1960 and 1970s, to a wider perception of economic 
inequality across Turkey.  We also noted the emergence, out of a process of infighting 
among Kurdish nationalist groups at the time (Marcus 2007: 40-42), of the separatist 
Workers Party of Kurdistan, the PKK, which grew in part out of this period of the 
widespread politicizing of economic inequity.   
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 A detailed examination of the PKK’s formation and trajectory is beyond the aims 
of this study.  A thumbnail sketch of their emergence and subsequent acts and aims, 
however, is critical to this chapter, as it helps us to understand the specific context behind 
rural forced migration and dispossession.  After its formal inception in a village outside 
of Diyarbakır in 1978, by the late 1980s the PKK had achieved a degree of power and 
popular support that few observers had foreseen (Marcus 2007: 89-130).  In line with the 
PKK’s tactical emphasis on what Joost Jongerden termed “poly-centricity…and multi-
directionality” (2007: 50)—small groups of guerrillas favored mobility and geographical 
unpredictability; there was no central unit but many semi-independent organs, and no 
single, stable base or front line—the rural-based insurgency moved across the southeast’s 
rugged mountain geographies and worked to build a network of peasant support so as to 
move, in Mao’s well-known phrase, like fish in water (2009:41).  This and similar tactics 
helped the ‘people’s army’ to transform its disadvantages into advantages, and to do the 
converse for Turkish armed forces.   
 By the early 1990s, however, the Turkish army began to change its strategies and 
to incorporate more recent strategies of military counterinsurgency techniques.  In its 
revised approach to eliminating a political movement that it framed as ‘terrorist’16 and a 
threat to national integrity, the military sought to root out the networks of rural support 
that in part allowed the PKK its tactical advantage, and to spatially concentrate 
populations in cities—what Jongerden refers to as a technique of “spatial deprivation”:  
[The PKK’s] dependence on [rural] space is also a guerilla’s weak point, and 
spatial deprivation the Achilles heel. The ‘field domination doctrine’ announced 
by the General Staff in 1991 and systematically implemented from 1993 onwards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a wry satire of the application of the term terrorism in contemporary Turkish politics, see 
Buğlalılar (2011). 
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changed the situation dramatically. The objective of the new doctrine was the 
destruction of the PKK environment, both by contraction (resettlement of the 
population) and penetration (deployment of special forces, applying the principles 
of a war of movement, and penetrating the spaces of the PKK, as well as drafting 
the civilian populations in PKK areas into the village guard system). At a tactical 
level, the resettlement and drafting policies both denied the guerrilla food, shelter, 
intelligence and recruits, and created kill-zones in the countryside. At a strategic 
level, the army engineered a new settlement pattern by accelerating rural to-urban 
migration (under duress, by threat and intimidation and by burning houses and 
destroying villages), thereby forcing the guerrilla to choose between retreat or 
engagement in a confrontation with the state in urban entities (a tough 
environment for insurgents, but favorable for the state). [Jongerden 2007:91] 
 
This dense quote refers to a number of means of displacement and dispossession, and in 
order to better understand how they impacted the history of the destabilization of rural 
lives and livelihoods around Diyarbakır, we should pause briefly to consider each.  
As we noted earlier, food supplies were a constant tactical challenge for 
guerrillas.  Thus part of the military’s strategy involved setting quotas on households, 
limiting the quantities of basic foodstuffs they could buy and store.  Being found with 
what was deemed too much food could, as some of my interlocutors recalled, raise the 
suspicions of the armed forces that one was providing support to the guerrillas, and result 
in being blacklisted and subjected to frequent and unpleasant house searches by state 
armed forces.  
Alongside food rationing were restrictions on rural mobility.  The aim of 
restricting rural mobility was to prevent contact between villagers and guerrillas.  What 
this often entailed in practice, however, was a restriction on animal husbandry, as 
shepherds relied on access to common mountain pastures (mera) to graze their flocks.  
Many of my interlocutors had memories of getting into heated discussions with soldiers 
who insisted that these restrictions were for the safety of the villagers; some, as we shall 
see in the following chapters, recalled firefights in so-called kill zones that took the lives 
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of women and men taking sheep or cows to pasture or women collecting firewood.  These 
restrictions were the first in a series of devastating blows to animal husbandry, an 
important component in regional rural livelihoods.  A curious bind: the price of violating 
these bans could be fatal, but the price of heeding the ban, while certainly less harsh, 
could be devastating for rural household economies dependent on animal husbandry.   
Because the processes of destroying and evacuating villages were so devastating, 
one can take no pleasure from the irony that the guerrilla praxis of blending with civilians 
in the name of their liberation led to countless peasant household catastrophes, after the 
military took a similar tack—that is, blurring the distinction between combatant and 
civilian in the counterinsurgency methods it adopted.  One such method was the attempt 
to forge a paramilitary force, the so-called village guard system—colloquially, korucu—
out of rural Kurdish society.  While playing, in some cases, on existing social divisions 
along tribal lines, the system was also spread by threat.   Villages were given the option 
of either accepting collaboration with the military, as armed units that agreed to inform 
on and resist with arms any PKK presence in their locality, or facing military forced 
evacuation and the destruction of homes and means of livelihood.  It is difficult to speak 
generally about what induced people to participate in the village guard system. In many 
instances, the military recruited tribes with historical allegiances, or smuggler tribes who 
knew the mountains and borders well (Bruinessen 2002).  Payments may have enticed 
desperately poor rural households, along with the guarantee of not being displaced.  In 
the passage below, the Kurdish journalist and political activist Musa Anter, slain in 
Diyarbakır in 1992 under suspicious circumstances, recounts an encounter with a village 
guard whose trajectory suggests the latter incentive.  Prefacing the story is a short 
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anecdote.  Anter was in a teahouse where a few young men were playing cards, and one 
accused another of cheating.  The accused countered not by the formulaic phrase kurban 
olayım (a phrase quite specific to the southeast, and meaning ‘please’, or ‘for God’s 
sake’, or literally, ‘may I be a sacrificial victim’), but with a fascinating variation: korucu 
olayım.  Anter goes on to say: 
Ninety percent [?] do this ugly work out of poverty.  A few days ago, someone 
said to me, crying, “Uncle, of course we know that this work is dirty.  But what 
are you going to do?  Seven children are looking to my hand [depend on me].  I 
have neither skills nor credit, neither capital nor goods nor property.  In the past I 
was engaged in smuggling [across the Turkish-Syrian border near Nusaybin], 
passing among the mines. For the subsistence of my children, I was, at every 
moment, nose to nose with death.  But still you couldn’t call what I did 
dishonorable, and still everyone had mercy on us and showed us respect.  But now 
this cursed village guard work removed us from humanity…Believe me, [if you 
die as a korucu] in the whole village you can’t find a single man to dig your 
grave.  Even your closest relatives won’t come to pay condolences…Believe me, 
uncle Musa, when I take that dirty payment it’s like putting a blind snake in my 
pocket.  I know it’s not right, but what can I do, my wife and kids are hungry.  
The other day I said, get up, damn it, and shoot them all, then shoot yourself, and 
be saved from this disgrace, but I couldn’t bear to do it to the children.  At first we 
thought this work was like being a watchman.  All right, no harm in that, we said. 
There have always been watchmen [a historical state-created position in such 
border spaces] and no one resented them. But it seems ours is another kind of 
watchman’s work.  Truly, we’re disgraced.  May Allah save us. [Anter 1996: 95] 
The village guard system played a small part in chipping away at the PKK’s rural 
support.  But the paramilitarization of the countryside was apparently not enough. An 
older man who watched his large holding of nut trees and vineyards burn, along with his 
house, in the emptying of many villages outside of the mountainous provincial town of 
Lice explained to me his take on the evolution of counterinsurgency strategies: “Well, so 
what happened?  So the government officials said, let’s try village guards.  But they 
looked and saw it wasn’t working.  So they said, let’s dry up the PKK’s tap…let’s empty 
the villages, because the ones in the mountains [dağdakiler, a common epithet for the 
PKK] go and get their food and drink from nearby villages.”  Peaking between roughly 
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1991 and 1994, the military undertook a deliberate strategy of evacuating and destroying 
thousands of rural settlements suspected of or proven to have some combination of the 
following characteristics: to be along PKK mountain routes, to be providing material 
support, intelligence, shelter, or recruits to the PKK, or to have resisted military pressure 
to become village guards.  Alongside the destruction of homes was a practice that Dutch 
researchers who brought together sociohistorical analysis and satellite imagery data of 
burnt or destroyed forests and settlements have described as environmental destruction as 
a counterinsurgency strategy (Jongerden et al. 2008).  Burned forests, burned fruit and 
nut tree groves and vineyards, destroyed stables, and trampled fields and gardens: when 
added to limited access to mountain pastures, dwindling returns and increased rural asset 
loss and indebtedness, as local markets suffered the many effects of conflict, and of 
course the most blatant event, the forced evacuation of large swaths of the countryside: 
all added up to the most significant demographic change to upper Mesopotamia since 
World War I.  
 Thousands of rural settlements now stand empty or in ruins in the countryside: 
“villages without villagers”.  Many of my interlocutors described the uncanny experience 
of returning, years after forced migration, to the village in which they grew up and 
formed memories connected to daily activities, only to find, as one middle-aged man put 
it to me, a landscape “flat, as if the middle of nowhere, as if no one had lived there for a 
thousand years”.  Meanwhile, the displaced were almost entirely left to their own devices, 
to go wherever practical details of family ties, money, or simple proximity allowed. In 
part, this dispersed Kurds across Turkey.  Istanbul, as commentators in the media and in 
academic writing frequently point out, is now the largest Kurdish city in Turkey, due in 
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part to the effects of forced migration in the 1990s.17  Around the same time, Kurdish 
migrant neighborhoods also sprang up in İzmir, Ankara, Bursa, Adana, and Mersin.   
 Many of the displaced also remained in the southeast, and set about their efforts to 
rebuild life and livelihood in cities like Diyarbakır, Batman, Van, and Hakkâri.  While all 
these cities were radically transformed, many analysts (e.g. TMMOB 1998) have 
identified Diyarbakır as something of a capital of displacement in the southeast. 
 As anyone familiar with the difficulties of reaching trustworthy statistics for 
situations of political conflict might guess, even the most basic figures regarding the 
period are deeply contested.   While the total number of rural settlements evacuated is 
more or less agreed to be around 3,000, estimates of the total number of rural residents 
uprooted vary greatly.  A chart included in a recent report by a pro-Kurdish forced 
migrants rights NGO18 nicely summarizes the murk:
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a passing mention of this common remark, see Kerem Öktem (2009) on unsanctioned forms of 
difference in Istanbul. 
18See also IDMC 2009 for a helpful summary of the available figures. 
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Table 2: adapted by the author from Diyarbakır GÖÇ-DER (2009) 
INSTITUTION ESTIMATE 
Investigative Commission of Turkish Parliament (1997) 378,335 
US Committee for Refugees 400,000 – 1,000,000 
Human Rights Watch 2,000,000 
GÖÇ-DER 3,500,000-4,000,000 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 3,000,000 
Union of Chamber of Turkish Architects and Engineers 3,000,000 
Office of the US Presidency At most 1,000,000 
UNHCR 2,000,000 
Joint statement by group of NGOs & parties in Turkey (İHD, TİHV, 
TMMOB, GÖÇ-DER, ÖDP, HADEP) 
More than 3,000,000 
UN Helsinki Commission More than 3,000,000 
Minority Human Rights Group International 3,000,000 
Hacettepe University (Ankara) Institute of Population Studies (state-
commissioned study)  
950,000-1,200,000 
 
From 400,000 to 4 million is a significant discrepancy.  Part of this has to do with how 
one calculates the ‘forced’ in forced migration.  Is a shepherding village that, while not 
directly evacuated, saw its main source of livelihood dry up due to restricted access to 
mountain pastures to be counted?  Or do we count only those villages that were 
evacuated by direct military force?  What about all those who fled out of fear of violence 
and rumors of impending conflict or paramilitarization?  Ultimately whether one takes 
the state’s most recent estimate of around 1 million or the high-end figure of 4 million, it 
is clear that great numbers of rural Kurds were uprooted in the 1990s.   In the case of 
Diyarbakır, within a few short, violent years, a city already relatively marginal to the 
geographies of wealth in Turkey, and suffering atop that from capital flight during the 
conflict—as well as from a string of economic blows around the same period unrelated to 
Kurdish dissensus in the southeast (UN sanctions restricting trade with nearby Iraq, 
Turkey’s national fiscal crises around 2001)—suddenly became home to tens of 
thousands of households rendered abruptly and radically dependent on wages, yet in the 
absence of sufficient wage labor to be had.  
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 The aim of this section was to expand our sense of the political economy of 
country and city in the southeast, and to provide a general sketch of forced migration.  To 
better understand the aftermath of forced migration, however, let us turn to a number of 
reports and studies on the consequences of displacement and dispossession in Diyarbakır.  
 
SURVEYING THE AFTERMATH 
  One of the more comprehensive and careful studies of the aftermath of 
displacement and dispossession in Diyarbakır comes from the Union of Chambers of 
Turkish Engineers and Architects, or TMMOB, a left-leaning civil society organization.  
Their 1998 Bölgeiçi Zorunlu Göçten Kaynaklanan Toplumsal Sorunların Diyarbakır 
Kenti Ölçeğinde Araştırılması provides a rough estimate of the total number of rural 
Kurds who came to the city across the peak years of forced migration.  Between 1990 and 
1996, they estimate that Diyarbakır took in just over 120,000 people and grew by 116 
percent (TMMOB 1998: 20-26).  Today, with an official population of just under 
900,000, this means that the city has grown by roughly 220 percent in approximately two 
decades.  Spatially, too, the city has expanded dramatically in recent years.  A majority of 
Diyarbakır’s structures were erected after the 1990s, and today the city continues to 
extend to the northwest.  There are new construction spaces every time I visit the city, 
and more than a few of the young men I interviewed or met in the process of this research 
have found temporary work on these construction sites, this being one of the few sectors 
in the city with job openings, even if they are mostly off-the-books and unpredictable.  In 
short, the rapid spatial growth of the city, consonant with its rapid population growth, has 
dramatically expanded the borders of the city throughout the past two decades. 
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 The TMMOB report totals up to a rather bleak picture of the city’s economy as it 
stood in the late 1990s.  Those few industries that did not flee the violent environment 
were working well under capacity.  Local agriculture and animal husbandry were greatly 
under-producing, city unemployment rates were at a staggering 70 percent, and 58 
percent of those working relied on day labor or other forms of work in the city’s thriving 
off-the-books economy (TMMOB 1998: 132-134, 143-144).  With a per capita average 
monthly income of 283 dollars, 87 percent of the city was living under the poverty level.  
Nearly 90 percent of forced migrants were found to identify unemployment as the most 
important challenge facing the city.  The report is full of such grim prediction as this:   
Of those who migrated from rural sites to Diyarbakır, 85.76 percent maintain no 
ties to the possessions left behind [in the countryside].  The effect of this situation 
on the urban economy is that, in the coming years, the city will experience more 
bluntly its deprivation from the countryside, and will be further impoverished. 
[TMMOB 1998:144] 
 
How have these predictions fared in time? 
Approximately a decade later, another report, this one researched and written 
under the aegis of the UN’s Local Agenda 21 and the Diyarbakır-based poverty-relief 
NGO Sarmaşık, confirmed the trajectory sketched out in the TMMOB report.  (Sarmaşık 
has explicit sympathies with the wider aims of the contemporary political struggle for 
expanded political, linguistic, and cultural expression for Kurds in Turkey.)   Sarmaşık 
employees described to me their aims in preparing the report as essentially empirical; the 
organization aimed to create relief or assistance programs for forced migrants, and felt a 
need to have solid quantitative data about the socioeconomic situation of the city’s 
displaced newcomers.  There is also an undeniable political element to the report.  It 
documents the nature and extent of state injuries against rural Kurdish villagers, and does 
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not hesitate to blame the state for the current undesirable livelihood conditions of forced 
migrations dispossessed of a means of livelihood and largely abandoned—or inclusively 
excluded, in Agamben’s framework—to the precarious margins of Diyarbakır’s and 
Turkey’s disinherited labor economies. In the report, Sarmaşık confirmed many of 
TMMOB’s fears.19  Through surveys and interviews carried out in 5,700 displaced 
households spread across five neighborhoods, researchers found a minority of households 
getting by on regular wage labor (around 20 percent).  Another 20 percent identified as 
unemployed, while an additional 40 percent reported relying solely on temporary, 
seasonal, or day labor to get by.  Eighty percent of displaced households surveyed, in 
other words, live in a situation of livelihood precariousness. 
The report states often and unequivocally that contemporary urban poverty is the 
outcome of forced migration and its dispossessing effects.  It further notes that of those 
surveyed who had left their villages (and not all were forced migrants from the 1990s; a 
small percentage of those included in the survey universe had come a generation or more 
ago), a little over 50 percent cited conflict as the primary cause, while another 23 percent 
cited economic factors.  Yet this latter figure, the report authors suggest, should not be 
interpreted in the conventional sense of economic migration (people leaving the country 
for the city for reasons of job opportunities): “more than coming to the city for its 
economic draw or opportunities for employment, people were fleeing a rural economy 
severely impaired by practices widely implemented during [OHAL, the period of martial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Having spent some time with Sarmaşık members (they were kind enough to let me visit their office 
frequently, a favor I tried to repay by translating documents into English for them), it is my sense that the 
report was carefully designed and methodologically quite sound.  One can always question the 
generalizability of its findings, but this only underscores the obvious point that statistics should be handled 
with care.  Given the problem of sound statistics in this context (or anywhere, for that matter), my approach 
here has been to draw from multiple reports, in the hope that across their differences a general sense of the 
period in question may emergence. 
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law in effect across the southeast for most of the 1990s], including bans on the use of 
pastures and stables, a food embargo, and the curtailing of travel and mobility” (Sarmaşık 
2009: 23).  The survey also contains a quantitative illustration of a matter at the heart of 
this and the following chapter: the means by which forced displacement also entailed 
dispossession.  The households in question reported the following losses: loss of 
agricultural products, 24 percent; loss of home, 35 percent; loss of fields, 24 percent; loss 
of home furniture, 27 percent; loss of animals, 22 percent; loss of work, 21 percent; loss 
of life, 8 percent.  While over 90 percent of households included in the survey reported 
making a living before migration from agriculture and animal husbandry, after the 1990s 
“most found themselves, in the urban economy, reclassified as temporary or ‘unskilled’ 
laborers…[and] with the instability that accompanies displacement, most of the displaced 
were excluded from urban labor markets” (Sarmaşık 2009: 24).  Further compounding 
this process were broader economic changes alluded to earlier:  
The atmosphere of conflict over the last twenty years has caused public and 
private sector investments to come to a halt, and brought about a serious 
contraction in employment and economic development. Investors are aware of the 
region’s clear potential, yet remain unwilling and hesitant due to regional political 
instability. Opportunities in Diyarbakır for employment, which were already 
insufficient, fell even farther below necessary levels with the rapid increase in the 
city’s population. This consequently boosted both unemployment and the 
informal sector. [Sarmaşık 2009: 4] 
 
The report goes on to state that by the World Food Organization’s standards of poverty, 
based on household incomes, in Diyarbakır over 80 percent of the households surveyed 
lived below the poverty line.  When further asked to compare economic conditions before 
and after migration, about a quarter responded “worse”; 40 percent responded “much 
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worse”.  The overall picture emerges, then, of not so much poverty but impoverishment20, 
not a static condition but a process, a condition created by human hands, whereby 
hundreds of thousands of people who, although many were landless and, by most 
standards, poor in the countryside—between 30 and 40 percent of the rural population of 
southeastern Turkey is estimated to be landless (TMMOB Diyarbakır İl Koordinasyon 
Kurulu 2009)—became unquestionably worse-off through dispossession and forced 
urbanization, and by the forms of wage dependency in the absence of sufficient wage 
labor that this brought.   
 Let me pause our exploration of these reports to explain a phrase in the last 
sentence, as it is an important part of this empirical context of dispossession, which 
would seem (at this historical point, at least, and in this city) to differ from the familiar 
Marxist picture of dispossession as the production of a class of “free” laborers to be 
exploited by capitalist industry.  The cultural historian of labor Michael Denning, in a 
recent theoretical piece on the concept of what he terms “wageless life”, calls for a 
conceptual decoupling on the following point: “We must insist that ‘proletarian’ is not a 
synonym for ‘wage labourer’ but for dispossession, expropriation and radical dependence 
on the market. You don’t need a job to be a proletarian: wageless life, not wage labour, is 
the starting point in understanding the free market” (2010: 81).  Wageless life is 
Denning’s attempt to theorize a condition that shares certain broad features—yet through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Terminology is important for organizations like Sarmaşık.  As I noted in a brief piece written in the 
middle of fieldwork (Day 2008), many local governmental and non-governmental organizations are 
emphatic in describing the present urban economic life of Diyarbakır not through the abstract noun 
yoksulluk (yoksul means poor, and is rooted in the negative existential participle yok plus –luk, an abstract-
noun forming ending similar to the English –ness) but through the verbal noun, yoksullaştırma (yoksul plus 
the somewhat clunky but effective modern Turkish ending -laştırma, which, broken down, is, loosely, 
yoksullaş (to become poor), yoksullaştır (to cause to become poor), yoksullaştırma (the condition of 
causing to become poor).  The difference in these terms corresponds to the English difference between 
poverty and impoverishment.  Questions of causality and process versus abstraction and stasis suffuse 
debates in contemporary southeastern Turkey on the aftermath of displacement. 
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a distinctly political-economy framework—with Agamben’s notion of bare life.  
However, there are important differences, to which I will turn in the conclusion of this 
chapter.  Here, it is sufficient to note that when I refer to the condition of wage 
dependency in describing the results of dispossession, this does not necessarily mean that 
the people in question are actually taking in regular or adequate wages. 
Returning to the reports, a similar picture to Sarmaşık’s emerges from other 
existing studies.  A neighborhood survey commissioned by the city government as it was 
rethinking so-called urban renewal21 strategies in Diyarbakır’s old walled city center, and 
carried out by a national (that is, not locally based, as are the other studies profiled here) 
research company, focused on 462 households in the old city center, which with its many 
abandoned houses and low-cost rents, took in a large proportion of the displaced in the 
early 1990s.  The survey found that 24 percent of ‘heads of household’—typically older 
males taken, by most such household surveys, as the basis for the generation of 
household statistics—reported being unemployed.  An additional 25 percent worked as 
temporary uninsured workers (porters, shoe-shiners, seasonal or day laborers in 
agriculture and construction, house cleaners, etc.), while another 10 percent worked as 
street vendors or hawkers and eight percent more as unregistered shopkeepers. In other 
words, totaling these figures, we see that nearly two thirds of households surveyed make 
a living in off-the-books sectors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 There is reason to recall James Baldwin’s famous quip, voiced in reference to so-called urban 
renewal schemes in the 1960s and 1970s in American cities: urban renewal means negro removal.  The 
same general process he meant to call attention to—urban renewal schemes overwhelmingly targeting the 
powerless—is regrettably at work in Diyarbakır’s ongoing processes of renewal—a subject urgently in 
need of ethnographic treatment—which are again displacing thousands of already displaced and 
dispossessed Kurdish urban newcomers. 
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The report goes on to note that just over half of the surveyed households earned 
less than 5,000 lira per year, placing them below then national minimum wage levels of 
416 lira per month, while one third earned between 6,000 and 10,000 lira, or roughly 
minimum wage or just above.  Roughly 90 percent of those surveyed, that is, were found 
to be living at or below minimum wage standards.  When the sources of household 
income are further unpacked, under half of household incomes come from temporary 
labor, while 21 percent derived from public or private forms of aid and assistance.  Only 
22 percent of household incomes are derived from regular wages.  Sixty-seven percent of 
households were found to qualify for state-sponsored low-income health care assistance 
(the so-called Green Card system), roughly five times the 2009 national average. 
  A final report comes from the Diyarbakır-based NGO, the Development Centre 
(Kalkınma Merkezi).  Their 2006 report, Forced Migration and its Effects: Diyarbakır, 
found, in a survey of around 400 households spread across five neighborhoods populated 
mostly by the displaced, that 60 percent of households had monthly incomes under the 
national minimum wage.  About half reported owning land in their villages, but were 
typically unable to make use of this land since coming to the city.  The report also found 
that more than one in four households surveyed were engaged in off-the-books seasonal 
farm work.  Two in three households further reported a serious decline in living standards 
since leaving the village.    
 Meanwhile, as the pervasiveness of poverty in Diyarbakır, and indeed across the 
southeast, is no secret in Turkey, poverty has attracted the attention of not only 
researchers but also national and international agents of “development”.  The scare 
quotes are meant to indicate not a generalized skepticism towards development, but to 
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question the extent to which the promises of various development agents are actually 
changing grounded economic realities of the displaced and dispossessed urban poor in the 
particular context of Diyarbakır.  Let us take as an example a development project that, 
for many people in Turkey who live outside of the region, is likely to be the first to come 
to mind if asked about poverty and development in the southeast: the Southeastern 
Anatolian Project, or GAP by its Turkish acronym.  There is a popular perception in 
Turkey, aided by semi-regular political pronouncements to this effect—such as the 
announcement in the run-up to the 2009 elections of a multi-billion dollar public 
investment in GAP (on everyday interpretations of this announcement in Diyarbakır, see 
the final chapter of this study)— that a great deal of money is being spent on the 
development of social and economic conditions in the southeast.  Indeed, on many 
occasions, when explaining my research to friends or acquaintances in Ankara or Istanbul 
and noting that I met many people in Diyarbakır who call for meaningful economic 
development, the response was often indignant: ‘But we’re already spending more than 
we can afford to develop the southeast!’   
 GAP is at heart a massive, ambitious dam-building project on the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers, focused on hydroelectricity and irrigation.  Since the late 1980s, GAP 
has further expanded its ambitions to ‘social development’ (see Özok 2004 for a 
biopolitical perspective on this shift in GAP’s rhetoric and practice), promising, among 
other things, expanded gender equality and lowered unemployment rates across the 
southeast.  But as Mustafa Sönmez (2012) has pointed out, while nearly 80 percent of 
GAP’s projected hydroelectric facilities have been completed—with much of the 
electricity channeled out of the region—the socioeconomic effects of the project are few 
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and far between, leading some to question whether they are not just efforts to soften the 
image of what is at heart a project with deep economic (energy production) and political 
(hydropolitical relations with nearby Syria and Iraq) interests at stake (see Nestor 1996, 
Jongerden 2010).  Only a fraction (less than 20 percent) of the projected irrigation 
infrastructure, which would arguably benefit the regional agricultural economy more than 
electricity, has been completed.  And promises of jobs brought by investment in energy 
and water infrastructure, such as the 4,000,000 jobs promised in a 2009 announcement, 
have been called, in a study written by TMMOB’s Diyarbakır branch, “entirely 
deceptive” (TMMOB Diyarbakır İl Koordinasyon Kurulu 2009:16), since most of the 
work in question—construction work on dam-building projects—would be largely off-
the-books, low paying, and temporary. 
 Another agent often expected, particularly in the now-hegemonic neoliberal 
language framing discussions of economic development in Turkey today, to play a role in 
rebuilding regional life and livelihoods is private capital.  In contemporary Turkey, the 
ruling vision of economic developmentalism no longer sees much of a role for state-led 
developmentalism, preferring instead a vision of the state as facilitating private capital.  
Yet for reasons noted above (conflict, UN embargoes, infrastructural challenges), private 
investment has proven difficult to attract at a significant scale. 
 Other forms of development exist.  Diyarbakır was, as noted elsewhere in the 
study, the pilot city in Turkey for the Grameen Bank’s global microcredit program.  As of 
2010, there were roughly 9,000 recipients in the city.  Having spent only a month during 
my fieldwork following microcredit collectors on their weekly household visits to collect 
on credit payments and spoken with a small sampling of recipients, it is difficult to make 
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broad statements about the efficacy of the program.  With that caveat, though, the 
recipients I met spoke without exception of the program as a band-aid, a superficial 
application to a problem that is larger than microcredit can handle.  There are other non-
governmental organizations at work in Diyarbakır as well, including a large number of 
religious NGOs carrying out charity works in poor neighborhoods.  It is difficult to see, 
however, examples of forms of economic development at the scale that might address the 
needs of forced migrants.   
 With this overview of the consequences and context of displacement and 
dispossession in mind, we turn to a brief theoretical consideration that serves as a 
conclusion to this chapter. 
 
BEYOND BARE LIFE 
 The scenario sketched out above lends itself in many ways to the framework that 
Agamben outlines in his work on bare life.  Including displaced Kurds in the city only to 
exclude or marginalize them as economic actors would seem to be the lesson of the high 
rates of joblessness and poverty in Diyarbakır, born of displacement and dispossession.  
Agamben’s term has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, as a cursory scan 
of virtually any journal in the social sciences or humanities would show, and part of the 
term’s appeal no doubt lies in the minimalism of Agamben’s way of conceptualizing.  As 
Jean Comaroff notes, he relies on only a few images and allegories, which she 
summarizes as “the ban as originary political act, the production of bare life as the 
threshold from nature to culture, [and] the camp as hidden matrix” (2007:208).  Yet the 
very elements that make his work appealing also point to its limits.  How far, Comaroff 
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asks, does the framework, “when applied literally to circumstances in the world” 
(2007:209), help one to explore the ways in which abandonment and efforts to deny 
people the civil and political rights of inclusion are actively mediated and interpreted by 
people living through them?  
 An alternative term, one that echoes elements of bare life, but that I believe opens 
up more analytic space (and is more specifically attuned to the economic concerns of this 
study) is Denning’s concept of wageless life.  Wageless life, as we began to explore 
earlier, is Denning’s term to designate people who have, through acts of dispossession 
and expropriation, been rendered radically dependent on wages, yet who labor in ways 
that a conventional Marxist focus on wage labor and the factory floor cannot easily 
account for.  These are not free laborers proletarianized into factory workers, but garbage 
pickers, street vendors, housecleaners, and a range of other largely off-the-books, part-
time, and informal laborers—what Jan Breman calls “wage hunters and gatherers” 
(1994).  At issue, then, is a set of circumstances quite different than the familiar Marxist 
account of a surplus wage army.  This is not to say that such an analysis covers all field 
sites impacted by the 1990s-era displacement.  It is possible to detect a functionalism in 
mass displacement and dispossession: the creation of millions of wage-dependent ex-
peasants as a way of providing industry with ready, “free” labor, and to attack the 
bargaining power of organized labor to boot.  There is something to this hypothesis, at 
least for certain areas; displaced and dispossessed Kurds do work in factories in the 
industrial outskirts of Istanbul and other cities; the proletarianization of dispossessed 
Kurds is a reality in certain economic geographies.  But, at least when considered from 
the vantage point of livelihoods of people based mostly in Diyarbakır, what the 
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ethnographic material following this chapter suggests is a perhaps more unsettling 
implication of displacement and dispossession.  The people we shall meet in the 
following chapters are less part of an organized strategy of capitalist accumulation 
through dispossession, and more living proof, however disconcerting, of the limits of 
indifference and political responsibility when ordinary people are treated as expendable 
objects of ‘national security’.  
 Wageless life is, as a concept, not only more attuned to the specific economic 
conditions of displacement and dispossession.  It also opens a space for more specific 
attention to the grounded realities of the people in question, particularly to their capacity 
as political actors.  Denning addresses the popularity of Agamben’s term, as well as a 
handful of others that he sees as broadly similar, and even if this grouping of terms 
overlooks important differences across them, the broader theoretical point is worth 
considering: “Bare life, wasted life, disposable life, precarious life, superfluous life: these 
are among the terms used to describe the inhabitants of a planet of slums…[But] to speak 
repeatedly of bare life and superfluous life can lead us to imagine that there really are 
disposable people, not simply that they are disposable in the eyes of state and market” 
(2010:79).  Denning instead focuses on a number of examples where people subjected to 
economic marginalization have acted to make their demands for better work heard, and in 
so doing, he implies a call for more attention to the forms of political struggle—acts, in 
Ranciere’s conceptual vocabulary, of the irruption of the non-elected into the realm of 
sensibility— emerging from spaces of displacement and dispossession.  The following 
chapter takes up this point by turning to a number of portraits and interviews of people 
who directly experienced the history and aftermath of displacement and dispossession, 
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and thinking through the significance of this material in terms of a politics of dissensus 
whereby evaluative discourses about getting by and livelihood struggles provide a means 
for the staking out of oppositional stances. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DISPOSSESSION’S ETHNOGRAPHY 
 
A STORIED REAL 
 Whereas the previous chapter aimed to provide a history of displacement and an 
overview of its aftermath from the vantage point of official reports, this chapter asks, 
what would this history be like when told from the point of view of its subjects?   
 This in turn raises a broader question.  What distinguishes written and oral 
histories?  One answer might distinguish between the credibility and rationality of the 
former versus the anecdotal and fallibly subjective nature of the latter.  However, as oral 
historians and anthropologists have tirelessly argued, credibility does not fall into such 
simple categorization. Thus Alessandro Portelli writes, “oral sources are credible but with 
a different credibility.  The importance of oral credibility may not lie in its adherence to 
fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge” 
(1998: 68).  “There are no ‘false’ oral sources”(1998: 68); rather, oral accounts, as 
narratives, offer a window, in Portelli’s approach, into the relationship between personal 
affective histories and the wider institutional and political histories in which the people 
he met across his research were embedded.  A number of anthropologists have followed 
similar lines of thinking, if informed by different theoretical frameworks.  Kathleen 
Stewart, in her rich rendering of an “other America”, Appalachian West Virginia, 
questioned the usefulness of distinguishing between the anecdotal and some ostensibly 
more real way of knowing, preferring instead an approach sensitive to an 
epistemologically more complicated “storied cultural real” (1996:64). 
 Importantly, though, to pursue such a line of thinking is not the same as 
relativizing credibility.  If the number of dead in this or that conflict does not matter, 
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quips Trouillot (1995:13), then why write anything if we already have Little Red Riding 
Hood?  Trouillot’s work on “power and the production of history” brings to light the 
“many ways in which the production of historical narratives involves the uneven 
contribution of competing groups and individuals who have unequal access to the means 
for such production” (1995:xix).  Trouillot avoids a simplistic inversion (which would 
see oral accounts, not official records, as containing the truth) and underscores an 
important point: in approaching narratives of the past, we must ask what is at stake, and 
for whom.   
 From that perspective, the line of distinction here is not only between oral and 
written accounts.  It involves what we might think of as a politics of verification.  Many 
of the reports from the previous chapter partake in a politics of verification shared with 
the oral accounts here, where what is at stake is proving that what is described really 
happened.  In these accounts, the important and implicit other voice in the debate are 
state claims, regnant until quite recently, that underplayed the severity of the events in the 
southeast across the 1990s, and that continue to underplay the severity of their 
consequences.  In that sense, across their differences, Sarmaşık, GÖÇ-DER, Kalkınma 
Merkezi and the men and women who share their accounts in this chapter all have a 
political and moral interest in ensuring that the past events and their aftermath that they 
relay are perceived as truthful.   
 Recognizing the shared stakes across oral and written accounts, however, we 
should not collapse their differences.  Critically, in this context, oral and written 
narratives of displacement and its aftermath have different conventions of persuasion that 
must be taken into account.  To take Sarmaşık’s report as an example, their almost sole 
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reliance on quantitative and statistical methods places them within a recognized set of 
rhetorical conventions for report writing—for indexing a document as concerned with the 
truth, rather than partisan advocacy.  Along these lines, a writer and researcher for the 
Sarmaşık report shared with me that such careful statistical detail was a very conscious 
move on the report planners’ part, an effort to have their claims ‘taken seriously’.  Across 
my research, I saw a similar rhetoric of verification at work.  A friend in Diyarbakır who 
worked alongside the mayor and who was involved in writing many of his national and 
international speeches described how, in the run-up to the 2009 elections, one 
presentation garnered particular praise from national and international audiences: a talk 
built around a report with page after page of graphs, charts, and statistics documenting 
the speech’s aim, which had to do with documenting a history of steady economic 
marginalization of the southeast since its incorporation into the Turkish nation-state.  
Turkish journalists and EU officials evidently praised the attempt to “speak through 
facts” rather than making “political” claims.  However intelligible these last remarks, 
what the audience correctly identified in the document was its utilization of a rhetorical 
convention of credibility building in the genre of reports: statistics, quantification, graphs. 
In the accounts that follow, however, different rhetorical strategies are at work.  
One is what we might call narrative strategies or set pieces that any listener expects for a 
story to be considered ‘authentic’.  For example, fires are mentioned in many of the 
stories that follow.  Of course, many villages were burned and the narrators may indeed 
have experienced this themselves.  But the issue is whether the inclusion here has to do 
with whether the story would, somehow, be thought narratively incomplete or faulty 
without reference to fires—a narrative question and not one necessarily of memory or 
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historical truth.  Another is the frequent peppering of accounts with discourse markers of 
actuality (vallahi, yemin ederim).  And similarly, there were often moments in interviews 
or encounters when people stepped back from their own story and directly addressed the 
credence of their narrative, saying, in so many words, please believe what I say.  My field 
notes record three incidents, for instance, wherein, in the middle of an interview, my 
interlocutors interjected, saying that if I were only there in the village with a camera—
which would seem to stand in here as the device of objective recording par excellence—I 
would have been able to see that their narratives were true.   
This raises questions: might there not be a politics of rhetoric at work here?  And 
what does this rhetorical work reveal of the stakes behind these oral accounts?  I do not 
approach the oral accounts of displacement and its aftermath that follow as transparent, 
straightforward acts of relaying ‘what really happened’—though they may be that.  
Rather, I am interested in the political-rhetorical function embedded in these accounts.  
That is, the accounts may at times, in Portelli’s terms, depart from strict historical truth, 
but the important question is, why would speakers do so?  This would seem, along with 
Portelli and Stewart, to be in pursuit of a cultural real wherein what is at stake for 
Diyarbakır’s forced migrants is not only resisting the denial of the events that led to their 
uprooting and impoverishment, but also—and this gets us back to the theoretical 
framework laid out earlier in this work, to Ranciere’s (2010) politics of dissensus—
taking issue with a current state of affairs by way of a moral-political evaluation of state 
wrongs through discursive acts (Volosinov 1973). 
 Before proceeding to the ethnographic heart of this chapter, we must consider 
another theoretical point, one that surfaces in the narratives that follow and across the 
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following chapters.  This is the matter of time or temporality and its relationship to 
political life after displacement.   
 
TEMPORALITY 
 The extent to which the social experience of time is, beyond its physical reality, 
shaped in important ways by social, cultural, and political circumstances, is a theme well 
explored by anthropologists, geographers, and in other cognate disciplines (Lovell 1992, 
May and Thrift 2001, Munn 1992, Rotenberg 1992, Rutz 1992).  “A politics of time”, 
notes Rutz, “is concerned with the appropriation of the time of others…and above all, a 
politics of time is focused on a struggle for control and forms of resistance or 
acquiescence” (1992:7).  Is the attempt to control time a part of—to again invoke 
Ranciere’s distinction—the policing of Kurdish politics?  A number of the men and 
women profiled below describe a process of constant, exhausting, despair-inducing 
struggle to make a living after dispossession.  They describe having to negotiate a world 
of work defined not by the ideal of steady wage labor (regular income, basic social 
benefits and workplace rights, a degree of protection and job security), but by an 
improvised, day-to-day process of combining a number of often-insufficient sources of 
income.  They talk of leaving home in the morning, arriving home at night, and feeling 
they have struggled all day but with little to show for it, and not a minute to spare.  Is this 
a police act of depoliticization through preoccupation and distress?  Is temporality not a 
part of a police attempt to depoliticize life in southeastern cities? 
 Certainly a number of my interlocutors felt so.  A young man who was sitting 
quietly by as I interviewed his father about his trajectory to the city as a result of village 
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evacuations interjected at one point in the interview to give his opinion that the struggle 
to make ends meet meant the end of effective political mobilization for Kurds.  I 
paraphrased him in my field notes as saying, when everybody’s worried about how to 
make it until tomorrow, how can they think of the future?  How can they think of politics?  
This was a sentiment I encountered not infrequently in fieldwork.  But how far does this 
explanation go in characterizing the political present of Diyarbakır (or at least, political 
life as it was between 2007 and 2009)?  Is it the case that leaving people without time is a 
component of stripping them of political life, of rendering populations barely living?  Is 
radical dependence on wages and the market in the absence of sufficient opportunities to 
actually earn enough wages equivalent, to adapt Maurizio Lazzarato’s analysis of the 
function of debt, to being “deprived of a future, that is, of time, time as decision-making, 
choice, and possibility? (2012:8).  Are “the future and its possibilities quashed”, as 
Lazzarato claims, when the busy-ness of wagelessness “neutralizes time, time as the 
creation of new possibilities, that is to say, the raw material of all political, social or 
esthetic change” (2012:49]?   
 Such a way of thinking has potentially powerful analytical application, and may 
explain certain aspects of the links between Diyarbakır’s post-displacement economic, 
political, and imaginative life.  But it does not capture the whole reality of temporality in 
this context.   The matter of time in the wake of dispossession must be complicated, I 
think, by the existence of another valence of sociopolitical time in the wake of 
displacement and dispossession: time freed up.  Let me be careful here, lest this point 
come off as callous.  Dispossession and the production of mass joblessness have led to a 
situation of forced idleness, waiting around for months for another temporary job, not 
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having anything to do for long stretches of time.  It is possible to see this as another mode 
of depoliticization through exhaustion; the waiting around involved in unemployment can 
be more taxing and tiring than employment.  Along these lines, anthropologist Ghassan 
Hage has analyzed the enforced waiting that Lebanese migrants often face—the need to 
be patient, often at great lengths, in trying circumstances, waiting at checkpoints or for 
immigration papers—as a strategy of depoliticization, a technique of governmentality 
that encourages a “celebration of one’s capacity to stick it out rather than calling for 
change” (2009:97).  But does this exhaust the analysis of time in this context?   Is this 
always a matter of empty, depoliticized time?  What about the acts of people to fill this 
time meaningfully?  Are there not also empirical instances in which the freeing up of 
time, in conditions of wageless life, has opened spaces of political possibility?  David 
Graeber concludes his popular tome on debt by “putting in a good word for the 
nonindustrious poor…Insofar as the time they are taking time off from work is being 
spent with friends and family, enjoying and caring for those they love, they're probably 
improving the world more than we acknowledge” (2010:390).  And in the context of 
Diyarbakır we may add, time spent negotiating a new politics of Kurdish struggle.  
Scholars of Kurds in Turkey have analyzed previous eras of rural-urban migration 
(largely due to the mechanization of agricultural) as having catalyzed political awakening 
among urbanized Kurds by bringing them together in cities and making them aware of 
their shared condition and struggle (Marcus 2007:17).  Has forced displacement not done 
the same, by bringing displaced and dispossessed rural Kurds together in marginalized 
urban neighborhoods and subjecting them to similar experiences of impoverishment, poor 
labor conditions, and policing?  The enforced ‘free time’ of economic inclusive exclusion 
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can also be seen a positive component of the practical groundwork for the emergence of a 
new wave of politicization.  In the absence of other work, many young people have been 
encouraged to repay the sense of debt (bedel) they feel to the history of Kurdish political 
struggle, a debt to be repaid through political activism: by entering local governmental 
politics or civil society organizations, by turning out in large numbers for street protests, 
or, at a more mundane level, by keeping alive in everyday conversations and acts of 
interpretation the ambitions and imaginaries of Kurdish dissensus. 
 In short, the question of temporality lacks a single answer; both overworking and 
distress and underworking and activism were observed in my fieldwork.  Both cases 
nevertheless evidence a temporal dimension of displacement and dispossession deserving 
ethnographic attention.  With this in mind, we now turn to the ethnography, to accounts 
of displacement and its aftermath. 
 
NARRATIVES OF DISPLACEMENT 
1. Z:  “Is there any factory better than a village?”   
 Z was born some forty years ago in a village to the south of Diyarbakır not far 
from the provincial border separating Diyarbakır and Mardin.  The village sits at the base 
of Karacadağ, a chain of once-active volcanoes that quite literally made Diyarbakır’s 
existence possible, having deposited the layer of basalt from which the ancient city walls 
and the city’s oldest houses, workplaces, and places of worship were built.  Karacadağ’s 
slopes are also believed to be one of the first sites of the domestication of wheat (Heun at 
al. 1997), with wild progenitor varieties still growing on its slopes.  But though wheat has 
long been a mainstay of farming in many villages surrounding Diyarbakır, the precise 
location of Z’s natal village, built on the old lava flow, was too rocky for much in the 
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way of farming.  Only a few small plots had been cleared for subsistence farming and 
limited surplus production.  More central to their village’s livelihood, given the proximity 
of good mountain pastures or mera, was shepherding.  Tending large flocks of sheep was 
what Z grew up doing, as did his father and his father’s brothers.   
 In 1991, however, political conflict began to spread to the village.  Z explains: 
“The people in the village, some were becoming village guards, some Hızbullah.22  We 
took a look around and decided to become migrants.”  The decision, his younger brother 
later explained to me, was in fact taken not by his family alone. The leaders of the tribe to 
which his family belonged had met and taken the decision to refuse military pressure to 
become village guards.  Once their refusal was made clear to local military 
representatives, residents were given a week to evacuate the village.  Otherwise, as was 
publically announced in the center of the village, everything would be burned.  People 
left in haste, and were, as Z put it, scattered across Turkey.  Most came to Diyarbakır, but 
Z also counted more distant family in İzmir.  As for his household, they came to 
Diyarbakır because one of his older brothers had already moved to the city in the middle 
of the 1980s to work in construction, and had rented a small apartment.   
 Though a week is fairly little time to leave a life and a way of making a living 
behind, the family was somewhat fortunate in that they were able to sell their animals (at 
least in comparison to those households that saw their animals expropriated by 
paramilitaries or had to sell much more quickly).23  But, as with nearly everyone I talked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hızbullah in southeastern Turkey bears no relationship to the movement in Lebanon.  It is the name 
of a violent religious paramilitary movement based in Diyarbakır and a few surrounding cities, which 
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s and called for the revolutionary overthrow of Turkey’s secular 
state system, inspired by events in Iran.  For more on Hızbullah, see chapter five.  
23 A number of people told me that their animals were stolen by paramilitaries, though I have not been 
able to locate any studies to confirm how common this was.  I had no reason to doubt them, aside perhaps 
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to who was engaged in animal husbandry in the village and who was forced to sell this 
important stock of wealth in haste during the mess of forced migration, Z said that the 
animal traders offered his family well under half the going market price for their large 
holding of “small head” animals (i.e., sheep and goats, as opposed to “big head” animals, 
cattle), effectively cutting their main source of rural wealth in half in a single moment of 
exchange under emergency conditions.  In Diyarbakır, the family—then composed of Z’s 
elderly father, his ten brothers, two younger sisters, and his father’s two brides—was able 
to stay for the first year in his brother’s apartment, which Z remembers as extremely 
crowded.  This is in fact a very common image in narratives of the first years after forced 
migration: an apartment or house with multiple families and 20 or more occupants, all 
struggling to rebuild life and livelihood in the city.   
 His recollections from the first few months, too, were not dissimilar to what I 
heard from many others: fear of venturing beyond the very immediate surroundings of 
the house, which some people described as a fear of getting lost in the unfamiliar new 
setting, and others as a fear born of the relatively regular occurrence of extrajudicial 
killings and disappearances on the city streets.  In any event, after nearly a year of living 
in this way, the family found, through a relative, a plot on what was then considered the 
far reaches of the city: land off the main road to Elazığ that was, at the time, mostly 
cotton fields and unoccupied stretches of land sloping slowly down to the banks of the 
Tigris.  With the money obtained from the sale of their animals, the family was able to 
afford the construction of a basic structure.  The money was not enough to cover 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from the bitterness which some people harbor against those who became village guards. Some, though not 
all; some of my interlocutors showed understanding to those who decided to take up the state’s offer, even 
if most people tended to use somewhat derogatory terms to describe those who agreed to take up arms for 
the state: “dishonor”, “slavery”, “betrayal”, “selling oneself”, “ignorant”. 
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windows or doors, so they put up plastic to keep out some of the cold.  Technically, 
access to this and most other plots in Aziziye could not be legally purchased; most of the 
land was not for sale, as the state has a claim, either through direct ownership through the 
Treasury (Hazine) or oversight via religious endowment (vakıf), to most unoccupied land 
in Turkey. In Aziziye, aside from a few spots of private ownership, the peri-urban land on 
which Z’s family and others like him built their new squatted homes was no exception to 
this.  Instead of buying land, most migrants who ended up in Aziziye seem to have done 
one of two things.  Some went through an informal real estate agent of sorts who sold 
access to the land (based on exactly what claim to legitimacy I was unable to ascertain).  
While these agents were apparently up front about the land’s indefinite legal status, they 
offered assurance that no authorities would bother them (for a brief mention of these 
agents, see Kalkınma Merkezi 2010).  Others like Z’s family built first on land that was, 
whatever its technical status, practically unoccupied, and hoped for the best.  The hope 
was not unfounded.  In Turkey, as in many state spaces where rapid, unplanned 
urbanization overwhelms the possibilities for state regulation of the process, state claims 
to land ownership have typically been enforced with an eye to pragmatism.  That is, the 
state has often found it in its best interests to turn a blind eye to technically illegal 
practices, as this has allowed displaced and dispossessed populations to eke out a living 
in the city while authorities are able to evade or delay questions of responsibility and 
care.  It is certainly more cost effective, after all, for a state to feign ignorance of things—
and perhaps, come election time, to announce the legalization of all previously-built 
structures, in a well-known strategy of vote luring—than to take responsibility for the 
provision of adequate housing for newcomers.  Of course, Turkey has at times intervened 
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to claim its right to unoccupied land.  Forced evacuations of informal settlements in the 
name of ‘urban renewal’ are a part of the recent historical memory in Ankara, Istanbul, 
Izmir, and other cities remade by migration.24  But in Diyarbakır, at least until quite 
recently,25 the state’s general preference has been to let things play out as they may. 
 In Z’s family’s case, the land’s status was complicated.  “We came to the city and 
we lived in a gecekondu [a home that is self-built, without official permission]…[The 
land] belonged to the Treasury.”  A man soon came claiming a prior right to the land.  
Again Z: “He said ‘I’m the owner of this land,’ and he wanted his money.  But when he 
saw our condition, he showed understanding.  ‘Your condition’s clear, you’re living in a 
house without windows or a door’, he said.  We had put up plastic.  He was 
understanding and didn’t have us thrown out.”  Within a year, however, their house was 
destroyed by the state through an ironic turn of events.  Toward the end of the 1990s, a 
state-designed affordable housing project broke ground on land abutting Aziziye, and 
built a new road and a new cluster of apartments, which were framed, at the time, as a 
solution to the city’s housing crisis in the wake of migration.  In constructing the road, 
the state destroyed Z’s family’s house, for which they received a small amount of 
monetary compensation (none of the surviving family members I talked to could recall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The leveling of self-built, rural-urban migrant settlements on the outskirts of Turkish cities continues 
today with probably more intensity; one need only take the bus from the national capital Ankara’s airport to 
the city center to see uncanny landscapes of the ghost-like foundations of razed homes and the footpaths 
and stairs linking them, and behind these emptied spaces, a horizon dominated by the pastel high-rises built 
by the powerful state housing authority TOKİ, allegedly as a solution to the problem of informal 
settlement. 
25 Things are quickly changing, though.  On a recent trip to the city, two neighborhoods where I carried 
out fieldwork had a distinctly different skyline of TOKİ housing units in the place of razed informal 
housing.  As I finish editing this chapter (early in 2012), large sections of Aziziye, which was, as of 2009, 
largely just one- or two-story informal structures built by the recently displaced, were being razed and 
replaced with apartment buildings.  It remains unclear what the cityscape’s skyline will be in another 
decade (or even sooner), but there is clearly significant political and financial support for this logic of the 
formalization and ‘apartmentization’ of displacement’s typologies of housing. 
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exactly how much).  But with this money, rather than settle in the new apartments—built 
ostensibly for recent migrants, though as far as I could ascertain, and I lived in those 
apartments for the two years of my fieldwork and also interviewed doormen about their 
buildings’ occupants, modest as the rent and utilities fees were, few migrants could afford 
to live there—they chose another path. Z’s household, now doubly displaced, instead 
elected to move to another unoccupied site a little farther down the road leading out of 
town, where they built, in Z’s words, “exactly the same gecekondu”.   
 The new house bordered Diyarbakır’s main industrial park (sanayi sitesi), which, 
though the term in English may conjure up images of large factory buildings lured by 
attractive incentives, designates in fact row upon row of small workshops with few 
employees.  Here, as in many of the productive spaces that undergird countless spaces of 
neoliberal manufacturing worldwide (Elyachar 2005), off-the-books family labor, 
negotiated degrees of tax formality, and other work in market spaces between legality and 
illegality prevail.  Despite the new home’s proximity to the industrial site, however, no 
one in the family was employed there.  By chance, before the road that caused this second 
displacement was constructed, the family had built a bakkal (a small neighborhood 
market selling all sorts of daily necessities, from diapers, candy, and produce to kaçak 
cigarettes) close to their first home in the city, and the same process of construction that 
led to the destruction of their first home not only spared the shop; it left it in a much more 
advantageous location, benefitting not only from road traffic but also from its newfound 
proximity to salaried apartment dwellers.   
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 Most of Z’s younger brothers worked in the bakkal.26  Additionally, one of Z’s 
brothers also had found work as a kapıcı27, a doorman, in the nearby apartments that 
effected the family’s second displacement.  All of his male siblings, once old enough, 
entered the circuits of off-the-books seasonal farm and factory work, on hazelnut farms 
along the Black Sea, cotton fields in the hinterlands of Urfa and Adana, or in tomato 
paste factories outside of İzmir (the latter through paternal kinship ties).  Through the 
combination of these varied and irregular incomes, the family tried to make a living in the 
city.  “The struggle to stay alive, hayatta kalma mücadelesi”, was the phrase that Z and 
his brothers preferred, and however clichéd this phrase may ring to many readers familiar 
with the discourses of the economy here and elsewhere in Turkey, there is a certain 
unsettling truth to it.  As Michael Denning notes (2010), the ‘free’ in ‘free labor’, after 
all, mostly entails, for those dispossessed, expropriated, and forced to depend on wages, 
being free to live a life of economic insecurity and the haunt of constant precariousness. 
 Troubles pursued the family.  Not long after migration, the elderly father passed 
away.  Z’s explanation, echoing that of his brothers, was:  “My father died because of 
migration; he couldn’t adjust.  Actually, after migration, quite a few old people, like my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In Diyarbakır as in many American convenience stores, sugar and tobacco were the mainstays of the 
shop’s profit.  In the case of the American corner store, one must also add lottery tickets, an interesting 
object for economic-anthropological research in America’s deindustrialized urban spaces.  For a related 
example, see Wacquant (1999) for notes on the “underground lottery of the ghetto known as the policy or 
numbers game", along with Light (1977).  In Turkey’s southeast, the spread of bahis (illegal internet 
gambling, mostly on soccer matches) is widespread.  Many teahouses in the city provide spaces for internet 
gamblers to watch matches on big-screen televisions, with computers for making bets tucked into small 
shop spaces nearby.  As one interviewee said, “in the world, it’s Las Vegas, in Turkey it’s Las Diyarbakır, 
Las Batman”. 
27 While being a doorman is an unenviable position in the value hierarchies of work in Turkey, for 
generations of rural-urban migrants the position has been a coveted one, primarily because, whatever the 
relative indignities of subordination that one must suffer, the burden of rent is evaded, and however limited 
one’s income, there are opportunities for side jobs for doormen and families members, as in, for instance, 
housecleaning for wives (see Özyeğin 2002).  In Diyarbakır’s constrained job market, many reportedly 
have to bribe their way into this job. 
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father, couldn’t adjust and died.”  One of Z’s younger brothers later fleshed out this 
etiology, explaining that his father had in fact died of tuberculosis.  But rather than 
attribute this to the combination of age, living conditions, and stress, the family preferred 
another explanation—one not unique to them—and saw his death as caused by an 
incurable longing for the life he left behind.  His death left the eldest brother of the 
family, a few years older than Z, as the effective head of the household.  Meanwhile, 
looming over the shop, one of the family’s main sources of income, was the threat of 
destruction at any moment by the state, should legal codes of ownership be enforced.  Z 
and his brothers regularly complained that they couldn’t lay a nail for fear that any 
investment in the structure would be in vain, should the land be claimed and, like their 
previous house, leveled.  And, as it happened, in a recent trip to Aziziye, I found that not 
only the shop but most of the homes around it had been demolished, with nothing left of 
the shop but a pile of stones and some chickens picking through some trash.  The family 
made an agreement with the municipality that bought them some more time, and rebuilt 
their shop—“is this the fourth or fifth time?” asked one of Z’s youngest brothers as we 
chatted and caught up, too young to remember all the destructions and reconstructions—a 
little farther up the road. 
 Years after resettling in Diyarbakır, Z had married and had three children.  Unable 
to find regular work, he tried to secure a livelihood by other means.  He bought an iron 
pushcart and outfitted it with a pressed sandwich maker.  The pushcart was parked in a 
location Z chose with an eye to practicality: close to an electricity line that could be 
tapped to power the sandwich press, under the shade of a mulberry tree, a stone’s throw 
from the family store, and most importantly, on a footpath linking Aziziye to two nearby 
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schools.  Most of his customers were children buying a sandwich and a box of overly 
sweet juice before school or on lunch break. 
The neighborhood behind the cart did, superficially at least, resemble a village.28  
But looks can be deceiving; the livelihood practices common to Aziziye’s displaced 
households bear only a surface resemblance to those preceding the waves of rural 
displacement and dispossession.  As one Diyarbakır based NGO’s report on the 
socioeconomic conditions of Aziziye suggests, most people, having been cut off from 
rural livelihoods, have taken to creating whatever livelihoods they can within the limits of 
their new home (Kalkınma Merkezi 2010).  In ways similar to what Asef Bayat calls the 
“quiet encroachment” of the urban poor in Tehran and Cairo (2000, 2004), across the city 
thousands of people like Z have seized on spaces along roads, which offer a chance for 
commerce without paying rent or the various fees and taxes required to run an on-the-
books commercial venture, and have staked their hopes in remaining off the radar of the 
forces of economic regulation, such as the municipal police (zabita)—or at least being 
able to negotiate an agreement with them when they come by.   
Z identified as unemployed, despite the observable fact that he clearly worked all 
day—making sandwiches, fixing flat bike tires at another small roadside stand he 
opened—and received money in exchange for this labor.  Yet he did not value what he 
did as ‘work’; these were rather acts done to eke out a minimal living in the city.  Despite 
spending nearly every day standing on the street, leaving early in the morning and 
returning late in the evening, the wages he earned were not enough for a secure life for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 As noted in the text above, I happened to live in the housing units just next to Aziziye, and my daily 
bus route to the city passed through the neighborhood.  Not that often, but still perhaps once every two 
months or so, a slow-moving cow would block the road, leading to tsk-tsking  and derisive comments about 
the allegedly ignorant, backward mindset of the squatter settlement’s inhabitants from people who boarded 
the bus in the middle-class housing units.   
	   74	  	  
his family.  Lacking the money to support an independent household, he and his wife and 
children shared a house with his deceased father’s two brides and a number of his young 
brothers, a situation that he complained about, but for which he saw no immediate 
solution in lieu of steady work.   
 But another important element in the idea he was voicing is, I think, the specter of 
past rural productivity.  Z came of working age within the practices and knowledge 
appropriate to the rural productive economy, and invested something of himself there, 
acquiring a handy familiarity with animals and agricultural work.  He made clear, in 
narrating his life’s trajectory, that his first and staying understanding of his life was 
formed within the possibilities that the village political economy provided.   Transplanted 
to the outskirts of the city and having lost all of the household’s (mostly animal) wealth, 
save for what was now tied up in the store, Z was one of many older men—older 
signaling in this context old enough to have made a practical and imaginative investment 
in rural life—who were largely left to idealize a home and rhythm of life to which they, 
in all probability, will not return.  He asked in one interview, “Is there any factory better 
than a village?  There’s land, water, there’s everything.”  However, he acknowledged that 
to return to his natal village would not only require the assurance of peace and an end to 
the threat of violent conflict breaking out around the village.  The family would 
furthermore need a large sum of wealth in order to reestablish a viable rural livelihood 
(investing in animals, repairing or rebuilding stables, and so on).  He noted, “One doesn’t 
return to the village without money…some apparently have returned to our village, but 
we weren’t able to.  Here in the city, you sell to live, even if just simit.” 
 Here it is worthwhile to pause Z’s account and to call attention to the imagery of 
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simit.  A savory ring-shaped bread smothered in sesame seeds and a fine coating of 
molasses, simit is a ubiquitous and cheap form of street food, found across Turkey.  Its 
inexpensive nature also gives it a place in popular narratives of poverty, as in the Arabesk 
song I recently heard in a taxi about a man who sells his land in the village and moves to 
Ankara only to waste his wealth frivolously, and who then must learn the price of simit 
and ayran (a stock image of the cheapest way to fill one’s stomach).29  Like fire, holes in 
shoes, and crowded apartments, this is one of a handful of stock images that surfaced 
throughout my research, begging the question of whether its function might have less to 
do with faithful representation than narrative, or more accurately, rhetorical efficacy.  For 
instance, many of the city’s displaced newcomers I met framed selling simit as a last 
resort of sorts.  Consider an exchange I had with two brothers working in small-scale 
trade.  I regularly spent time in their sliver of a shop, chatting and taking notes on their 
account-keeping techniques (and their impressive ability to recall the details of their 
balances, even the ones they did not bother to record on the back of a cigarette carton).  
On this occasion, they were complaining about the purported unwillingness of kids in 
their neighborhood of Hançepek to work.  Claiming that marijuana, petty theft, and 
organized crime (mafyacılık, by which they meant drug trade) had habituated the 
neighborhood’s youth to a life of idleness, they employed the image of an older man 
(who ideally should be enjoying the respect and right to rest that comes with age in 
Kurdish culture) forced to do the tiring and unsavory work of selling simit, in order to 
chastise the young for their presumed disinclination to work: “When you see 65 year old 
men with a tray of simit on their head, going from coffeehouse to coffeehouse, then 
certainly the kids too should be doing something”.  We shall return to the question of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 On the anthropology of Arabesk, see the work of Martin Stokes, especially 1992 and 2010. 
	   76	  	  
stock images and rhetoric below; meanwhile, let us make a note of the significance of 
simit as a narrative referent and return to Z’s account. 
 Continuing with his explanation of the practical difficulties involved in village 
return, Z went on to explain, “In our village you need animals to make a living.  
Otherwise you’re in bad shape.”  In this assessment, he was not alone.  Many human 
rights and NGO reports that touch on the obstacles to village return in the wake of forced 
migration cite the financial obstacles to reestablishing a viable rural livelihood facing 
many displaced families as among the most important practical barriers to return.30  Few 
of the people I met who expressed a wish to return—and most older people did—were 
confident that they could afford to re-establish a productive livelihood in the countryside 
after having lost or liquidated what they were able to salvage of their forms of rural 
wealth—cash that most reported as having been quickly spent in the city, with the new 
costs of living (bills, rent, transportation) and the challenges of getting by on what is 
almost uniformly the sub-minimum-wage, irregular, and off-the-books work of 
dispossession.  Again Z: “One needs money to return to the village…besides the cost of 
cement and windows, there’s the stable, the seeds, the fertilizer.”  He characterized his 
life in the city as a day-to-day mode of existence (“biz günlük olarak yaşıyoruz ha”), 
never being able to “make an investment for the future”: 
Here getting by depends on what we earn daily.  I’ve been doing day labor since I 
migrated. I worked in construction, I lugged propane tanks, I was a garbage 
picker, and I was a porter. There’s nothing else to do…Nowadays I say, if only I 
had work.  But there’s thousands of unemployed like me, so I have no hope at all.  
Think of it, I even applied to one of the worst professions, being a doorman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Sources also mention ongoing military bans on return to certain rural geographies (as recently as 
2011, a few of my interlocutors whom I kept in touch with after fieldwork reported being unable to return 
to their villages, where some still planted grapes or visited relatives’ graves during religious holidays) and 
the sporadic persistence of armed conflict as barriers to village return. 
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(kapıcı)31, but for that they wanted four or five thousand lira [as bribe].  I don’t 
have that kind of money.  Even if they wanted one thousand, I don’t have that. 
Day to day we live, day to day. 
 
The pushcarts he made a living by were insecure not only in terms of the low, 
unpredictable income they brought.  Neighborhood thieves also broke into them semi-
regularly, raiding the locked compartment where he kept the sandwich ingredients and 
the boxes of sugary fruit juice.  One of our interviews happened to take place not long 
after one such event: 
A few weeks ago, a thief got into the cart, and he took whatever was there: the 
fruit juice, chocolate bars, and all the ingredients for tost.  I went to the police, 
and the man said if he filed a report that it would just burn me too, since my work 
is illegal.  You’re right, I said, but what else am I to do?  It’s not that I want to 
stand outdoors morning to night selling tost, but what am I to do?  I have to.  If 
need be, I’ll collect garbage.  In the end, I didn’t register a complaint because I 
met the thief face to face.  He was a young kid.  I asked him, why did you do this?  
He said, I was hungry so I stole.  My own kids came to mind.  If I leave them 
hungry, they’ll steal too.  I forgot about it and went home. 
 
Here, in a long passage that touches on many of the same themes as above, Z paints a 
bleak picture of life in the city.   
We now have to leave in the summers to work elsewhere.  In the winter, we return 
to Diyarbakır.  For 14 years we’ve been leaving to pick hazelnuts, cotton, 
tomatoes. 
Vallahi, I just leave the house in the morning and return home late at night, and if 
I sit down for a bit, suddenly it’s already morning again.  We’re chasing after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 A kapıcı functions something like a superintendent in the US, yet with more of a sense of servitude.  
Typically doormen live in the entry level or basement of an apartment and have reduced or free rent in 
exchange for tending the building and being on call for its residents.  A teacher friend of mine has told me 
about what he termed the inferiority complex of the sons and daughters of doormen in his school.  And 
indeed, I’ve seen doormen in my apartments in Diyarbakır and Ankara treated with the casual disdain often 
shown by the salaried classes to those who make a living from serving them (for a brilliant analysis of the 
history and implications of this social and economic rift/relation, see Gorz 1989:6-7).  The literature on 
rural-urban migration in Turkey is full of mentions of this profession.  Readers in English can see, for a 
sociological perspective, Özyeğin 2002.  Interestingly—and I am not sure how widespread this is in 
Turkey—a number of unemployed and underemployed men I met in Diyarbakır mentioned, like Z, looking 
for work as a doorman, but lacking the requisite entry fee—more accurately, the bribe—of a few thousand 
lira that one pays to a contractor as a new building is still in construction.  At one point, I mentioned these 
stories to a few friends in Diyarbakır, and they replied with the kind of shrugging disinterest that suggests I 
was again just asking them to explain was mere common knowledge in the city. 
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bread, I mean, with this pushcart…If I sit idly by, then the children will go 
hungry.   
 
Maybe if we had a certain income, I’d want to take my children, I mean, let’s say 
it’s springtime.  Now and then, we’d take our kids for a stroll around town, eat 
out, have a picnic. Well, those days are far from us.  To us there’s neither spring 
nor winter, neither spring nor fall.  That is, to us it makes no difference, as it’s the 
same thing every day, the same.  This is our situation: we’re chasing after bread. 
 
Right now my little brothers are in their twenties, and they too don’t have a right 
and proper job.  I’ve one brother who should be going to the [college entrance 
exam prep] lesson houses, but we can’t afford to send him.  So we say to him, 
forget about studying, go work in the construction sites32…So that’s that, I mean, 
there’s no work for us to do. None.  
 
Now I’ve got five kids, no social security no insurance, no job, I’ve got a 
pushcart, so we [I] come here and sell tost…Then someone comes from the 
school saying ‘you have to consider your children’s nutrition’.  They say, ‘you’re 
should leave this or that in your children’s lunchbox.’ But in our house, those 
things aren’t to be found.  It’s either a boiled a potato, a boiled egg, a tomato, 
some bread…The teachers say, why do you every day leave your kids the same 
things?  Well, because there’s nothing.  And they’re right, I too want to leave my 
kids one day with fruit, the other, maybe cake, you know, let their nutrition be 
different.  I too am aware of this.  But when you don’t have it, necessarily you 
leave them what you have.   
 
So you get sad, you constantly get sad. You sleep because when you sleep you 
forget, but then you wake up and you remember, ‘you have to consider your 
children’s nutrition’. 
 
Approximately a year after this interview I returned to the site where Z parked his 
pushcarts.  The sandwich cart, his main venture, was gone.  I tracked down his younger 
brothers, who explained that, having taken a job as a night watchman job in a bakery, the 
room where he slept had a leak in the heating stove’s pipes.  Z seems to have passed 
away in his sleep.  Among other unequal patterns of distribution is that of workplace risk.   
His phrase “no better factory than a village” hints at the matter of idyllic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Incidentally, in the three years that have passed since this interview, the brother that he mentioned 
did indeed earn a position in a two-year program, the equivalent of an Associates Degree in the US, in civil 
engineering.  Upon graduation, however, unable to find work, as of spring 2012, he was working in a small 
stationery shop that the family opened by taking a cash loan from a relative. 
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constructions of the countryside that we shall take up more directly in the next chapter.  
For now, let us turn to a number of additional accounts from this period of forced 
migration, keeping in mind the aim of exploring the profound transformations brought 
about by displacement and dispossession by way of the stories of ordinary people 
narrating changes to life and livelihoods in the wake of these transformations. 
 
2. Baran: “Here, if one day you don’t work, you go hungry” 
 Baran, a man in his mid 40s, came from a village outside of Lice, and his way of 
earning a living after dispossession and displacement is not dissimilar to Z’s.  Our first 
interview, arranged by a mutual friend, took place just next to his pushcart, which he kept 
parked on a corner in a neighborhood of concrete midrises mostly rented or owned by 
families who came to Diyarbakır in the 1990s.  He sold roasted sunflower and squash 
seeds in cones of rolled up scrap paper, and most of his patrons were men sitting and 
chatting or playing games in a few nearby coffeehouses.  He had a large scar on his hand 
from where he claimed police had held a lighter to it, trying to extract information on the 
whereabouts of a relative who had joined the PKK.  But before the scar and the string of 
police detentions and experiences with torture in Diyarbakır in the 1990s, like nearly 
everyone who came to the city in the first part of that decade, it was political violence 
that provoked the move.  Villagers refused to accept the spread of the paramilitary 
system, and so found their village burned by the military, which in his case transformed 
such familiar stuff of village life as animals in stables into distressing dreams: 
We didn’t come out of desire but out of fear.  They burned our village.  Already 
they were burning everywhere around us.  Like everybody else, we were forced to 
flee.   It was the end of 1992, the beginning of 1993. 
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How can I explain?  As the village guard system spread, villages were no longer 
at ease.  Once they set up a checkpoint there, you can’t raise animals.  Village life 
is raising animals, and some farming. What else does one do in a village? 
 
The sounds of the animals caught inside, the women screaming, that smoke, that 
fire, the sound of children, it doesn’t go from my mind.   They burn the houses 
and you’re there looking at the smoke.  It enters into my dreams. 
With two central foundations of everyday life, home and livelihood, radically 
destabilized, Baran struggled not just to rebuild these, but also to adjust to the small 
things of life in a new setting, such as buying yogurt. 
Housing, it wasn’t to be found. And we didn’t know how to go about it.  I came 
with my things loaded on a truck.  I found a house, two rooms.  The truck broke 
down on the road.  In fleeing, nothing went right. 
 
We were strangers.  Risks were high, we couldn’t even go out to buy yogurt.  One 
relative said, ‘follow your neighbor and wherever he buys things from, you too 
buy from there’. So I started to orient myself to my neighbors.   
 “I couldn’t find a job or anything”, he continued, describing how he and a friend started 
to share the work of the latter’s street cart.  (Diyarbakır is thought to have more than 
15,000 street peddlers, a drastic increase from pre-migration levels). “I got job as a 
peddler and I’m still doing that job, but now I work on my own.  It’s a small share of the 
market, but there’s [$5-7] left to me at day’s end.” 
In contrast to the image of the rural migrant who grows accustomed to the alleged 
small luxuries of life in the city—an image I not infrequently heard from the city’s settled 
merchant and shop keeping classes, some (though not all) of whom held migrants in 
rather negative regard, seeing them as indolent, dependent, and uncultivated people who 
ruined the city they knew—Baran was, like nearly all the older migrants I met, 
unequivocal in his wish to return.  Political fears combined with the general 
precariousness of life in the city made village return an attractive, if unlikely, vision:  
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How can I say it?  Our culture didn’t suit here. Your psychology’s ruined. You’re 
like a fish out of water.  There was the fear of being killed.  I mean you couldn’t 
think of economy, because it’s as if you have an enemy and he’s following you.  
So no job, no food, no savings.  Stress—my balance was ruined and I would lose 
my mind with all these difficulties.  I mean, think of it, I found a house but I’m 
unable to get by.   
 
You live big problems, trauma.  You can’t carry out your basic human duties.  
Because you think, when will they come for me, how, where?  Every hour, every 
minute I was thinking this.   I had a relative; he was eighteen when we found him 
in the state hospital morgue.  Sometimes I wished I had died there. 
 
Baran echoes many forced migrants I met—echoes, at least, those who came of age in the 
village—in his wish to return to his village if only circumstances were right.  “What 
business do I have here?  I wouldn’t hesitate a second if it were legal for us to return to 
our village. Like I said, if things were at ease, I’d return. I’d live on my own land.  Even 
the littlest thing there was better than anything here. In the village at least you feel that 
you’re free, but here how could that be the case?  Here, if one day you don’t work, you 
go hungry.”  The social genesis of his desire to return is obvious enough.  What Z called 
day to day living defined Baran’s livelihood as well.  With his roasted seed pushcart he 
found a small “share of the market”, as he put it, and seeing the precariousness of work 
around him, he held to it.  But it kept him in constant livelihood insecurity.  Baran, like Z, 
finds himself, after dispossession, self-employed, reliant on a meager, unpredictable 
source of income, largely de-linked from dependable social safety nets, beset by worries 
about how to make a living, and reminiscing about a village life that, despite all its 
inequities, nevertheless guaranteed one’s existence. 
 
3. Mehmet: “I was paying them installments on something they burned, that was very 
hard” 
 
 Another illustration of the aftermath of forced migration comes from a man in his 
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mid-40s who was living in the neighborhood of Melik Ahmet in Suriçi, within 
Diyarbakır’s old basalt walls.  He came from a village outside of the town of Hazro, 
where, by his account, his was among the two or three most well off households in the 
village.  “I had a nice overcoat, not everyone could have such things”, he bragged, adding 
that his wealth was such that he could sit and not work if he wished: “My wife used to 
say, get up, work!  But I would hire workers instead.  What I mean is, our situation was 
good.”  In Diyarbakır, he lived in a modest home in a neighborhood where people 
complained about pickpockets, petty theft, and drug use and dealing.  Sitting on floor 
cushions in a sparsely decorated living room, he apologized a number of times, saying 
that he wished I could have seen him in the village.  There he could have shown me true 
hospitality, he said, and recalled times when his father could afford to sacrifice a lamb for 
every visitor.   In part, this was a conversational habit of self-deprecation in hospitality; in 
fact he was extremely generous, bringing plate after plate of fresh fruit, nuts, and fruit 
leather and pots of tea.  But it was also about the specter of comparison haunting 
displaced families, particularly older people who carry the memory of rural livelihoods 
and a certain security of existence, and who filter much of their urban experience through 
these memories.  This very process is the subject of the next chapter, though, so here I 
merely note it as we turn to Mehmet’s more general remarks on village life.  “Growing up 
in the village”, Mehmet said, 
 
I remember that it wasn’t like today’s Kurdish cities.  Animals, vineyards, 
gardens, that’s what we lived by.  It’s very hard for a person to break from the 
village life and to come here and not feel like a stranger.  I mean, you come with 
no profession.   
 
When we came, there were ten in our household.  Working, eating, it was very 
hard.  There wasn’t any work to be had. Think: we sold the animals at below half 
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price.  When you think that there were 1,000 or more animals in every village, 
naturally no one would buy them at the animal market.   
 
The significance of animals as a form of rural wealth in the southeast, a region where 
shepherding plays an important role in the rural economy, and the impact on household 
livelihoods of so many families having to, in the chaotic days of displacement, sell their 
flocks at far below market price is something we have seen elsewhere in this chapter.  
Mehmet went on to describe in more detail his early years in the city, noting first the 
number of years he paid rent.33  “For nine years, I paid rent.  I’ve pushed a street cart for 
more than 15 years.  Actually, for 10 years, I sold things without a cart, just out of hand, 
in this city.”  A few years ago, he took out a bank loan and bought a vehicle to transport 
everyday goods from wholesalers to shops.  But he was involved in a bad traffic accident 
and suffered lasting physical injuries that have kept him from work.  The village seemed 
to him the only option for a viable livelihood, but as he makes clear, there are obstacles to 
return. “Actually my brother returned to the village.  If I had the chance I too would 
return, but how?  If I go, I’d need a house, how’s that going to happen?  I still owe a lot 
on the car.  And I’m not well and can’t work now.”  
 He took a dim view of life in the city, and echoed Z’s sense of life in the city as 
one self-same day after another, yet in this instance from the perspective of someone not 
as busy as he wished to be.  “It’s morning off to the teahouse and evening to home.  If 
there’s a bit of bread around, we eat that.”  The specter of village productivity and the 
sense of possibility associated with rural livelihoods alongside urban limitations surfaced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 One wonders about the degree to which applying for compensation (tazminat) might introduce into 
ways of talking about forced migration certain discursive habits.  Thinking about village life in terms of 
what can be quantified (acres of land, numbers of fruit and nut trees, number of cattle and sheep) or talking 
about city life in terms of years of rent paid—all play a part in the application process for compensation.  
This recalls the analytical distinction between the last chapter and this one, and suggests how written and 
oral rhetorical conventions bleed into one another. 
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often in his account: “If I could just bring yogurt back from the village, we’d have a way 
of getting by, but you can’t do that here either.”  Echoing a familiar theme in rural-urban 
migration studies—a widespread perception among newcomers of a lack of solidarity and 
mutual support in the city versus the country—he reflected, “In the city, it’s not clear 
who’s hungry and who’s full.  Everyone looks after himself, thinks for himself.”  Things 
were better, he repeated often, in the village: 
Our life in the village, we had a two-story house, it had a living room and a 
bathroom.  I took farm credit from the state; I made a stable for my cows.  And 
it’s all gone.  We came here, and I was paying them installments [to the state] for 
something they burned.  That was very hard for me.  Go now and look, it’s not 
apparent even where the house was—as if it were all flat ground. 
 
Our vineyards, the farming, the animal work, it went well.  Our pocket was full.  
We planted barley and the money would last us a year.  I planted a little tobacco.  
I would buy animals and turn them, buying when they were small, fattening them 
on our pastures then selling them for nearly double the price.  I would buy at 500 
and sell at 800.  Here, that too is not an option. 
As noted in the first chapter, economic hierarchies in the countryside, save for those 
between large landholders and the rest, often mean little after migration.  Mehmet 
represents how someone of regard in the village was rendered equal to all forced 
migrants, and the sting this leaves. 
 
 4. The Şimşek family 
 In a neighborhood inhabited almost entirely by the displaced, in a part of the city 
dominated by cement midrise rentals, the Şimşeks, who lived until the early 1990s in a 
village outside of Lice, owned a modest apartment.  The family first lived in a rental, but 
they saved, sold family gold, and added that to the money they received upon the sale of 
their animals to purchase a small place.  (In the 1990s in Diyarbakır, it was possible to 
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find modestly priced housing.)  The fact that they owned their home should not be seen 
as a sign of relative wealth; many displaced families, more than one would guess, were 
able to purchase homes.  As one report on the aftermath of displacement notes, “When 
displaced families first came to Diyarbakır, by selling whatever they had, before all else 
they worked hard to acquire a place for the family to take shelter.  Currently, 
approximately half (49 percent) of [the surveyed displaced] families live in houses they 
own” (Kalkınma Merkezi 2006: 29).  Newcomers recurrently summarized to me their 
early years in the city as an effort to find a place of their own, and to avoid rent.   
 The older family members were without work, though when their health still 
permitted they had traversed the country as seasonal agricultural workers. An important 
source of income and insurance for the house came from a daughter who had found work 
at a fast food restaurant in a shopping center, where she earned minimum wage and had 
health insurance. 
 This passage—long and minimally edited—begins with the recollections of the 
oldest man in the house.  Later his wife and son-in-law enter the conversation.   
The village head (muhtar) called everyone and said ‘gather in the central square’.  
Then they started to burn houses.  Then I left my animals in town [Lice], and first 
we came to Lice, then to Diyarbakır.  A house, a blanket, nothing.  If you 
happened to have had money on you, then you had it.  Otherwise, well… 
 
If the price for the animals was two, we sold for one.  We had to sell.  We looked 
for a rental.  We had no furniture, not even bread.  No one would hire us.   
 
We suffered, we had no security.  We couldn’t go out.  There was Hızbullah.   
 
We worked and what not, but the house was a rental.  The kids worked.  That’s 
how we ate our bread.   
 
Think, the village is destroyed, and you’re in dire straits.  Vineyards, fields, 
gardens, there was everything.  But they burned it, they destroyed it.  Quite a few 
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people went and their places were deserted.  They [their gardens, fields] were 
without anyone to look after them for 16 years.   
 
We dealt with animals, with the land.  We had a lot of land.  I personally had a 
mill.  In the village, it’s such that however many vineyards or gardens you have, 
then that’s how much work you have. 
 
(Auntie interjects):  We’d water the onions, the vegetables, and the wheat.  We’d 
spend our time and patience with them.  We’d hoe the fields. 
 
(Main speaker):  My land was extensive.  There were only two families in the 
village above me [in terms of economic hierarchy].   I mean, I had plenty of land, 
plenty of animals.   
 
And money?  We would buy more animals or things for the house, and the money 
we earned stayed in our house.  Money was just for exchange.  We’d sell grapes, 
walnuts, almonds, and we’d buy clothing, basic things.  In the village, money 
doesn’t go far.  There’s no coffeehouse, there’s no this or that. 
 
Then one day we looked, they had set fire to everything.  “You’re terrorists, we’re 
going to kill you all”.  This they were yelling and screaming.  You know how they 
say during the apocalypse everything’s all mixed up in everything else?  It was 
just like that.   
 
I took my kids and without even being able to grab a single hair from our house 
we escaped to Lice, then to Diyarbakır.  Then I went back to Lice and sold my 
animals. 
 
(Auntie):  They burned the village.  They burned my house.  They burned my 
stable.  They burned my garden.  They burned my trees.  We fled.  We came on 
foot.  We were in bad shape, and along the way no one would take us in.  ‘If we 
take you in, if we help you, they’ll burn our village too.’  People we had known 
for years, with whom we had relations [unspecified of what precise nature], they 
wouldn’t extend a hand.  But we’re not resentful.  Maybe if we were in the same 
situation, we too wouldn’t have helped.  In any case, it’s a good thing that our 
road didn’t pass through Kulp.  If it had, they would have killed us.  But whatever 
it is, the things they did can’t be explained.  There aren’t even any bones left from 
my son.  Our village was beautiful.  Life was good: our mother’s land, our 
father’s.  Everything was there.  And then they rip us apart like you would tear 
your worst enemy to shreds.   
 
So then we came to the city but we didn’t even have a blanket to spread on the 
sidewalk.  Our son-in-law had a relative here.  We slept, ten of us, with two 
blankets on the bare cement floor.  It went on like this for ten years.   
 
	   87	  	  
There wasn’t work to be had.  And the police wouldn’t let our children be.  When 
[a guerrilla male relative] died they took my son into torture for ten days.  The 
things we endured! 
   
(Main male speaker):  I’ll never forget, one time the sole of my son’s shoe was 
ripped, so I burned some plastic and let it drip into the hole to keep the water out.  
There were days when we couldn’t eat bread.   
 
My youngest son started selling simit on the street, and some people were always 
buying from him.  Later, we checked up on him and realized he was selling to 
Hızbullah.  So we immediately got him inside and didn’t let him out again.  At 
that time, easily 10 to 15 people were being killed every day, and if they weren’t 
killed they were kidnapped and disappeared. 
 
(Son in law): I tell you, were they to excavate underneath some of these mosques 
in Diyarbakır, the bodies of quite a few Kurdish patriots would turn up. 
 
(Main male speaker):  We couldn’t go outside, we were terrified.  
 
(Auntie):  When we came, when we went to the market or wherever, they’d say 
“where did you come from?”  And when we said “from Lice” they’d say “you’re 
terrorists.”  
 
In the village we’d at least have bread and wild greens, but in the city we don’t 
have such possibilities.  Think, we had 14 cows.   
 
And I mean, we’d go to harvest the crops or to tend the vineyards, and you 
weren’t even aware of how the time passed.  Because resources were plentiful in 
our village, there was more work to do every day, and we weren’t even aware of 
how the time passed. 
 
[Main male speaker]: We weren’t thinking of applying for compensation for our 
losses. But then again, it’s not like we were taking someone else’s money.  I mean 
the state took everything we had, cruelly, like a non-believer.  So we thought, let’s 
take what we deserve.  But they rejected our application.  We objected to our 
lawyers, but there’s still no answer.   
 
I feel it wouldn’t be right if we were to return to the village because we’re poor 
here.  But if I return without qualification to the land of my father and 
grandfather, that’s beautiful.  May that day come and I won’t look back. 
 
Present in this passage are a number of the concerns raised in the outset regarding the 
peculiarity of oral accounts and questions of temporality.  Rather than analyze this 
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passage in isolation, however, let us, by way of a conclusion, consider the broader 
matters raised in these four cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 One way to read these accounts is in terms of the detail they shed on the means by 
which the destabilization of livelihoods through displacement and dispossession took 
place.  Across the accounts, we hear of animals sold at great losses, gardens, vineyards, 
groves, and other rural small-scale agricultural and horticultural transformations of 
landscapes destroyed or left to fall into disrepair after their caretakers were forced to 
leave.  The emptied and sometimes burned-out shells of homes too, which are a part of 
household livelihoods insofar as they save one from rent, were destroyed or abandoned to 
ruin by neglect, as were other built structures of rural livelihoods such as stables. Family 
gold holdings were brought to jewelers or moneychangers and converted into cash.   
 Yet what if we bracket the status of these accounts as historical documents?  If we 
set aside questions of the actual size of landholdings or stables, or the specific sequence 
of the events described, or even their actual occurrence in the exact ways described, then 
what else might come to light?  For one thing, there is a strong sense of what Walter Ong 
(2002) identified as the situational nature of oral thinking—thinking through familiar 
objects or scenes.  We recall the prevalence of one such scene: that of burning, of fire.  It 
is remarkable that virtually everyone in this chapter, and indeed, virtually everyone I 
spoke with for this research, described the means by which they came to the city not 
through the more general description of village evacuations, but village burnings.  Given 
what is known about the processes of village evacuations, such descriptions are almost 
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certainly accurate.  That said, there are other questions to be asked of this material.  
Burning stables, holes in children’s shoes, having to sell simit: these and other images 
followed me throughout my fieldwork, turning up across interviews and everyday 
exchanges on the subject of forced migration.  At work here would seem to be not just 
‘the real’, but a storied real, a process of adapting elements of a genre of migration stories 
and the trials of life in the city after displacement that, when included in a story, add to its 
credibility.  The reason that these images come up so often, I think, is not that people 
wish to avoid talking about the actualities of the past.  It lies in a desire to make their 
stories socially recognizable and legible, and to indeed become more truthful, more 
convincing, by including these elements.  In other words, the reasons behind the 
employment of this genre, to return to Trouillot’s remarks, would seem to have to do with 
the stakes behind these stories.  Marking one’s story as authentic through the use of such 
narrative devices matters to speakers because the truth of their accounts matters, given 
the history (until recently, at least) of the denial of the extent of village evacuations.  
Simply put, people care that what happened is not silenced.   
 That these accounts are often used to morally and politically condemn the state is 
also something that surfaces.  However, to better appreciate the dynamics of discourse, 
moral condemnation, and political stance taking—of taking issue, through language, with 
a particular “distribution of the sensible” (Ranciere 2010)—we must turn to the material 
central to the next chapter, where the work of rhetoric as a means of moral and political 
evaluation and condemnation is more central. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOMATOES THIS BIG: RURAL IDYLL AFTER DISPOSSESSION 
 
THE POLITICS OF BREAKFAST 
 
 Just north of Diyarbakır, on the west bank of the Tigris, sits a satellite of housing 
units—long rows of low rises cut by a few roads, with a handful of markets and 
teahouses, a neighborhood health clinic, and a bus stop—largely disconnected from the 
rest of the city. The official name for the units is 450 Houses.  Unofficially, they are 
known as disaster housing (Diken 2007), an epithet pointing to the fact that the units 
have, despite their relative youth, been wrapped up in an impressive string of political 
and natural mishaps of local and transnational scale.   
 The settlement was first built to house victims of an earthquake in the nearby 
town of Lice in 1975. The earthquake destroyed nearly 8,000 homes and damaged 8,000 
more, rendering tens of thousands of people homeless overnight. Within a few years, 
though, the units were mostly abandoned; living in a low rise apartment complex proved 
as undesirable as the other forms of emergency housing,34 and residents soon returned to 
Lice to spaces and functions they more associated with home (for instance, a place for 
animals, a plot for horticulture and viniculture, a clay oven, and a home built from 
materials suitable to the extremes of summers and winters in southeastern Turkey).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
34 Emergency tents and prefabricated housing units provided by Ankara and imported from Europe 
helped to ease the immediate housing crisis, as did international financial assistance led by Saudi Arabia 
and Libya (Mitchell 1977).  Though largely forgotten outside the region, the earthquake has had a number 
of lasting effects, both on Lice’s landscape and on international disaster relief practices. In an area outside 
the collapsed old city center, which was fatefully built of rubble stone, there are remnants of Yugoslavian, 
Swiss, and French style prefabricated homes.  And in the organization Oxfam, the use of an igloo type of 
relief housing was abandoned after its poor results in Lice. 
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 A few years later, Ankara faced a rather different disaster when it was forced to 
provide temporary shelter for tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds who crossed the border 
into Turkey in the 1980s, fleeing chemical-weapons attacks on northern Iraqi settlements.  
Most of the refugees were concentrated closer to the Iraqi border—in Hakkari or 
Yüksekova.  The ability of those cities to provide emergency shelter was limited, 
however, and the state intervened to relocate a number of the refugees to Diyarbakır, 
where 450 Houses was again put to use.35  Yet these occupants, too, soon abandoned the 
units, such that when a few hundred thousand displaced rural Kurds began arriving to the 
city in the early 1990s, 450 Houses was purposed once again to settle people uprooted by 
disaster. 
Under the shade of a mulberry tree outside a teahouse in 450 Houses, a man in his 
late forties—call him Ahmet—described his trajectory from a village outside of Lice to 
the settlements.  His village was burned in August 1994.  He repeated the precise date 
frequently throughout our conversation, in a habit of specifying and reiterating dates that 
I often encountered in forced migrants’ narratives.  (This is possibly an effect of the 
various bureaucratic processes of verification that one must go through in order to apply 
for government compensation for losses incurred as a result of counterinsurgency 
techniques such as forced migration and environmental destruction—an instance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In a reflection of the ambivalent feelings, at best, that some of the city’s already-settled (i.e. in the 
city before forced migration) self-described “true Diyarbakırites” hold regarding the recent direction of 
Kurdish nationalist political discourse and practice, a number of older middle class professionals I met, 
many of whom were distinctly concerned that I would portray their city as only marked by poverty and 
political dissensus, painted a history of a tranquil, genteel urban life before the “peşmerge” arrived from 
northern Iraq.  One woman, who proudly traced her genealogy to Arabistan and underscored a number of 
times that she was not Kurdish, claimed that no one had an interest in Kurdish music or Kurdish language 
and “linguistic rights” before this period.  This is certainly a questionable history of the reemergence of 
Kurdish nationalism, but it is interesting in that it repeats the notion that the “true” reasons for this recent 
historical development lie outside of Turkey and its history of dealing with the existence of Kurds within its 
borders. 
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textual habits identified in the previous chapter bleeding into the oral.)  Whatever the 
reason, Ahmet noted, explaining the state evacuation and destruction of his village, “the 
people had to migrate to the city.  And we migrated.  We came here.” Many first stayed 
in tents, depots, or with relatives, while a group of men, Ahmet remembers, petitioned the 
governor for permission to settle in 450 Houses.  Permission was granted, but the years 
since seem to have left Ahmet with the feeling that, beyond that initial assistance, he and 
his neighbors had been abandoned.  “The state at no time supported us, at no time lent 
assistance.  Do you know? They gave support to those migrants in the city, even though 
they made many mistakes [here he implies that they supported the PKK].  Here if once a 
month, once a month, [the state] had supported us, we would still have given thanks.  But 
this?  Now that they left us in the city’s outskirts, we are left in need of bread”.  Of life 
since, he had little good to say.  He had no steady work, like most of his neighbors; a 
public health study focused on rates of and reasons for diarrhea, carried out in 450 houses 
by two specialists from the local university (Elmacı and Özelçi 2001), claims that a 
majority of the neighborhood’s residents are either without any work or rely mainly on 
temporary, seasonal, and unreliable incomes—much in line, as we have seen, with other 
dispossessed geographies in the city.   
Also like many of his neighbors, Ahmet was involved in a long and trying process 
of applying to the government for material compensation for losses incurred as a direct 
effect of counterinsurgency practices.36 At the time of our conversation, he had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Compensation began with a number of high-profile cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights in the first few years after the events of the 1990s.  ECHR operates on the principle that victims may 
apply if no laws for redress exist within their own national legal framework.  In July of 2004, Turkey, both 
to close the breach in political and cultural intimacy (there were some 8000 cases before ECHR by 2004 
(GÖÇ-DER 2009: 11)) and to exercise more control over the determination of compensation amounts, 
initiated its own national system for compensation under Law No. 5233.  A number of non-governmental 
groups, both national and international, have voiced concerns about the means used for quantifying and 
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expecting a final settlement on his claim for two years, after a series of objections to the 
amount offered followed by re-inspections of the evidence of damage by state officials.  
“When is that money coming?  We have no hope.  One year?  Two years?  Never?  It’s 
up to the state”.  He was explicit about his wish to return, and had heard of reinvigorated 
attempts at village return.  “We see it on TV, in the papers, but we don’t know what 
they’re doing…Let them inform us so that at least we can be prepared.”  But he had little 
hope of that project either, for a number of practical reasons often elided in the more 
optimistic press and politicians’ statements on village return.    
Now apparently some village return project was prepared.  But when they send us 
back to the village, under what conditions am I to live?  I have in the village 
neither a home, a stable, animals, nor money in my pocket.  When I go to the 
village, at the very least I’d need a tent so I could sleep there.  But I don’t have 
that chance…When citizens return, either a certain amount of credit should be 
given, or the state should support them for a couple of months such that when I 
load my wife and kids on the back of the truck, I have support until I can plow the 
fields and make a living from that.   
His trajectory is in many ways similar to the people we met in the previous chapter.  But 
also present in Ahmet’s account was a further aspect that allows us to look more closely 
at the meaningful mediation of economic life after displacement and dispossession, and 
the modes and forms of politics emerging therefrom.  It came across in a phrase he 
repeated throughout our encounter when he tried to restate the difference between life in 
the village and life in the city: “While in the village we would every day make breakfast 
of honey and butter, here we can’t even see an olive”.   
 The focus of this chapter is on nostalgic constructions of the countryside in the 
wake of the 1990s, and the uses, in discourses on the aftermath of displacement and 
dispossession, of signs of rural land and livelihoods as a means of morally and politically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assessing losses, the amounts offered, the long delays and bureaucratic complications, and the questionable 
aims of some lawyers, among other matters. 
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evaluating the consequences of forced migration.  Specifically, I am interested here in 
how signs of rurality (tomatoes, walnut trees), in their positive association with 
sustenance and fertility, are used in the narratives of migrants to not only paint the 
countryside as good, in contrast with an urban present overwhelmingly characterized as 
bad.  The destruction of such positively valued signs, in the process of displacement and 
dispossession, also becomes part of the discursive practices by which state acts of 
counterinsurgency are evaluated as immoral; signs of soil and its fruits are part of the 
means by which people stake out a critical, oppositional stance to “the state” and to the 
state of affairs they find themselves in.   
 In other words, thinking through Agamben’s conceptual vocabulary, but 
challenging his implication that the project of abandonment actually succeeds in stripping 
its subjects of their political life, through these everyday signs deeply associated with 
what is good in rural life, people take issue with the state’s sovereign claim to use 
violence against its own citizens, and to then include them within its ken only to exclude 
them.  Using tomatoes or soil as rhetorical stepping stones, people question the self-
evidence of the condition they find themselves in, and suggest a sense of political 
belonging that does not recognize the state as the ultimate authority, but that rather has its 
allegiances with the ongoing project of Kurdish dissensus and oppositional political 
praxis. Rather than quashing the political “problem” of Kurdish dissent in Turkey, then, 
we again see that displacement has rather shifted its terrain and its terms.  It is in trying to 
understand this process that I focus here on idyllic constructions of the countryside and 
the political appropriation of signs of food and soil. 
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 Idyllic constructions of the countryside and food signs were not something I set 
out to research.  Rather, these themes and images emerged unexpectedly from the 
research phase informing the previous chapter: interviews and less formal conversations 
and encounters with individuals and families with first-hand experience with the military-
led evacuation and destruction of surrounding rural communities in the 1990s and the 
attendant forms of loss of life and livelihoods.  This phase of research, as noted earlier, 
was primarily focused on eliciting accounts of migration and transformed livelihoods, but 
time and again, as I asked my standard questions about migration, work, rent, and the 
like, I found myself noting a number of unanticipated images and objects of memory: 
walnut and almond trees, implausibly fat tomatoes, pears like nectar, butter that some 
swear kept villagers alive well into their 100s, or tasty yogurt allegedly unmatched by 
anything one can find in the city.   
 Back in Cambridge and beginning to work through fieldwork data, I happened to 
mention the unexpected recurrence of these objects and images to an anthropologist 
visiting from another school.  His reply caught me off guard: to paraphrase, well yes, 
often the people we anthropologists talk to tend to account for confounding life 
experiences through such primitive imagery.  I was taken aback by the last phrase, not 
because I thought he was implying an evolutionist denial of coevalness that Fabian 
(1983) sees at work in stubborn and subtle ways in much anthropological thinking.  
Knowing his work, I am fairly sure he meant primitive in the sense of fundamental, 
elementary, or basic.  Rather, my surprise was due to the fact that this was precisely the 
opposite point I was trying to make in the description of this material to him.  For it 
struck me at the time of fieldwork, as it does now, that there is nothing elementary about 
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the ways in which the stuff of rural life is put to use in the narratives of forced migrants 
to tell complicated histories of migration, dispossession, transformed livelihoods, and 
urban impoverishment.  The objects themselves, in their indexical association with the 
ordinary rural activities of eating, farming, and shepherding, are perhaps in some sense 
basic, but what they are tasked with, in the city’s displaced, dispossessed neighborhoods, 
is something quite intricate.  These objects are the stuff out of which people attempt to 
give meaning to an exceedingly messy sociopolitical history, and to ask a tomato to tell 
the history of loss and dispossession is no elementary task.  Is there not analytical value, 
then, in not too hastily dismissing these ways of conceptualizing and narrating a 
confounding history as merely basic—for there is a “politics of significance” at play in 
labeling certain forms of stories as “mere” (Herzfeld 1997)—and to instead attending to 
the resonance of the stories of people who have lived—some as self-described guerrilla 
families, some as more or less sympathetic by-standers, some as self-described victims—
through, to echo Roseberry (1989:59), a disordered past and into a present much the 
same?  It is with this framework in mind that I examine this common genre of narrating 
household histories of declining livelihoods and the differences between rural and urban 
life by way of signs of the stuff of rural life and livelihoods, and explore the potential 
political work that these discourses might be carrying out. 
 But here, before proceeding to the ethnography, we need to pause to consider 
more clearly how discourse is used to morally persuade others of a certain politics of 
dispossession and displacement. Let us take the example of implausibly fat Lice 
tomatoes.  Lice tomatoes are, like other products of the soil analyzed below, indexes in 
the semiotic sense in that they acquire their social meaning by virtue of spatial or 
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temporal contiguity to something, possibly also another sign (Peirce 1974, Mertz 2007).  
We shall see below that the signs for food in people’s narratives are contiguous to the 
sign for Kurdish soil or earth—that from which one has been dispossessed—and as such 
are good to think with due to this logic of metonymic association. The unusual size of the 
tomato and its delicious taste or color are themselves qualisigns with iconic value, the 
presumption being that only foods of this kind or quality could be grown in such fertile 
soil.  The metonymic or indexical association goes even deeper because these foods are 
part of the ensemble of foods that compose agricultural production in the region.  But 
there is another aspect of significance at work, and one that gets us to the moral and 
political evaluation at work here, one hinted at in the previous chapter, but in need of 
fleshing out.  There is a moral valence to the indexical and iconic system around foods.  
Food production is linked to the sustaining of life, something clearly suffused with 
positive moral valuation.  This would seem to be a part of why the state’s scorched earth 
policies are valued as doubly immoral by the people we will encounter.  The use of food 
signs described here is not only because of people’s agrarian backgrounds.  Nor is it only 
because of an orientation to situational thinking that Ong (2002) locates in oral cultures: a 
predilection to think through immediate and familiar objects or situations rather than 
abstractions.  It rather has to do with an association of agrarian livelihoods not only with 
innocence—a number of people I met underscored that they were “hurting no one” in 
their previous livelihoods—but morality: sustaining life, sustaining, even, the nation.  
The status of the southeast as breadbasket of the southeast, a center of fertile land feeding 
the country, was not lost on my interlocutors.  The people I met in researching this and 
other chapters underscored this moral valence to make a political point.  This chapter 
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tries to unpack the political significance of morally charged signs of rural life.  We begin 
with a brief exploration of the valences of rural idyll. 
RURAL IDYLL  
 A number of analysts—critical geographers in particular—have noted the 
pervasiveness of idyllic constructions of the countryside, in both popular and academic 
understandings of rural life and across a variety of contexts (e.g. Valentine 1997, Little 
and Austin 1996).  Specific to Kurdish history, politics, and culture, geographer Maria 
O’Shea has described the salience of nostalgic constructions of Kurdish rurality in both 
the academic literature on Kurds and in the myths and images by which many Kurds 
themselves articulate ‘Kurdishness’.  On the latter point, O’Shea writes: 
If any common thread of culture unites the disparate parts of Kurdistan, and forms 
a basis for both Kurdish identity and national mythology, it would appear to be 
the rural experience. Despite the inequalities and poverty inherent in Kurdish rural 
life, many Kurds idealize the rural idyll, in much the same way that the virtues of 
nomadic tribal life are extolled by many settled Arabs. [2004:136] 
 
Rural idyll, she shows, is reflected in many of the signifying practices present across the 
Kurdish Middle East, from popular Kurdish music to children’s names to the sorts of 
foods Kurds would identify as ‘truly Kurdish’.  Though O’Shea does not specify, in the 
following passage, precisely what part of the Kurdish Middle East her observations are 
based on, the general idea that idealized constructions of Kurdish rural life are carried out 
through food rings true in my experience: 
Those foods thought of as Kurdish tend to be those of the village—hearty soups, 
dairy products, and grain-based dishes. Many everyday food-related activities of 
village people are revered by Kurds, frequently practiced in homes in the urban 
setting and often exported to foreign lands as symbols of Kurdish identity. 
Examples include: the making of flat griddle bread…butter churning, providing 
both Kurdish butter and the national drink, buttermilk…yogurt and cheese 
making…All these foodstuffs, the fruits of subsistence farming, and their means 
of production, are considered to be somehow inherently Kurdish. They appear in 
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proverbs and expressions, are often ostentatiously favored over richer fare, and 
are considered to be more delicious in Kurdistan than elsewhere. [2004: 137-8] 
 
Similarly, the scholarly habits of representing Kurdishness that O’Shea and others 
identify as endemic to much of the published work on Kurds and Kurdish geographies 
also tend to focus on the rural at the cost of a more invested analysis of other aspects of 
Kurdish culture, society, and politics.  As Dutch ethnographer Martin Van Bruinessen 
remarked, “cities appear to have been peripheral to the concerns of most Kurds as well as 
those who studied them” (1996). 37   Though this observation may not be as representative 
of the state of scholarship now as it was in the late 1990s, the general point holds; there is 
a strong association of Kurdishness, across different registers of discourse, with an 
idealized picture of rurality.  Many of my interlocutors seemed to speak of their lives as 
suspended somewhere between country and city, and it was from this unstable point that 
they told stories of delicious clotted cream or soil that returned two or threefold on what 
one put in.  In thinking through this last point, Raymond Williams’s seminal work The 
Country and the City offers an important insight.  Williams analyzes imaginative 
constructions of the countryside in the United Kingdom across centuries of urbanization 
and industrialization, and makes the dry observation that, no matter when we look, the 
blissful rural past seems always to have only just vanished (Williams 1975; Roseberry 
1989: 57).  This perhaps renders idyllic constructions of the countryside questionable as 
historical records, but that is not, for Williams, the point.  What analysis instead has to 
account for are the uses of the past in the present.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 At least in the example of Kurdish Turkey, it seems clear that this tendency is rapidly changing, as 
more and more researchers from within Turkey and without are looking into the social and political lives of 
cities across the southeast and in Kurdish geographies in Turkey’s migrant metropoles. For a brief sampling 
of the literature available to English readers, see Gambetti 2009; Öktem 2004; Özsoy 2010, 2013; Üstündağ 
2005.  Nükhet Sirman is also involved in ongoing research on Kurdish rural-urban migrants in Mersin. 
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 Williams’s felicitous line on the “well-known habit of using the past, the ‘good 
old days’, as a stick to beat the present” (Williams 1975:12) provides a point of departure 
for thinking through the uses of the past in the stories of older migrants in contemporary 
Diyarbakır that I will work through in the following pages.  But what precise aspects of 
the present are being, as it were, beaten?  And how is this generative of political stance?  
How are these forms of talk that extol the virtues of rural life and focus on workaday 
elements of rural life and livelihoods (fruits of the soil, products of animal husbandry, the 
soil itself) working to provide the ordinary stuff from which people articulate a critical 
stance to experiences of city living founded on acts of dispossession and marked by 
impoverishment, wage dependency, and economic precariousness?  Let us now look, in 
ethnographic detail, at the work of moral valuation via food signs as an important 
everyday tool for the articulation, between material practice and its meaningful 
mediation, of a stance of objection, a politics of displacement and dispossession.  We 
begin with the rhetorical life of land. 
 
RICH SOIL 
 One key image in idyllic constructions of the countryside is the fertility of soil. 
Diyarbakır, to remind the reader, is located in the northern stretch of a landscape that 
ancient Greeks called Mesopotamia, between rivers. The agricultural productivity of the 
landscape—the so-called Fertile Crescent—is famous, nationally and internationally.  
Discourse on the fertile, blessed nature of the soil (bereketli toprak) finds a way into a 
range of public representations of the region.  A recent statement by the Democratic 
Society Congress (a group of politicians and intellectuals assembled to theorize the future 
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of Kurdish politics in Turkey) on the significance of economic reforms, if Turkey were to 
enact the vision of democratic autonomy they are calling for, begins with these words: 
To speak of the economy in these lands (bu topraklarda), in perhaps the first 
center of economic society, is exciting.  Because these lands are depicted in all the 
holy books in terms of abundance, fertile geography, and heaven. This is a place 
that saw the emergence of the Neolithic village and the agricultural revolution, the 
cradle of Mesopotamian Civilization where the first societies began to live 
together and become self-sufficient.  Unfortunately, today this heavenly 
geography has been transformed into a virtual hell in the grips of poverty and 
economic abandonment. As a result of colonization and intentional economic 
underdevelopment, with its hunger, joblessness, and destroyed nature, Kurdistan 
has become a virtually unlivable space, creating a wave of migration scattered in 
all directions.  [DTK n.d.] 
 
Local business interests also frequently reference the soil’s fertility in promotional 
brochures, speeches, and interviews meant to entice investors to a geography where over 
20 percent of the regional economy is in agriculture and animal husbandry and a 
significant percentage of local industry (matched only by textile production) has to do 
with the processing of agricultural products. Under the heading “Fertile places (diyarlar) 
that witnessed history”, for instance, a promotional booklet prepared by the Diyarbakır-
based Karacadağ Development Agency first describes Diyarbakır as “located in a place 
where civilization was born, agriculture was first carried out, and which is known as the 
Fertile Crescent due to the fertility of agricultural lands” (2010:5-6), before going on to 
list a series of facts meant to prove the region’s deeply rooted history of agrarian 
abundance: the first known domesticated wheat was found just outside of the city; the 
first wild grapes were found in the same site, along with the first chickpeas; Diyarbakır 
was a major supplier of roses to the Ottoman Empire, and in the 1500s the province met 
Istanbul’s needs for meat.   
 Many of my interlocutors, from long-settled shopkeepers to displaced newcomers, 
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invoked the image of fertile land and the history of productivity associated with it to ask, 
rhetorically: how is it possible to have such poverty and want in such a plentiful, 
productive ecology?  People posed such questions not only in terms of the aboveground 
offerings of the land.  What lies beneath the land was also the subject of similarly 
intended speculation.  There is a great deal of rumor and conjecture in Diyarbakır (and 
indeed, in Turkey more generally) about great oil reserves said to lie just beyond the city, 
but that are closed to tapping, due to ill-defined external pressure. 38   
Images of the fertile soil of the region, in short, simply abound in the city, and 
across social categories; it would be difficult not to come across them.  But although this 
imagery was sometimes explicitly linked to stories of outside meddling or potential 
investment opportunities, more often, in my fieldwork at least, such imagery was invoked 
to draw a contrast between past rural productivity and present urban privation.  Thus a 
man in his late 40s or early 50s who saw his village outside of Kulp burned by the 
military, and who, in 2009, was working as a street vendor selling inexpensive belts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Concerned less with what grows above ground than what lies beneath, stories of the purported great 
underground mineral wealth in the southeast were extremely common in Diyarbakır.  A widespread rumor 
in the city points to the extensive oil fields in nearby northern Iraq and the modest ones in nearby Batman 
and claims to have knowledge that far more oil reserves exist in the southeast, but that outside powers 
refuse to allow the fields to be tapped.  My field notes record this exchange with a middle-aged tailor born 
in the city but with family roots in a nearby village, “Look, at a certain point, a line is drawn [the border 
with Iraq].  They draw a line, eh [he extends his finger and draws a line on my knee].  Now, how is it that 
on one side they are rich from resources, and on the other, nothing at all?”  He left the question open.  
Sometimes the agent refusing to permit the rumored oil fields in the southeast to be exploited is Ankara 
(because, as the guesswork goes, it wants to keep the southeast poor and thus subservient), sometimes 
America, and sometimes an international oil company (typically Shell, probably because it operated a plant 
for years outside of Diyarbakır).  And the accusation runs along similar lines as the general theory, also 
quite widespread in the southeast, that holds that eastern Turkey has been intentionally underdeveloped 
economically to serve a national interest in regional docility and dependence.  Another vein of mineral 
stories maintains the same general thesis (that there is great potential in the region), but instead of being 
underused, it is said to be abused.  Thus the copper mines just north of the city (in use since the late 
Ottoman period), the oil fields outside of Batman and just south of Diyarbakır (discovered in the 1940s), 
and the many hydroelectric stations built along the region’s key waterways, the Tigris and Euphrates—all 
are cited as instances of resource extraction that enrich or benefit mainly those outside the region. Again, 
these and similar rumors have social purchase because they tap into the widespread perception that only 
political injustice and intentionally structured inequality can explain such poverty amidst natural 
abundance. 
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wallets, nail clippers, worry beads, and trinkets recalled this about his land and its 
productivity: 
Our land, yani, I’d taken a separate plot from my father’s.  Vallahi, our land, it 
was fertile.  Maybe you won’t believe it, but you’d put in one and get out 
three…Working in the fields used to be our thing, wheat, barley, green lentils, red 
lentils, and tobacco.  Our onions, they were famous.  Our vineyards were 
extensive; they had a start and no end!  I used to make [fruit leather] and [fruit 
sausage, produced by boiling grape juice thickened with starch and repeatedly 
dipping a string of walnuts into the mixture, then letting it cool, then dipping it 
again to form another layer, and so on] and send it to Diyarbakır for sale.  We had 
fruit trees, plums, apples, pears, apricots.  Yaw, our village was lush, I mean, I 
wish we were there together now, you’d see what I mean.  
 
If for him the relevant contrast was between past relative wealth and his present condition 
of economic marginality, another man in his 40s from a village outside of Lice contrasted 
the fertility of his land—which he encapsulated in the image of Lice’s famous enormous 
tomatoes—with what seemed to him a laughably meager monetary compensation by the 
state for his losses.   I listened to his stories in his living room one evening.  As was 
customary for such house visits, the evening started with a long and graceful process of 
social warming up, during which his wife brought multiple pots of tea and prepared 
heaping plates of fruit and nuts, interspersed by cigarettes my interlocutor rolled from 
tobacco grown just outside his natal village outside of Lice.  In this particular instance, 
the speaker was keen to show me a series of photographs he had taken with his cellular 
phone on a recent trip back to the now almost entirely deserted village.  They were 
grainy, but showed him sitting before a small grill billowing smoke in an open field, and 
in the shade of a stand of trees.  “True nature”, he said, “open air, not all this beton beton 
beton”.  Good for your lungs, too.   In another photograph, he was cupping his hands and 
holding something red and large: a Lice tomato. 
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Think of it, you apply for compensation for this land, and they give you 8,500 
lira.  That’s not even enough to clear the ground.  It’s not enough for a truckload 
of sand, or 500 bags of cement, or whatever else you need to construct a house.  
But out of fear we couldn’t object.  They didn’t compensate us for rent either.   
 
Our land sat fallow for years.  There were 50-60 pine nut trees, 10 dönüm of grape 
vines, but they dried up at the root.  My trees would yield five tractors of 
pomegranates, and the same for figs.  
 
But go there now and you’d say there’s no life here.  Everything dried up.39 There 
were plum trees, pears, apples.  You would get a sack of barley in exchange for a 
sack of pomegranates.  The grapes, the apples, those we would bring to nearby 
treeless villages and sell them.  We wouldn’t bring them to the city.  We were 
mountain villagers.   
 
If here you pay 30 a month for water, in the village, there’s no such thing.  And 
electric bills only came in [Prime Minister and President] Özal’s time [the 1980s].  
The well, the vegetables: all were ours.   
 
Here, like I said, the tomatoes are two lira for a kilo, and if you buy a kilo it’s 
barely enough for a salad.  A single Lice tomato was 1.5 kilos.  Really!  But you 
can’t find them anymore.40  They’re just a myth now. 
 
As evidenced in this exchange, stories about the soil’s abundance often bled into 
reflections on food.  The next section considers these ethnographic instantiations of rural 
idyll via food signs. 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT 
 Home visits—some of which led to recorded interviews, and some of which 
resulted in long, open-ended exchanges, noted down as completely as possible—usually 
involved, as in the accounts relayed above, my typically male interlocutor’s wife or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The reader will remember very similar remarks, uttered by two other older displaced people I 
interviewed about village life, from the previous chapter. 
40 In fact, Lice tomatoes did occasionally appear in Diyarbakır’s street markets.  Their skin was striated 
and imperfect, their coloring was variegated, and they had the taste of an excellent summer tomato.  I 
mentioned, during the exchange in question, that I had bought and eaten some of these tomatoes, but my 
interlocutor was certain that whatever I had tasted would have paled in comparison to what he was talking 
about. 
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daughter emerging from the kitchen with plates piled high with clementines, pears, or 
pomegranates.  In winter months, there was also typically a stack of fruit leather or a bag 
of hazelnuts, almond, or walnuts—stock winter food in many villages, and said to keep 
the body warm in the cold months.   
 Beyond the pleasure and grace of these acts, noteworthy was the extent to which 
such mundane objects of consumption so often served as catalysts or prompts for 
recollections of rural life (for ethnographies of food as an especially rich site for the 
exploration of sensuous memory, see Sutton 2001, 2010; Holtzman 2006).  What is more, 
fruits, nuts, and dairy products not only acted as rhetorical stepping stones for reflecting 
on past rural productivity, abundance, and a feeling of security and assurance of one’s 
ability to get by, which was contrasted by ex-villagers, both implicitly and explicitly, 
with the aftermath of dispossession and urban impoverishment.  They also provided a 
means for morally and politically evaluating displacement and dispossession.  Thus an 
older couple talked about searching out a particular nut merchant in Diyarbakır who sold, 
alongside the fat, easy-on-the-eye walnuts imported from other cities or from overseas, 
sacks of smaller, deeply tannin-blackened walnuts grown in villages outside the town 
they hailed from.  At certain times of the year, too, at certain heavily trafficked 
intersections men would sit next to a sack filled with walnuts or almonds and with a small 
cardboard sign on the sidewalk in front of the sack advertising the origins of the nuts.  
Field notes also record an instance when an older man was showing me how to roll up 
walnuts in fruit leather, making a dürüm of sorts, when suddenly halfway through eating, 
he put it down and, with a theatrical look of disgust, insisted that “Turkish” walnuts41 had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This instance of ‘ethnicizing’ consumables brings to mind discourses on “Turkish tea” (a rather mild 
black tea grown along the eastern coast of the Black Sea that is the standard across most of Turkey) versus 
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no taste and were nothing like the yield of the trees “they burned”.  The taste of the 
walnuts thus activates an association in which not just memory or longing are at stake, 
but a political condemnation of the state for its scorched earth policies.  The reason why 
tomatoes or walnuts work so well for this is their indexical association with the sign of a 
landscape over-endowed with signs of fertility and the sustenance of life.   The acts of the 
state (namely, destroying walnut groves) become not only unjust, but immoral. 
 The use of mundane rural objects as semiotic tools for political and moral 
condemnation also extended beyond fruit and nuts to other objects of rural life.  In a visit 
to a house on the far outskirts of town, to a family that was receiving animal husbandry-
targeted microcredit loans from the Bangladeshi Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus’s 
Grameen Bank—Diyarbakır was the test pilot for the Grameen Bank’s extension of its 
controversial microcredit program to Turkey—a bowl of slightly sour homemade yogurt 
with a thick layer of kaymak (the semi-solid skin of milk fat that forms on the top), 
glasses of yogurt watered down to a drinkable consistency and salted (what O’Shea 
above called, more or less accurately, buttermilk), and a small bowl of honey from my 
interlocutors’ natal village were placed on the floor before us as we chatted.  We began 
dipping some leftover market-bought flatbread42 into the yogurt.   The elder male of the 
household, who was explaining the inadequacy of the few animals they had for making a 
living in comparison to his large flocks in the village, repeatedly called my attention to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the local preference for Ceylon tea, imported (and often smuggled) across the Syrian border.  Dislike for 
Turkish tea gets worked into daily life in interesting ways, in popular humor (see Güzel 1997), in ways of 
politely (or sometimes not so politely) chiding the proprietors of teahouses, and in mundane expressions of 
Kurdish nationalism.   
42 The kind of bread typical in western Turkish metropolises, somun ekmeği or simply ekmek, which 
closely resembles what in the United States would be called Italian bread, while not impossible to come by 
in Diyarbakır, was far less common than the standard nan/pide.  The latter, meanwhile, is relatively rare in 
western Turkish cities such as Ankara or Istanbul, except during Ramadan, when bakeries begin to produce 
a close version under the name of Ramazan pidesi.   
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the taste of the yogurt and the honey.  My field notes record his repeated use of hakiki—
as in, this is the real stuff, how it should taste, and how it tasted in the village.  He refused 
to eat store-bought yogurt in the city, he said, and insisted it was unhealthy, whereas 
‘authentic’ rural animal products are health-giving, the evidence for which he saw in men 
in his village who purportedly lived well into their early 100s because they ate so much 
butter and kaymak.  His positive valuation of rural products, in contrast to the negative, 
ostensibly inauthentic nature of city commodities, continued after the snack, when he 
produced a small tin of tobacco and, rolling a cigarette, noted that the tobacco, which was 
from a village not far from his own, not only tasted like it should when it comes from 
Lice growers, but was less harmful than pre-rolled cigarettes.   
Nor is this habit limited to the agrarian products of place.   In writing up this 
material I had the chance to return to Diyarbakır a number of times, and on one trip, my 
research assistant and I tried, without success, to count how many times we had heard 
some variation on the phrase, “even the rocks there were better than here”—that is, even 
the lowliest, simplest object there is preferable to anything in our lives now.  In one 
instance drawn from field notes of a passing chat with a woman feeding her cow—we 
were on the way to interview one of the men whose words I relayed above—my assistant 
asked the woman what she called the cow.  Without hesitation and with a wry smile, she 
replied “Tayyip” (the name of the standing Turkish Prime Minister).  She asked us what 
we were doing in her part of town with our notebooks in hand, and we explained that we 
were meeting a couple of families to talk about the process of being forced to leave the 
village and rebuild a livelihood in the city.  Why did we not think to talk to her, she 
asked.  Her family had come to this particular stretch of land south of Diyarbakır on the 
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Bismil plain to plant tobacco—work the family knew well, having lived in a tobacco-
producing village outside of Kulp.  Within a few years, however, a national quota system 
was put in place that drastically limited how much a single household could sell to the 
state buyer per year, slashing household incomes and once again eliminating the 
livelihoods of the many already-once-dispossessed families trying to get by on these 
fields.  She said that she especially missed the cold springs, and that when they return to 
the village for religious holidays and family grave visits she fills up a few plastic water 
bottles to bring the spring water back.  From the mention of water, the conversation took 
a morose turn:  
Sometimes we go back to the village, to visit, for a wedding, for a funeral, and we 
can’t take it.  That cold water, our trees, our fields, our animals…Even the rocks 
there were better than [anything] here.  They took it all from us, when we see it 
we want to die…Now we’re all dispersed, some to prison, some to the graveyard, 
some are just scattered everywhere.  What I want is to come together again, but 
that will only happen in the graveyard…Your land is lovely, it’s the place you’re 
born, [but] if this is how the world is, I don’t want to see it.  I want to die, but I 
can’t die.  I can’t forget any single thing that I lived.  Our pain is the same, our 
problem is the same.  It got into us and it just won’t get out. 
Here again, it is spring water, trees, and fields—products of the land—doing more than 
acting as triggers for memory or desire for another time and place.  It is the moral valence 
of these signs that underscore the speaker’s political condemnation of state acts, past and 
present, that both led to her displacement and dispossession, and caused her ongoing 
urban impoverishment.  Here is a politics at work, one carried out through an art of 
convincing, and aided by signs of rurality deeply imbued with moral value. 
 In its general features, this blending of memory, the stuff of rural lives and 
livelihoods, and place is not wholly unique to Diyarbakır, to Kurdish Turkey, or to 
Turkey more generally.  In the example of food, anthropologists are familiar with the 
meaningful associations of food and place at work in, for instance, French notions of 
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terroir and its legal-agri-cultural twin concept appellation d’origine contrôlée.  Less 
institutionalized forms of public culture surrounding food across Turkey, too, are 
suffused by talk about agricultural products as indexical of place and particularity.  One 
of the stock questions asked in Turkey to someone from a place one is unfamiliar with is, 
“oranın nesi meşhur?” or what’s famous there?, a question that almost without exception 
refers to agricultural products.  Public monuments, public squares, statues, bridges, and 
official stationery in cities and towns across Turkey are adorned with agricultural goods 
that stand in as indexes of place: the giant statue of a fig in Aydın or a carrot in 
Beypazarı, the ubiquitous watermelon imagery in Diyarbakır, images of apricots in 
Malatya, or statues of clusters of grapes in the seemingly unending vineyards inland from 
İzmir in the Gediz Plain.  At a less monumental scale, street markets across Turkey are 
filled, in the appropriate season, with shouts of the names of certain place-food 
associations: Afyon potatoes, Bursa peaches, Ayaş tomatoes43—the list is long.   
 One possible interpretation of this Turkish version of terroir is that these 
strategies are part of the semiotics of nation making.  Like most nation states, Turkey 
inherited an internally diverse territory that was, furthermore, overwhelmingly rural and 
agricultural. Agricultural products can be seen to have provided a suitably familiar and 
workaday means for articulating how places belong to the national whole; indeed, 
knowledge of these food-place associations is part of the national curriculum.  In a way 
perhaps broadly analogous to Benedict Anderson’s idea on the political function of 
newspapers (1983), food, too, may provide an everyday object for imagining one as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 While living in Ankara at the end of this writing process, it was reported in a number of news 
sources that the mayor of the town of Ayaş not far from Ankara had commissioned a sculptor to carve a 
statue of a giant tomato, to be placed at the entrance of the city.  Presumably this will replace the small one 
there now. 
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connected to others across a vast territory.  But clearly there is something else at work in 
the use of food (as well as other indexes, such as soil or rocks) within the political history 
of the southeast.  That migration can effect a redoubling of the semiotic potency of foods 
(as catalysts of memory, as triggers for comparing here and there, now and then) and 
other quotidian objects, and enlist them in articulating claims to locality, is widely 
observable in any large city in the world touched by migration.  But what particular forms 
of political work are being done by the stories relayed above, given the particular 
conditions of forced migration and the violence and loss surrounding the means by which 
many of the people in these pages arrived in Diyarbakır?   
 At stake in idyllic constructions of the countryside in Diyarbakır is not an 
undirected or habitual form of rural nostalgia.  Rather, people were using ayran and 
walnut trees to express their grievances at the perceived injustice of being forcibly 
removed from viable rural livelihoods and left to reconstruct life and livelihood in an 
urban political economy of dispossession followed by wageless life.  Their invocation of 
the rural past, in other words, was not only—not even primarily—about the past.  
Denouncing the taste of yogurt in the city or playing up the delectableness and health-
giving properties of the onions in one’s village is a way of taking a stance to the state of 
affairs that the displaced and dispossessed find themselves thrown into, and doing so 
through morally charged signs. 
 That the city’s displaced and dispossessed would have objections to being 
uprooted and facing impoverishment and economic precariousness in the city is clear 
enough.  But to appreciate some of the specific reasons and objections, it may be useful 
to return to the interviews and field notes informing this and the previous chapter and to 
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attend to those passages where people touch more explicitly on themes of perceived 
injustices of this period and its aftermath.  Consider this rather long account from a man 
in his mid-thirties, relatively young at the time of migration from his natal village outside 
of Lice.  Today he is underemployed, and gets by on a combination of seasonal 
construction work and selling fruit from a pushcart.   
It was the end of 1992. Conflict broke out in the village. Many soldiers died.  At 
the time my older brother was with our animals in the mountains.  Evening came 
on.  We waited.  He didn’t come.  Then the soldiers came to the village with dead 
bodies and they said, “Do you know these terrorists?”  I took one look and wished 
I hadn’t.  It was my brother.  He had two kids.  We dealt with the farming and he 
looked after the animals.  Yes, he was partial to the cause, but there was neither a 
gun in his hand nor anything else.  They killed him.  But then they said he was 
killed in a terrorist struggle.   
 
We opened a court case at the European Court of Human Rights.  [And their 
decision was that] the price of my brother’s being reduced to pieces was 40,000 
lira.  How can I explain?   
 
Later they started to burn the village.  On that same day, there was a big military 
operation on the [PKK] camps in the [nearby] mountains.  See, our village was a 
verdant village.  Just beyond our mountain there were guerilla camps.  Nowadays 
if you go, they are still are there, but in ruins.  Still, their cooking and sleeping 
and gathering places are apparent.   
 
Anyhow, a big conflict happened, three days and three nights.  And they were 
attacking us, too.  They started to burn houses, with flamethrowers. I’ll never 
forget, one dishonorable solider, while burning houses he was looking at us and 
laughing.  He was naked from the waist up.  Can there be such a creature? I’m a 
villager. I’ve seen many animals in my life, but I’ve never seen such an animal.  
They were throwing grenades into houses.  There was an auntie, she was quite 
old.  When the soldiers burned her house, she threw a stone—she was right—at a 
soldier.   He started to bleed.  They started striking her with the butts of their 
rifles.  We too then attacked the soldiers; we challenged them.   But is your power 
enough?  They’ve got guns, this guy is the state.  The auntie died two months 
later.   
 
They took us to the road to Lice and drove us out, hitting and striking.  We 
villagers said, ‘Let’s go to Lice’.  A bus came, some of us got on, and we said, 
‘take us to Lice’.  The driver said, ‘Lice’s no different from here’.  We said, 
‘where shall we go?’  In the end, we came to Diyarbakır.  Everyone tried to find a 
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relative’s house.  We were all scattered.  I had an uncle, an animal trader, we 
stayed with him for two months or more.    
 
Yaw, we came, okay, and the state had killed my brother, and may Allah damn it, 
damn its people, its flag, its everything.  And it was like I was naked.  I couldn’t 
walk, I couldn’t look ahead of me.  When I ate, it was like I was chewing grass.  
But the short of it was, we had no choice but to adjust.  But it wasn’t one month 
that the youngest of the house, my 17-year-old brother, took to the mountains [i.e. 
joined the PKK].  That’s all we needed, you know?  At that point I had one kid, 
but I said, by Allah, if it weren’t for this child I too would have gone, and for that 
reason I wasn’t at all angry with my brother.  May Allah be with him and protect 
his companions.   
 
To support our house I worked as a porter in the produce wholesale market, and I 
worked in Hevsel gardens [a stretch of millennia-old agricultural fields bordering 
the old city center of Diyarbakır, on the banks of the Tigris River].  Later, I went 
to Adana, Giresun, Sakarya [all provinces far from Diyarbakır, and centers of 
seasonal, migrant, off-the-books agricultural labor], to pick hazelnuts and cotton.  
But it’s wrong.  I mean, they take you out of your village, and you go and do 
hamallık [lit. portership, more generally, lowly jobs] in the homeland of those 
who evicted you.  
 
Look, by this Quran on my wall I swear, may I be struck down if I lie when I say 
that I would cancel my children’s schooling, take them by the hand, and return to 
the village if it were possible.  A person leaves the soil where he is born only if he 
is without honor or if he can’t live there.  But it wasn’t that we came [willingly].  
They chased us out. 
At a general level, his narrative highlights the creative conflation of political histories of 
violence with subsequent experiences of work.  Unwilling or unable to forget the 
powerful incidents that marked his passage from rural viability to urban precariousness, 
past perceived injustices bleed into those of present livelihood practices, in a seemingly 
singular continuum of injury.  Such is the experiential backdrop against which idyllic 
countryside should be interpreted. The normalization of violence in the 1990s—violent 
home evictions, rural property destruction, disappearances, torture, and public 
executions—is hard to fathom, as much for readers from Ankara or Istanbul as from 
Cambridge.  The counterinsurgency practices pursued in that turbulent decade have 
rendered such experiences a taken-for-granted part of life in the contemporary social 
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truths of Diyarbakır, as in other nearby cities.  Though I never expressly sought them out, 
stories of such experiences were an unavoidable part of this research.  Consider one more 
account, this one from a single mother—her husband died under unclear circumstances 
while a political prisoner—who described her rough passage from country to city:   
We came to Diyarbakır in 1993.  From [a village outside of Lice].  We used to see 
to our getting by with animal husbandry and farming.  We didn’t have any 
problems.  We did pretty well in fact.  Four children and us: our situation was 
quite good.  We didn’t have many expenses.  Our pleasure, our economy, our 
financial situation, our spending of time: all were in place.  We had animals, cows 
and sheep, and our land was irrigated.  We would plant wheat, barley, lentils, and 
a small amount of tobacco. [But coming to Diyarbakır] we had to travel around a 
lot at first; we experienced many difficulties.  Life was merciless.  Then in 1993 I 
lost my husband.  We started to live with my mother- and father-in-law.  I had to 
look after my children.  I am still working day and night.  The rent, the children’s 
school, I’m both mother and father.  It’s hard, but this is reality. 
I’m working now as a cleaner in a private hospital.  I take minimum wage. I’m 
insured, but my children can’t benefit from it because I am not legally shown as 
married [i.e. the marriage was a religious ceremony, not a state-recognized one, 
meaning that she remains, after her husband’s death, illegible to formal 
bureaucratic systems of marriage registration whereby certain state benefits are 
calculated], but we had my children registered under my husband’s younger 
brother.  Because they appear as his children, my children have no problem there.  
Until recently I’ve never taken any assistance.  But this Ramadan, the 
municipality was giving assistance packets.  How long it will last, I don’t know.  
And I’m critical of them on this subject.  Nobody looked after us.  My house is a 
rental after all. My pay doesn’t stay in my hand.  The rent is 260, then there’s 100 
for the electricity, and then comes the water bill.   
Who doesn’t miss their land?  But it’s not possible to return.  No one is left in the 
village.  It was completely evacuated.  While leaving—actually, while being 
removed—from the village we had to leave very mercilessly.  It was the spring of 
1992.  A [military] operation was carried out on the village.  Everyone in the 
village was collected in front of the mosque. Our home was burned first.  Already 
for three days and three nights tanks and artillery were raining down on us.  After 
that we came to Diyarbakır, and we stayed with a relative for three months, then 
we returned to the village, or that is, we settled in shacks in Lice.  My child was 
three months old.  After a few months had passed we then returned to our village.  
In 1993, they again gathered everyone, set fire to things, and insulted us.  ‘You 
returned to help the terrorists.’  Because no solution was left, because Lice too 
was burned, necessarily we came to Diyarbakır.  It was after that that it happened 
to us [the death of her husband].   
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Villages were being burned daily at that time.  In 2000 a very small number of 
people returned to our village, they set up tents.  Again the soldiers destroyed 
them not once but twice.  After 2001, [the soldiers] didn’t mess with them.  We 
haven’t gone for eight years.  It’s rumored that a military headquarter has been 
established there. 
I will never forget this: They were burning our home before our eyes.  My 
daughter was then three years old, and her slippers were burning.  She said to me 
in Kurdish, ‘Mother, my slippers are burning.’  The soldier at the same time was 
saying, ‘What did she say?  What’s she saying?’  At that moment my husband 
went inside, and it was full of smoke and fire.  My mother-in-law said, “My son’s 
burning, my son!”  She started to cry out, ‘You burned our house and hearth!’  
Then she said to the commander, ‘What did we do?  You burned and destroyed 
everything of ours.  What are we to do now?  Any solution for us?’  The 
commander taunted, ‘Your son [an alleged PKK member] will find a solution.’   
My husband and I came to Diyarbakır without shoes on our feet.  That day, four 
children from the village died because of artillery fire and helicopter bombing. 
How can we forget the weeping, the cries, the shrieks and wails?  The soldiers 
said ‘Don’t leave any live animals behind’, so we tried to save them.  We tried but 
it didn’t happen.  My chickens burned alive.  I said ‘Don’t burn my home’, and 
they took my by the arms and the hair and dragged me.  The house burned very 
quickly.  Then they collected us at the head of the road and put a soldier in charge 
of us.  Then they burned the remaining homes.  We also had a tape player hanging 
on the wall.  That really got me.  They reduced to shreds my [various banned 
Kurdish musicians’] tapes, everything.   
Would that everything were like goods and property.  Some things can’t be 
brought back again. 
Again, it is in the context of such life and livelihood histories that idyllic constructions of 
rural life should be interpreted.  Local walnuts contrasted with supposedly tasteless 
imported ones not only provide a means of talking about what it beautiful and positive in 
rural life versus what is unsavory and negative in urban life.  They are part of the 
meaning toolbox, the thinking equipment, by which many displaced families deploy 
morally charged signs of rurality to underscore the perceived injustice and injury behind 
their displacement and dispossession and their relocation to urban economies defined by 
joblessness and livelihood precariousness.  As outlined in the previous chapter, the point 
is not whether these accounts are entirely factual, but what other modes of factuality they 
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are trying to accomplish by explaining the loss of livelihood through charged everyday 
objects.   
 At stake, then, is not simply nostalgic longing, but a politics of objection, a stance 
of dissensus.  Diyarbakır is frequently described in Turkey as a ‘political’ city.  
Criticizing Ankara for its perceived past and present wrongs, discussing the latest speech 
of prominent political figures in the various faces of Kurdish politics, recalling various 
transitions in leftist politics in Turkey’s history, invoking popular contemporary terms 
such as cultural rights, linguistic rights or popular themes such as gender equality: these 
and similar subjects circulate freely and often in Diyarbakır’s coffeehouses, small shops, 
and other public spaces of congregation.  That the prevalence of such subjects is further 
perceived as quite ordinary, unremarkable, and taken-for-granted by most residents—to a 
degree that newcomers or outsiders familiar with other Turkish cities are often surprised 
by—is, at least in part, what gives Diyarbakır this reputation.  Yet alongside talk about 
the practices of political parties or invocations of the keywords common to the language 
of contemporary Kurdish politics, there is another sense in which one can talk about 
politics carried out within or by everyday language.  Politics can, recalling our discussion 
of Jacques Ranciere’s work (2010), also be thought of as something distinct from the 
language and practices of political parties or government.  Instead, one can think of 
politics as instances wherein the intelligibility of a particular social and economic 
arrangement is thrown into question, and an active process of interrogating the logic and 
reasons for things as they are becomes a widespread part of everyday life.  In 
southeastern Turkey, the profound transformations to life and livelihood brought about by 
displacement and dispossession have not only led to widespread conditions of economic 
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precariousness that broadly echo Denning’s work under the concept of wageless life.  It 
has led to widespread public acts of taking issue with this history, to the flourishing of 
talk about perceived past and present political and economic injustice, the debts and 
obligations of the state to its citizens, and more.  And this political history matters for 
how people mediate economic life.  The events of the 1990s are widely perceived as 
injustices committed by the state, and this perception filters into everyday anecdotes and 
jokes likening this history to robbery: to an act of property changing hands in a way 
considered immoral and unsanctioned.  Consider one such joke44 that circulated in the 
buildup to the 2009 elections about a rural landlord robbed of his clothes in the bath 
house only to be put in the ridiculous position of standing naked and trying to prove the 
act of theft.  
There was once a rural landlord who went to the public baths in Diyarbakır.  He 
was washed and dried and went to make his way back home. But on the way out, 
he found his shoes missing.  He went to the bathhouse owner to ask who might be 
held accountable (hesap sormak).  'Impossible! Such things don't happen here!'  
The landlord tried to make his case, but the owner would not hear him out. 
  
Sometime later, it again came time for the landlord to have his bath.  Again he 
was washed and dried, and went to make his way back home. But on the way out, 
this time he found his shirt missing.  Again he went to ask who was accountable 
and again the owner would not hear him out.  'A real troublemaker, this one!  A 
real complainer! ' 
 
Again sometime later, it came time for him to go the baths.  Again he was washed 
and dried, and went to make his way back home.  This time, he reached for his 
things and found every last piece of clothing gone.  Again he went to hold the 
bathhouse accountable, and again they would not hear him out.  It was all too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Diyarbakır is renowned, regionally at least, for a public culture marked by wry political wit, and any 
portrait of the city is incomplete without at least some recognition of the social role of lightness as a 
response to political impasses and everyday troubles.  A friend working in the cultural wing of local 
government, for instance, once sat in on the screening of a film about torture and detention in Diyarbakır’s 
notorious prison.  The main criticism that she and her friends had of the film was that it was too heavy-
handed, and captured nothing of the constant banter and humor of, at times, the blackest sort by which 
people made an already unbearable situation just a bit lighter.  Doğan Güzel’s comic strip series Qırıx 
(1997) is a fine example of the city’s advanced political humor.  
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much.  Standing there naked, he cried, 'For God's sake, I don't mean to complain, 
but do you think this is how I arrived?  (bele mi geldim45)?'  
 
Or consider an analogy relayed to me by a shopkeeper I interviewed many times and met 
regularly for small talk across most of my two years in the city.  This exchange took 
place, again, in the run-up to the 2009 elections, when the nationally ruling AK Party 
aspired, in the words of party leader Tayyip Erdoğan, to “take Diyarbakır” from the rule 
of the legal Kurdish party, and to this end had upped its distribution of public assistance 
(in the form of food, heating assistance, cash payments, and even white goods) to 
impoverished geographies across the city and the southeast.  We were sitting in his shop, 
surrounded by walls stacked to the ceiling with shiny packs of cookies, snack cakes, 
sugary drinks, and smuggled cigarettes when, in response to my question about what he 
made of the influx of assistance into his neighborhood—which was literally built by the 
displaced and dispossessed—he gestured to the walls of the shop and asked me to 
imagine that someone had come and robbed his shop of all the goods on its shelves, 
leaving the family in dire straits.  Then, he said, imagine that sometime later, the same 
agent who deprived the family returned offering to help them out by giving them the 
same goods, which they needed to make a living, only they called it an act of 
beneficence.  “Now what would do in such a situation”, he asked rhetorically, hinting to 
the fact that many people across the southeast rejected this aid on the principle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Part of the punch line’s magic was its use of the Diyarbakır dialect of Turkish, which is closer in 
many ways to Baku than Istanbul.  Thus böyle (in this way) becomes bele, as öyle (in that way) becomes 
ele.  Also, the context of this joke is no doubt important.  It was said by a prominent local politician in an 
introduction to a presentation that tried to make the case for seeing state policies as responsible for the 
production of poverty in eastern and southeastern Turkey.  For a published study based on this political 
initiative within the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, see Sönmez 2008.  This was about not just 
robbery, but about playing on the sense of absurdity in finding the burden of proof laid on those who feel 
they have had their means of living unjustly taken from them, and who have encountered many practical 
obstacles in their search to hold someone or something accountable (in applying for compensation, within 
the framework of Law No. 5233, for example) for their losses. 
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refusing the seeming charity of one assumed to be the agent of injury.46  The lesson from 
these anecdotes is this: the fact that displacement and dispossession and the forms of 
impoverished urbanization they brought about happened by force, as part of a deliberate 
governmental strategy, has injected into popular ways of conceptualizing and talking 
about livelihoods a strong discourse of justice, blame, and accountability.47  
Contemporary economic life, in other words, is shot through with political questions 
about who caused widespread destabilized livelihoods, unemployment and 
impoverishment, as well as what should be done, and by whom, to address these matters.  
Enmeshed in economic life and its concepts is the turbulent political history of the last 
two to three decades and the dilemmas and unanswered questions, among a large part of 
the city, regarding the present conjuncture.  
What I have tried to illustrate in this chapter are some of the ways in which 
political sensibilities and stances towards the state are staked out not only with reference 
to Ankara or Imralı, but also through matters seemingly as unrelated to politics as huge 
tomatoes and abundant walnuts groves.  The processes of displacement and dispossession 
followed by urban precariousness have forced upon people an awareness of a disquieting 
reality that Marx detected at the heart of capitalism’s particular calculus of labor’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 There are a few things going on in this story.  Here, the instance is used simply to illustrate the 
currency of this sense of having been unjustly deprived—robbed—of a livelihood.  That said, there are a 
few anecdotes that help to illustrate the relevance of the shopkeeper’s rhetorical question.  There were news 
stories that ran around election time of a group of women in the nearby city of Batman who forcefully ran 
AKP welfare agents out of their building.  In another, a few of the foot soldiers of a microcredit program in 
Diyarbakır that was initiated by an AK Party MP (but that maintained it was a non-partisan, apolitical 
venture), young women who were tasked with going door to door to collect the weekly payments of the 
credit recipients, recalled being met at the door of one house by a man with a hunting rifle in hand who 
insisted they leave, that first the AK Party should show it was willing to end the war and only then would 
he accept “their help”.  The young woman in question relayed this last story to me with a sense of 
frustration at what she saw as the misguided, misinformed opinion of under-educated peasant newcomers.  
But one should not be so sure that the widespread popular perception of microcredit as an AK Party project 
is inaccurate. 
47 For a stimulating social-theoretical consideration of the social life of blame, see Tilly (2008). 
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necessity.  “It is already contained in the concept of the free labourer”, he wrote, “that he 
is a pauper: a virtual pauper . . . If the capitalist has no use for his surplus labour, then the 
worker may not perform his necessary labour” (1973:604).  Michael Denning has 
imaginatively interpreted this passage as Marx’s “account of bare life: since the exchange 
required for the means of living—the selling of labour-power—is accidental and 
indifferent to their organic presence, the worker is a virtual pauper” (2010:91).  The 
people I spoke with in Diyarbakır in researching this and the previous chapter, whose 
lives and livelihoods were transformed by displacement and dispossession, understood 
quite clearly that the system of market dependency into which they were thrown by the 
events of the 1990s is largely indifferent to their ability to make a living by selling their 
work for wages.  This fact of indifference is not only existentially unsettling.  It also 
throws a wrench into one of the more familiar theoretical frameworks for thinking about 
dispossessed labor, captured in the image of a reserve army of labor: a mass of 
underemployed or unemployed, wage-dependent workers who function to drive down 
wages and weaken the bargaining power of organized labor.  While there are certainly 
geographies of labor in Turkey where dispossessed and proletarianized Kurds are being 
actively exploited in this way, such a framework for accounting for the aftermath of 
economic dispossession, whatever the appeal of its functional simplicity, only clarifies 
one possible trajectory. Again, Denning: “under capitalism, the only thing worse than 
being exploited is not being exploited” (2012:74). It is precisely this condition of forced 
wage dependency in the absence of reliable wage work—being under-exploited—that the 
men and women I spoke with for this research spent so much time talking about and 
interpreting.  And it is precisely this constant discursive activity that gives dispossession 
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an idiomatic significance in Diyarbakır, where this recent history is re-inscribed through 
ordinary objects of rural life, from soil to the breakfast table, and given deep moral and 
political significance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BUILDING A FUTURE I: THE SONS OF MIGRATION AND WORKING LIFE AFTER 
DISPOSSESSION 
 
Like I said, I’ve got to see to my own future.  I mean, look at youngsters like us.  
School?  Only so far.  Then some go elsewhere to Istanbul or Ankara and work as 
waiters or construction workers or day laborers.  Or they stay and take over their 
father’s business, or work for their older brothers.  Like this or like that, they get 
by.  But none have a regular life.   
—Young man, 19, working in his older brother’s kebab stand, Interview, Winter 
2008 
 
WORK HISTORIES, WORK FUTURES 
 The previous two chapters drew on oral accounts of the sociopolitical aftermath of 
displacement and dispossession from people old enough to have come of working age in 
the village before displacement in the early 1990s.  Assembling the chapters involved 
working through fieldwork data on land and livelihoods lost, flocks sold at great losses, 
bride wealth gold sold, debts taken from jewelry shops, kin, or (as a last resort) loan 
sharks (tefeci), and tabs at the neighborhood corner store.  The aim was to draw from this 
material a way of telling the history and current aftermath of displacement, dispossession, 
and urban impoverishment that is attuned to the interplay of livelihoods and symbolic 
practice, and to the ways in which talk about livelihoods might be understood as an act of 
political stance-taking, of dissensus. 
 At a general level, the object of inquiry in this and the following chapter is 
roughly the same: the incomplete efforts of people who came to the city in the 1990s to 
rebuild life and livelihood, the meaningful mediation of this process, and the potential 
political implications of this mediation.  What distinguishes these chapters from the 
previous ones is their focus on young men from forced-migrant families.  With only one 
exception, all the young men whom we shall encounter below were born in the village 
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and spent their first half-dozen or so years there. All carry some memories (however 
colored by the constant retellings of family members and friends, which, in any event, 
would seem to be true for older relatives, too) of the violent processes by which their 
families were compelled to leave the countryside for the city.  Yet, in contrast to their 
elders (whose narratives in the previous chapter tended to dwell on, and draw a politics 
from, rural life and livelihood), the young men I interviewed and spent time with on-the-
job for these chapters tended to be preoccupied with the future, and with the question of 
building a viable life and livelihood.  Temporality thus matters here, too, and in ways 
similar to the previous chapters: a surfeit of free time for those without work, a constant 
running from here to there, a lack of time, for those juggling the demands of work and 
school.  Yet again, in this and the following chapter, we will see that these pressures of 
time do not constitute a stripping bare of political life.  Here too, in other words, the 
concern is with political stance taking as emerging from the interplay of everyday 
livelihood-related acts and their meaningful mediation.  Here, though, ‘livelihood-related 
acts’ will have to stretch to include education, which in this context becomes fetishized as 
a ‘way out’ of livelihood insecurity, even, we shall see, as it is perceived as both an 
instrument of Turkish nationalism and an example of state neglect. 
 One note before we explore a number of theoretical points about youth and its 
political framing.  The reader may wonder why there are no female voices in this and the 
next chapter.  After all, women were displaced and dispossessed as well, and the variety 
of forms of labor (seasonal agricultural labor, unpaid domestic labor, informal work) they 
engage in is crucial to the viability of displaced households.  Is the absence of women an 
artifact of being a male in the field? In a sense, yes.  A number of these interviews grew 
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out of many long hours spent sitting in chairs outside of corner stores, bakeries, or 
neighborhood restaurants run by young men I knew, whose friends would come by 
throughout the night, leading to conversations that often ran into the early hours of the 
morning.  The time required to develop these relationships would have been a significant 
challenge with young women.  I did enlist the help of a friend to carry out interviews with 
a few young women, but these did not lead to the same long, open-ended, casual 
exchanges that I was able to have with young men.  As to the challenge that in focusing 
on men’s labor I am reproducing a patriarchal logic, I can only say that I try not to 
present men’s experience as universal, nor do I discount the labor of women in displaced 
livelihoods, even if their voices do not figure into this ethnographic work.  With these 
caveats, I move to a series of general remarks on youth and its political framings. 
 
YOUTH AND YOUTHFULNESS 
 In a recent essay on youth and political life in the urban Middle East, Asef Bayat 
distinguishes youthfulness from the simple biological fact of being young.  Youthfulness 
is, in his conceptual vocabulary, a socially defined space between “the period of 
vulnerability and dependence of childhood… [and] adulthood, the world of work, 
parenting, and responsibility” (Bayat 2010: 118)—a space that, as generations of 
anthropologists have noted (see Bucholtz 2002 for a review of the anthropology of 
youth), is highly plastic across time and space. Bayat describes, for instance, that in his 
natal village in Iran, the transition between the social worlds of childhood and adulthood 
was fairly swift, whereas in his fieldwork in Tehran and Cairo, he observed an elongation 
of this transitional period, and an opening of space for the elaboration of a set of 
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“dispositions…ways of being, feeling, and carrying oneself” that Bayat gathers under the 
concept of youthfulness (2010: 118).  The concept of youth, this suggests, is best 
approached as always socially embedded, always a vessel whose referential content is 
filled up differently in various historical and cultural contexts.48   
 In thinking through this ethnographic material on young men in Diyarbakır and 
their concerns with, as the restaurant worker above said, seeing to their futures, Bayat’s 
approach is both helpful and problematic.  On the one hand, the lack of jobs has done 
here what it has in countless other broadly similar contexts: pushed back the age of 
finding a stable job, getting married, and establishing a household independent of one’s 
parents—all the commonly identified accouterments of male adulthood.  On the other 
hand, others features of youthfulness identified by Bayat—“freedom from responsibility 
for others”, for instance—are less relevant in migrant households, where often it is the 
labor of the sons of migration, and often starting from a fairly young age, that is crucial to 
the economic viability of the household in its new urban setting.  For many of the young 
men whose practices of labor and labor preparation (schooling, vocational training, and 
trying to come up with schemes for making a living) form the ethnographic basis for this 
chapter, the transition between childhood and working life was a swift one.  A clear 
statement to this effect came in an interview with a young man who had seen his village 
burn when he was around six years old, and who had started working within a few years 
of coming to Diyarbakır, doing all the standard jobs of child informal labor—selling 
gum, packets of tissues, ice cream, and simit, shining shoes, working in coffeehouses and 
restaurants, and most recently working nights in a bakery.  After he listed off the various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Durham (2000) for an attempt to apply the linguistic-anthropological concept of shifters to 
describe the cultural and historical contingency of ‘youth’. 
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jobs he had done, I commented that he had started working while still a child, which he at 
first passed over with a nod, but then quickly corrected me.  “Not while a child.  When 
we were children, our childhood—I mean, without living our childhood, when we looked 
at others, they lived their childhood. Of course we wanted to do that too, but…when you 
start working at eight or nine, without living childhood you directly pass to a young 
man.”  This is not to say that taking on responsibilities as key income earners in 
dispossessed, impoverished households at a young age necessarily negates all other 
aspects of youthfulness—for instance, most of the young men I met cared tremendously 
for their dress and personal appearance, and enjoyed leisurely, boisterous strolls down the 
city’s main thoroughfares or in its malls.  But the sociopolitical context of forced 
displacement and economic dispossession, and the obligations these events have tended 
to place on young men, I will argue, have uniquely qualified the experience of 
youthfulness in contemporary Diyarbakır. 
Qualified how?  What seems particular about the forms of youth explored here is 
the fact that, as we noted earlier, many Diyarbakırite newcomers, young and old, perceive 
their current economic situation as rooted not in fate or the vagaries of an abstract market, 
but in specific, deliberate practices of the state—processes that, as we have seen, 
rendered rural livelihoods unviable for thousands of small farmers and shepherds.  Many 
also share the widespread idea that the limited labor markets of regional cities, where 
many of the displaced and dispossessed and their children ended up, are the product of a 
history of intentional underdevelopment.  This introduces a politicized reading of 
economic life that has struck me across my research in the city as rather unique in its 
spread.  In traveling and doing research in other parts of Turkey, it has been my 
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experience that people unfamiliar with Diyarbakır—and, as people in Turkey, in my 
experience at least, freely admit, few without family in the region or reasons of work 
have been to the east of Turkey, though this, as Ayşe Öncü (2011) has pointed out in an 
engaging article on a resurgence of representations of the east in television and tour 
packages in the early 2000s, may be changing—struggle to imagine the extent to which 
critical discourses about inequality and injustice, state violence and the perceived misuse 
of state authority enter into ordinary conversations of all subjects.  These matters frame 
the favored cluster of topics in the conversational life of the city, unemployment, 
underemployment, and the conditions of whatever work is available, which were also 
central to the concerns and conversations of the young men we shall encounter in this 
chapter.  Before we get to these conversations, however, we need to understand the broad 
demographics of the city and review the regnant political framings of young Kurdish men 
in contemporary Turkish public discourse.   
 
DEMOGRAPHY AND ITS POLITICAL FRAMINGS 
 Diyarbakır is a young city in a young country.  At the time of my fieldwork, in 
Turkey generally the proportion of the population aged 24 or below hovered around 43 to 
44 percent, whilst in Diyarbakır, the number for the same age group was around 57 
percent, a rate roughly comparable to other southeastern cities remade by forced 
migration: 61 percent in Batman, 62 percent in Hakkari, and 60 percent in Van (TÜİK).  
The simplest explanation for the overwhelmingly young character of southeastern cities 
would point to the massive influx of rural families due to forced migration, and to the 
relatively high birth rates common to rural families in eastern and southeastern Turkey.  
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In the national popular imagination, meanwhile, this simple explanation is often 
subjected to disparaging interpretations.  One of the more insidious of these 
interpretations rests on a logic reminiscent of arguments used to attack American welfare 
policies by casting beneficiaries as undeserving due to their supposedly irrational 
practices of giving birth to many children in the absence of sufficient work (O’Connor 
2001, Maskovsky and Morgen 2003, Wacquant 2007).  The problem (or, depending on 
one’s politics, the usefulness) of this internationally mobile discourse about poverty is 
that it displaces a careful consideration of political economy (declining wages and 
fortunes, the shifts to flexible, more precarious, and less protected forms of labor, 
growing socioeconomic inequalities) in favor of a focus on the behavior of the poor as 
the ‘real’ explanation of poverty.  In Diyarbakır, a friend recounted an encounter on a 
plane with a retired teacher couple who had taken their first trip to Diyarbakır and came 
back filled with complaints about the high number of children in the streets of the historic 
city center.  In the face of such poverty, one of the teachers felt that having so many 
children was nothing but ignorance (cahillik).49 The same general idea also trickles down 
to parts of Diyarbakır’s established bourgeois classes, many of whom speak with 
unabashed disdain about the influx of such rural practices into the city.  I was also told by 
a high-ranking administrator at the Grameen Bank microcredit program in Diyarbakır, 
after I asked him to compare his experiences in Bangladesh and Diyarbakır, that the real 
roots of poverty in Diyarbakır were the same as anywhere else: men who wanted to have 
too many children and were too lazy to work, preferring, as he claimed, to spend their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Indeed, in conversations in cities across Turkey, I have often been impressed by the ubiquity of this 
image of Kurds as hopelessly stuck in rural (read ignorant and premodern) ways of thinking; as having not 
come into sufficient contact with education and sites for the inculcation of a modern habitus; as behaving 
according to an irrational inertia rather than modern rationality. 
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time in the coffeehouse rather than find a job.50   But holding dispossessed, ex-rural 
Kurds responsible for their circumstances by accusing them of keeping on with this 
practice of over-fertility in cities long after its practicality clearly has limited analytic 
utility in understanding the political economy of the city today. 
 Whatever underlying reason is imputed, large families are a fact.  Across the 
southeast, the average birth rate is just below five children per house (Sönmez 2012), 
while in Diyarbakır, studies in neighborhoods largely inhabited by the displaced put the 
figure at just over six per household (Kalkınma Merkezi 2010, Sarmaşık 2009)—this 
versus a national average of about 2.5 children per family (TÜİK).  Families of eight, 
nine, or more children are not hard to come by in forced-migrant-heavy neighborhoods.  
 Not only has the existence of such an overwhelmingly young population provided 
fodder for nationalist discourses that would obstruct careful dissection of the causes and 
trends of contemporary urban poverty in southeastern Turkey.  It has also given rise to a 
version of youth bulge theory in Turkey.  Youth bulge theory essentially correlates large 
young male populations in conditions of limited economic opportunity with a greater 
probability for political unrest and instability.  Though its origins can be traced to the 
population geographer Gary Fuller’s work for the CIA in the 1980s (Fuller and Pitts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 My sense was that this particular administrator had a limited empirical sense of the context he 
worked in, perhaps excusable given the everyday bureaucratic responsibilities of his position.  He was sent 
from Bangladesh, did mostly office and diplomatic work and knew how to say a few everyday phrases in 
Kurdish and Turkish but could not participate in a conversation in either language.  The superficiality of his 
understanding of the city was revealed in another difference he observed between Diyarbakır and 
Bangladesh: whereas in the latter, he said, he had mostly used bicycles to go back and forth from work to 
home, in Diyarbakır he had a driver.  Or perhaps this was his way of erecting a wall and refusing to say 
much of substance about his work—something that an ex-employee of an office institutionally affiliated 
with microcredit told me that he and his co-workers were explicitly instructed to do when dealing with 
journalists and researchers.  Additionally, the idea that men in Diyarbakır’s coffeehouses are there out of 
laziness not only ignores the broader political economy of joblessness.  It also overlooks the economics of 
coffeehouses in this context. In the absence of sufficient work, opening coffeehouses (as with opening a 
kebab stand or a corner store) has provided work, however low paying, for hundreds of çaycı and çırak.   
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1990; Fuller 1995), it has, in the decades since, seeped into journalistic and governmental 
common sense.  A variation on this theme surfaces often in news pieces—most recently, 
in the wake of the so-called Arab spring—as an ostensibly scientific explanation for 
everything from sporadic urban riots to non-state armed political organizations subsumed 
under the term terrorist.   
 Often overlooked, however, is the fact that youth bulge theory is simply that—a 
theory—and should be treated as such.  An exception to this common sense is the 
anthropologist Anne Hendrixson, who in a 2006 briefing for the UK-based Corner House 
discusses how youth bulge theory has been used in many international contexts to suggest 
that “Southern nations and Southern cities are incapable of accommodating their young 
populations”, and to present an “over-generalised picture of a disordered South prone to a 
stereotypical violence and degradation that its governments are not sophisticated enough 
to handle” (2004:12-16).  She goes on to note that the theory not only “disrespects the 
younger generation, underestimates its potential, and leaves it undervalued” (2004:16); it 
can also provide a seemingly scientific language to alarmist discourses used to justify 
police profiling and the military surveillance of spaces with large young populations.   
In Diyarbakır and other southeastern cities, particularly after the street 
demonstrations in Diyarbakır in March 2006 in which young men and boys played a 
prominent role, the detainment and maltreatment of young men in police custody have 
become normalized features of the police life of the city.   According to the Diyarbakır 
branch of the Human Rights Association, following the March demonstrations, some 400 
children, by official figures, were taken into custody, while unofficial estimates suggest a 
figure of around 700 youth (İHD 2009).  Those demonstrations were the stuff of memory 
	   130	  	  
by the time this research began—significant stuff, though, referred to by some young 
men I spoke with as a milat or milestone in the city’s political history.  Yet the strategy of 
profiling, indefinite detention, and maltreatment had become a policing fixture.  Backed 
up by alarmist images in the national media of “stone throwing children”, from March 
2006 until the publication of a report by a number of human rights groups in 2011, it was 
estimated that some 4,000 young people, mostly males, were detained or imprisoned 
across the southeast (see Radikal Gazetesi 2011).  One of the milder but nonetheless 
revealing consequences of this process was reflected in this research in the fact that any 
time political tensions were high and police presence was intensified around the city, my 
young male research participants would often phone me early in the morning to 
reschedule our interviews or postpone our rendezvous at the coffeehouse, preferring to 
stay home and avoid the risk.   
The media representation aspect of this political process was also not lost on the 
critical imaginations of the young men interviewed for this research.  Complaints about 
the overwhelmingly negative and panicky portrayal of Diyarbakır’s young men in 
national media were widespread.  “According to them, we do nothing but throw rocks 
and break windows”, complained one young man we shall meet below, referring to the 
ubiquity of such representations in the Turkish national media.  Images of young men 
throwing rocks and participating in street demonstrations even made it to the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey, which in 2010 passed the so-called “Law on Children 
Who Throw Rocks”,51 facilitating the criminal prosecution of minors for such street acts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Nazan Üstündağ suggested, in a recent conference, that rocking throwing should be seen not as a 
crazed act, but a political “form of negotiation” (Etkin Haber Ajansı 2012). 
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The equation of economically marginalized urban Kurdish youth with potential 
criminals or terrorists stems from the same unsound line of thinking as youth bulge 
theory.  Rather than inquiring into the actual lives of young people, assumptions about 
who young Kurdish men are— or more accurately, who they may become—guide this 
thinking.  This would be problematic enough if it stayed purely at the conceptual level, 
but such assumptions also become part of the ideological legitimation of policing 
strategies, and they feed into the souring of ordinary relations between Turks and Kurds 
that lead to such outbreaks of inter-communal tensions as the surge in so-called 
“lynching” events in the late 2000s (Sönmez 2008).   
The political and moral condemnation of such constructions of youth is important, 
but perhaps more so is recognizing how limited such ideas are for opening up spaces for 
other questions about the contemporary political-economic and symbolic conjuncture in 
Diyarbakır.  There is a clear need to replace assumptions about what young men could 
become with grounded explorations of the political-economic context and the meaningful 
and material practices of actual lives, and to take “seriously the fact that youth are 
cultural actors whose experiences are best understood from their own point of view” 
(Bucholtz 2002:523-533).  With this in mind, let us begin to explore some of the 
fieldwork data, and to pay particular attention—to link this chapter explicitly to the 
others—to the ways in which, through discourses on livelihood conditions (on the lack of 
work, the disagreeable conditions of the work to be had, the unfulfilled potential of the 
educational system as a means to another working future), young men are suffusing their 
everyday lives with moral and political evaluations of what they take to be the injustices 
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of the state, and are staking out a critical stance vis-à-vis the state of affairs and 
questioning the nature of their political belonging. 
 
“OKAY, YES, EDUCATION’S NECESSARY, BUT…” 
 The role of education in the reproduction of the economic status quo, as explored 
in the ethnographic literature on Turkey and elsewhere, is well documented (for an 
exceptionally textured and well-researched ethnography of education and class in Turkey, 
see Balkan and Rutz 2009; on France and the UK respectively, see Bourdieu 1991 and 
Willis 1977).  In the wake of forced migration in Diyarbakır, education has received its 
share of attention, particularly from NGOs.  The Development Centre in Diyarbakır noted 
in its 2006 report on the effects of migration in Diyarbakır that migrant families tend to 
have low levels of literacy and educational achievement; around 45 percent of women 
and 17 percent of men surveyed were illiterate, while only about 8 percent of males 
reported graduating from high school (Kalkınma Merkezi 2006: 33).  The report also 
notes, “During the most intense period of migration, there was an overcrowding of 
students in neighborhood schools, the student body doubling or even tripling in some 
schools.  Many children, because there was no school in their villages or because they 
were unable to attend school, experienced problems when they started at neighborhood 
schools since they were older than their classmates” (2006:35).  Further, because the 
quality of education in the village tended to be lower than in the city, many migrant 
children perform with low levels of success in their first years in city schools. 
 The regional lag in educational completion rates for young men and women has 
been the subject of a range of studies in the field of education, many of which turn, in 
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journalistic fashion, on the question of the problem’s roots. According to Şahin and 
Gülmez (2000), for instance, the problem is essentially one of cultural difference (a term 
they leave under-examined), and the reforms called for are within the educational system, 
which the authors advise should take measures to better serve a diverse national student 
body.  Other more critical studies explicitly reject such a culturalist explanation.  Keyder 
and Üstündağ state unequivocally that the important obstacle before education is not 
cultural structure but poverty and the lack of capital investment in the region (2006:3).  
Still another way to appreciate how the political history of displacement and 
dispossession has constituted education as a problematic is through an ethnographic 
approach to how the problem of school touches down in specific working lives.  Let us 
take a close look at the post-displacement trajectory of a young man whom I shall call 
Nimet.   
 I met Nimet roughly six months into research, and we have been in regular 
contact since.  From our first extended interview, Nimet’s concerns were consistently 
focused on what he referred to as building a future (geleceği kurmak), though he was 
ambivalent as to whether the best route for him was in continuing with high school or 
dropping out and devoting himself fully to finding a trade.   
 For most of the time I knew him, Nimet had almost none of the free time that 
Bayat identifies as among the qualities of youthfulness.  Having been in and out of formal 
schooling throughout his childhood (for a variety of reasons—accidents, work—more or 
less directly related to forced migration and its wider consequences), he had returned to 
high school as a 19-year-old freshman.  At the same time, he was working early mornings 
and late nights in his older brother’s kebab stand.  He effectively ran the stand for much  
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of the day with the help of a young assistant (çırak).  His older brother generally showed 
up early in the morning and early in the evening, when he would apply his practical 
master knowledge (ustalık) to the cutting and kneading together of lamb meat, tail fat, 
and herbs for the minced-meat kebabs, or to the slathering of chicken pieces or cubes of 
liver with generous amounts of red pepper flakes and oregano.  With his work done, he 
would then perform his expected social role as hierarchical superior in the workplace, 
sitting in a relaxed pose in meticulously pressed suits, conspicuously smoking an 
expensive brand of cigarettes and bothering to rise from his spot only when other 
shopkeepers on his street visited his stand (whom he would greet with great warmth and 
affection) or when money changed hands—which, particularly where neighboring 
shopkeepers were concerned, often involved prolonged rituals of the avoidance of money 
(on this, see Parry and Bloch 1989) and his refusal to accept payment.   
 As for Nimet, what little spare time he did have he preferred not to spend on the 
“empty things” he said he used to do: walking the streets with his friends till dawn, 
smoking hash, getting into mischief.  He regularly attended a neighborhood gym opened 
by a pair of brothers, physical education teachers in Diyarbakır with ambitions of keeping 
kids out of trouble by getting them interested in bodybuilding and competitive arm 
wrestling.  Nimet trained and occasionally entered national arm wrestling competitions.  
He took weight lifting very seriously, and was dismissive of the way that many of his 
young male peers from migrant households like his own would use the gym only in the 
late winter and early spring, lifting intensely over a short span and spending money on 
protein supplements, and talking loudly in the gym about going to Antalya or Marmaris 
or some such Mediterranean resort town in Turkey to work for the summer and perhaps 
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attract the eye of a foreign woman—usually, in this public fantasy, European, older, and 
well-off.  As earnest as he was in the gym, which we often attended together, he talked 
about arm wrestling as little more than a hobby, with his real focus, he said, somewhere 
between school and work.  
 Nimet talked incessantly about the necessity of education and the need for “our 
Diyarbakır youth” to get high school diplomas.  Yet before we get to those passages, 
perhaps we should start Nimet’s account where—in asking him to narrate his work 
history in one of our last long recorded interviews in 2009, shortly before he left for what 
turned out to be a brief, disappointing construction job in Istanbul and had asked for my 
help in preparing a resume—he felt it best to begin. 
 “Born and raised in Lice, in [X] village.”  With just over a thousand residents 
around the time of his birth, by 2000 census records Nimet’s natal village appeared as 
unoccupied, having been evacuated in 1993 by the Turkish military. While still in the 
village, his family’s productive life involved small-scale agriculture and animal 
husbandry.  “In the village, we were eight brothers, and my mother and father, bless 
them.  In the village, we dealt with shepherding, with animal husbandry.  We produced, 
uh, milk, yoghurt and cheese.  We’d get by with that.  Also we dealt with agricultural 
work.  We’d grow tobacco.  And tomatoes or cucumbers—whatever we could, we’d 
grow it and sell it.”  Nimet couldn’t recall the exact extent of their landholding—he was 
only around seven at the time the village was evacuated—but by the accounts of both him 
and his older brothers, it was enough to support the family. 
 By the early 1990s, the mess of internal political strife destabilized life and 
livelihood in Nimet’s village.  “There were some sorts of wars, for instance, guerrilla and 
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soldier—call it the PKK problem.  They [the military] burned the village, or, that is, they 
burned a part of our village, and part of the people in the village had to flee, while part of 
them stayed because their financial situation was low, and they were left to die.”  As with 
many forced migrants I spoke with from villages outside of Lice, Nimet’s family did not 
immediately come to Diyarbakır, but first attempted to settle in the nearby satellite town 
of Lice, where two of his older brothers had already moved for work.  This move, 
facilitated by family, involved among other things a change in livelihood practices.  With 
the possibilities for mixed subsistence and market agricultural production and animal 
husbandry destroyed, in Lice and afterwards, they relied on a combination of, at first, 
small-scale trade and farming of a small family plot they happened to hold on the 
outskirts of town, followed by a number of semi-formal service and shop keeping 
ventures: 
In Lice, I had brothers, two older brothers.  Both were working, one in a bread 
bakery, and the other in a market.  As for the rest of us, we had some land in Lice 
where we’d plant tobacco and, in part of it, grow wheat.  Also, my Dad was a 
Cyprus veteran, my Dad used to go and come between here and Cyprus, and 
would bring whatchamacallit, household goods, say pots or pans, and we would 
take them and go street by street to different houses and we would try to sell 
them.  Yani, we would engage in trade, and would profit a little from that. 
 
But the stay in Lice was only temporary, as a military siege was soon launched on the 
town, in which many shops were burned and houses destroyed, and many residents fled 
to nearby Diyarbakır or more far-flung destinations.  In our conversations and interviews, 
usually carried out on squat, poplar-wood stools in front of his brother’s kebab stand, 
looking out onto the razor wire-lined walls of the nearby penitentiary that gave the 
neighborhood where his family settled its unusual name—Cezaevi, literally, prison—he 
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frequently came back to two memories from this period of military siege that he claimed 
had stayed with him since: 
Nimet: It’s like Baydemir [the widely admired mayor of Diyarbakır] said on TV, 
I’ve seen more than my age (yaşımdan çok şeyler gördüm).  As if I’ve lived for a 
thousand years.  Really, if you look at us easterners, hele hele, those young guys a 
bit older than me, if you look at them, you’d say, these guys lived a thousand 
years.  Such psychological problems were loaded onto their backs, in such a 
manner that it’s impossible to forget, psychologically.  What I’m going to say is 
something like that.  This I’ll never forget.  We lived eight brothers in a two-room, 
stand-alone house. 
 
Will: When you first came to Diyarbakır? 
 
N: No, this is in Lice.  Now, picture this, there’s nothing at home.  There’s no 
bread.  Our mom, what we call tandoori (tandır), our tandır bread, my mom had 
prepared the dough, you see?  And when the dough had risen, well, there was a 
curfew in Lice.  No one could go outside.  Those who left home, they were picked 
up and taken away.  And so what happened?  During the curfew on this day, a 
gunfight broke out.  I can’t forget it.  It was like this.  Our guerrillas, they came 
down from the mountains into Lice, and in came the soldiers.  They were firing at 
each other.  So, we eight kids, we were all hungry.  And the dough, er… 
 
W: Had risen? 
 
N: No, I mean, it was in a big plastic container (leğen).  And there right across 
from our house was the tandır.  Mom said, well either my kids are going to die 
from starvation or I will die from a bullet.  She made a choice.  Without hesitation 
she put her life on the line for her children.  So how did she do it?  When the 
gunshots died down, she would run and tak, she would slap a bread into the oven, 
and then run back, and then when the shots died down again, then again it was 
tak, another bread in the oven.  And in this manner, she produced a full container 
of bread.   
 
And I’m just talking about dry bread, aa.  Forget tomatoes or anything.  Just dry 
bread before us, a whole leğen full. We, eight or nine of us, or with Mom and Dad 
ten, we finished that bowl of dry bread. We were that hungry.  We were in such 
dire straits. 
 
W: How long did it go on? 
 
N: For three straight days those sounds of gunfire didn’t cease.  I won’t forget.  I 
was seven or eight years old.  No, I was seven. 
 
W: How did you sleep? 
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N:  There was no sleeping, brother!  My mom and dad used to say, we lived those 
days without standing up.  We slept on the floor and we did the soldier crawl 
across the floor, that’s how we would, you’ll excuse me, go to the toilet at night.  
Anyhow, these few days passed and then the other thing I can’t forget.  You know 
stables, animal stables?  In the Saddam thing… 
 
W: You mean Halepçe? 
 
N: No, this was a military operation in Lice, the soldiers called it Saddam 
something.  Was it the Saddam war? Anyway, at that time, the passing helicopters 
used chemical warfare. 
 
W: On Lice? 
 
N: Just like that, on Lice.  They were dropping chemicals on Lice from above.  
Now, you drop chemicals, but here there’s guilty beside innocent, civilian beside 
non-civilian.  The civilians, what did they do to deserve this?  So now, in this, 
what we call a stable—I mean, in our house, there were too many places that 
could let air in, so with my mom and dad and brothers and sisters and with some 
other villagers we knew, using mud from the ground below like cement, like 
mortar, with our hands, we filled in all the holes in the stable to keep the 
chemicals from getting in and making people faint.  There are things you don’t 
easily forget.  And I’d say these are some of the biggest lessons you learn in life.  
 
W: What sort of lesson? 
 
N: What sort?  Think, if one hasn’t lived even this much [points to the tip of his 
finger] of these kinds of problems, can one come and ask me to act like I didn’t 
live these at all?  They tell us, come on, say there’s no Kurdish problem, come on.  
Can they tell me that, brother?  No, of course not.  So is it possible for us to 
accept this?...Ahh, but now, I mean, just look now, you’ve asked me to explain 
this and now the wound is open again.  Psychologically you can’t forget. 
 
Livelihood was a persistent problem for Nimet and his family after displacement.   
Considered too young to work by his family in their first years in the city, Nimet recalled 
the work that his father and older brothers carried out to support the family: 
When we first came to Diyarbakır, well, our source of getting by was this.  My 
dad worked as a porter in construction.  I mean, he would go and do day labor on 
construction sites…I had older brothers working then, one in a coffeehouse, and 
one worked as an apprentice alongside a carpenter.  My middle older brother, he 
preferred not to come to Diyarbakır, he liked Lice more.  He would bring stuff to 
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soldiers, bring them daily goods [cigarettes, snacks] and in that way would make 
a profit for himself from the soldiers.52 
 
Diyarbakır was also marked by violence at the time.  As we saw in earlier chapters, house 
raids and extrajudicial killings were rather common, as was street violence in the form of 
extrajudicial killings carried out by Hızbullah, disappearances, and bomb detonations.  In 
the first few years, then, Nimet, like many of the migrant families I interviewed in the 
previous chapter, did not spend much time outside the house.  But as things calmed down 
in the city, and as every extra wage contribution to the household began to count more 
and more, he began to buy cheap wholesale goods (seeds, tissues, gum) and hawk them 
on the street or in coffeehouses: 
As for us young ones, at first, the streets were unsound (sakat).  Because they 
were unsafe, our streets, we generally stayed at home.  But when we got a little 
older, my older brothers, in front of schools they sold sunflower seeds or gum.  As 
for us, we did it old style.  I mean, we’d sell Hobi ice cream or cold drinks.  Or 
we’d make lemonade, for example.  When the kids in school were at recess 
playing ball in summer, when they’d sweat, they’d want something cold to drink, 
and we gave them lemonade.  Later we too started to sell gum and seeds. 
 
Yet even if state and revolutionary violence had begun to decrease, the streets still proved 
dangerous in another way.  It is well known in Diyarbakır that, especially in the early 
years of forced migration, cars hit many newcomer children, who were simply 
unaccustomed to city traffic.  A friend and activist who has been working with children in 
the city for years told me that she knew of no exact figures on this, but guessed that they 
were quite high.  Even in the comparatively small research universe of an ethnographic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This last detail presents an interesting contradiction.  It came just after I had gone to Lice with Nimet 
and spent a day walking around the town and among ruins in the nearby mountains with a few of Nimet’s 
maternal cousins.  Lice is, for its size, remarkably militarized, and as we walked past a couple of military 
outposts, two of Nimet’s cousins openly cursed the soldiers in Kurdish.  One of the cousins produced a 
marijuana cigarette, flashing it tauntingly before the young conscript behind the barbed wire.  Nimet 
happily joined in the exchange of jokes about soldiers that ensued. 
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project, I met two young men who been hit by a car and one who had a sibling who had 
been.53  As for Nimet, a car struck him full on just a few years after coming to the city: 
So time passed and when I was nine I was in a traffic accident.  Again I was laid 
up in the University Hospital.  My skull was fractured, and that’s why I don’t 
really remember much from my childhood.  It seems the doctor said this to my 
family: ‘if this kid lives, because of the fractured skull, well, there’s a risk he 
won’t live.  And if he lives, he will normally experience some kind of trauma’.   
 
In time, though, aside from occasional swelling that would send him, worried, to the 
hospital, and painful headaches that would make it difficult for him to concentrate even 
enough to carry out a normal conversation, Nimet was in good health.  Wiry and 
muscular, he wore tight and carefully ironed shirts that showed his figure.  In the kebab 
stand, he liked to challenge friends to arm wrestling matches.  His strong hands recorded 
his brief but significant working life: thick, stubby, crooked fingers perpetually calloused, 
cut, and cracked dry in the winter, with many scars, and leathery palms.  On one thumb 
was a deep scar from a serious cut sustained on the job while chopping meat, which 
gangrened and, again sending him to the hospital, almost required amputation. 
 More recently, with his days spread thin across school and work, he talked about 
the need to steer clear of the “human stables” (insan ahırları, a common disparaging 
description of coffeehouses) and to “develop himself”, which to his mind meant devoting 
himself to formal education.  However, apt as Nimet often was to pay lip service to the 
necessity of education, his views on its utility were ambivalent at best.  He would echo 
truisms—“it’s like they say, there’s a big difference between those who have read and 
those who haven’t, those who know and those who don’t”—yet in the same breath decry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Indeed, the problem continues; it was foretelling of this minor research note that on literally the very 
first day I arrived in Diyarbakır for fieldwork, my friend was nearly two hours late meeting me at the 
airport because the driver had hit a young boy in a neighborhood built by the displaced, and had to take him 
to the hospital.   
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what he saw as the substandard quality and lack of any meaningful results of education in 
Diyarbakır: “Diyarbakır’s youngsters, at most they study until high school, and after high 
school, it’s done.  Why?  Because they know that when they enter the university entrance 
exam, their chance of passing is, let’s say, 15 percent.  Most have no chance.  Why?  
Because our eastern education is different from the western education.”  He elaborated on 
this point: 
Our teachers in the east don’t spend much time on lessons or with students.  They 
don’t explain topics that well.  But teachers in the west, they explain with head, 
heart, and soul…And so when it comes time for the exam, the ones from the east 
don’t get a good education, while the ones in the west do.  But the exam is the 
same for both, the questions are the same.  So what happens?  Our easterners 
remain weak.  Now, there are those among us who do well, too, but what 
happens?  They immediately take them to the west.   
 
Nimet frequently expressed a belief that education is kept intentionally poor in the east in 
order to prevent the region from developing economically and politically, a belief that 
taps into a wider popular mode of conspiracy thinking about intentional 
underdevelopment explored elsewhere in this study.  Whether this claim can be supported 
or not, his general sense of significant educational differences in eastern and southeastern 
Anatolia are generally confirmed in other studies of the consequences of forced 
migration.  For instance, a major research project by the Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation (TESEV) noted that  
During interviews with the children of IDPs [policy speak meaning internally 
displaced persons] living in municipal neighborhoods with a high density of IDPs, 
the TESEV Working Group established that almost all children, male and female, 
are attending or have attended primary school. However, the rate of post-primary 
school attendance is rather low. Based on what the group could gather from its 
interviews, the quality of education in these neighborhoods is quite poor and 
classrooms are overcrowded. [2007: 212] 
 
Completing high school was a challenge not only for Nimet but for many of his male 
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peers.  In part, this was because of crowded classrooms and teachers assigned often 
against their will to the southeast who, according at least to Nimet and his friends, were 
uninspiring and were often unwilling to deal constructively with the discipline problems 
that frequently arose in the classroom, preferring instead to cancel lessons or simply let 
them pass without teaching.  But another factor affecting graduation rates was the fact 
that a majority of the young men from displaced households simply had to work to 
contribute to the livelihood of their families.  And balancing work and school often made 
studying in earnest a challenge.  Nimet was not unique in imagining this problem as 
wrapped up with questions of state culpability; he saw the state as behind the 
conditioning of different degrees of “opportunity” (imkân) for young people in the east of 
Turkey and young people in the west, which in his eyes meant that the state actively 
structured different futures.  In this particular exchange, the kebab stand was short on 
help, so he was showing me how to fold a head of lettuce tightly and chop it in the thin 
way his brother preferred for salads and dürüm toppings while he ran back and forth from 
the tables to the grill.  When the çırak and his older brother finally showed up, the latter 
graciously gave Nimet a break, and we sat and drank tea outside a nearby bakery where 
his friend worked.  Nimet was engaged in friendly same-street-sociality with an older 
man who brought us tea.  I was scribbling down a few of the quotes that someone in the 
prison administration had had painted on its outer walls—“The biggest prison is inside 
the mind of an ignorant person”, and “If you want to know a man, look at the company he 
keeps”—and when he returned, Nimet first shared with me the news that he had decided 
to drop out, before I turned on the recorder and reminded him of a sentence I had heard 
his friends and him toss around frequently: “our opportunities are very limited 
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(imkânlarımız çok kısıtlı)”: 
Nimet:  Definitely limited, my brother, definitely limited.  What they call limited, 
do you know what that is?   
 
Will: Well how about you, what does it mean to you, could you explain a bit? 
 
N: Well, let’s start with education.  The state says, we give you an education, we 
teach you.  Okay, eyvallah, you give an education, you teach.  But there’s no 
sincerity, no truth.   
 
W: From the state? 
 
N: From the state.  For instance, if you go to the west, it’s full education to the 
kids, and full opportunities. Now, if for our Diyarbakır youngsters, if one third of 
those opportunities were presented, all of us would have studied, all of us would 
have done something.  I believe this very much, with my most inner belief, we 
would have done it, no doubt we would have!  If I had those opportunities, if I 
had those chances, I would want to study.  To finish and find work.  You know me 
more or less.  On the one hand, I would very much like to study.  But on the other, 
I must help my family.  So then what was I doing [before dropping out]?  Half day 
work, half day school.  But what came of it?  A bit to this, a bit to that, but I didn’t 
understand anything fully from either.  It’s got to be full school or full work or it’s 
nothing. 
 
A couple of years after dropping out, on a recent visit to Diyarbakır, Nimet still talked 
about the necessity of education and said that he might pursue the equivalent of a GED in 
the future, but “not with the aim of certainly becoming this or that”, he added.  His sense 
of how to build a working future rather now seemed more attuned to entering into another 
hierarchical structure for building a future: the advancement of becoming a master of a 
trade.  He was searching for work in the field of construction, and meanwhile was 
keeping up a public face in his neighborhood through still helping out at his brother’s 
stand and trying to build and maintain a public identity as a reliable, upright, and moral 
man worthy to be a neighborhood esnaf.  His sense of education’s value was now geared 
to navigating state bureaucracy and defending himself when needed:  “Maybe I’ll make 
use of that information one day, to be able to defend my own rights.  For instance, if I 
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happen to have to do something in a state institution, I’ll know what’s what.”  For the 
time being, though, his sense of his chances for building a viable future through the state 
educational system was virtually nonexistent. 
 If for Nimet the salient reasons behind education’s limited future-provision for 
young men were tied to what he assumed to be the politically-motivated poor quality of 
education and to the practical, temporal pressures of having to work to help see to his 
family’s getting by, for other young men I talked to, other reasons came into play.  Two 
prominent themes were 1) language barriers, and 2) discrimination faced by those 
students who followed another possible educational route in the southeast, and one with a 
controversial history wrapped up with accusations of underlying assimilationist 
intentions: the boarding schools that offer poor Kurdish children room and board and a 
chance to devote themselves entirely to their studies so long as they live apart from their 
families for the duration of schooling. 
 Making it possible for children to study in Kurdish, the first language of a 
majority of people in the southeast, is currently among the chief demands of the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey and its push for expanded ‘cultural rights’ and ‘linguistic rights’.  
Most of the relevant NGOs working on various aspects of the so-called Kurdish problem 
in Turkey also make mention of the need for education in Kurdish.  One everyday take on 
this matter came from a young man who worked nights in a simit oven—another 
surfacing of simit in this study.  Like Nimet, he remembered clearly watching his natal 
village—also outside Lice, but far from Nimet’s—burn.  The villagers set up camp 
outside a nearby village where some people had relatives by marriage, but the military 
threatened the already settled villagers in not so veiled ways, claiming that the fires that 
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the campers lit to stay warm could easily be mistaken by soldiers as PKK camps and that 
the solider could not be held responsible if the village were consequently fired upon.  So, 
after some time the villagers asked their camping friends to leave, causing the displaced 
to again attempt to return to their village, which in turn prompted the military to again 
burn what attempts they made to rebuild.  The simitçi’s early memories of Diyarbakır, he 
said, were of arriving on foot with “nothing but the clothes on our back”—another stock 
image used by the displaced to describe the conditions of arrival, one that I heard 
countless times—and feeling literally physically lost in the city.  By the time I met him to 
do a series of interviews, he had long since left high school.  His shift in the bakery 
started around 10 at night and lasted until four or five in the morning.  Work started with 
him pouring the right measures of flour, oil, salt, and rising agents into the commercial-
sized metal mixer in the back of the bakery.  On one occasion, I jokingly asked him if he 
cared that the huge tin of oil he was using was stamped with an expiration date of over a 
month before.  He laughed and said that his employers did not pay him enough to care.  
Once the dough’s mix cycle was finished, he brought the yellowish oily mass onto a huge 
cool slab of marble in the middle section of the bakery—marble is plentiful around 
Diyarbakır, and certain grades can be purchased for relatively inexpensive prices in the 
southeast, making it a common feature in businesses of all economic scales—just beside 
the deep, tile-lined, wood-fired oven.  The mound of dough sat covered with a cloth 
while, for the next few hours, the young baker formed the dough and, when called for, 
stuffed it with cheese or sprinkled it with sesame and nigella seeds, to prepare the various 
breakfast savory pastries—in addition to simit, he also made açma, poğaça, and two 
Diyarbakır specialties, yağlı ekmek and çörek, the latter flavored with the kernel of St. 
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Lucie cherries—that would be sold from the glass counters in the shop front or 
distributed to a variety of semi-formal economic actors in the surrounding 
neighborhood—unlicensed shopkeepers who sold the pastries, along with perhaps a fruit 
juice, to morning commuters, or to young boys who came and bought a tray of simit and 
went from coffeehouse to coffeehouse with the tray balanced on their head, yelling 
“simiiiiit, sıcak simiiiiit”.   
 Shaping dough one evening into hundreds of small rings, he recounted the jobs he 
had done to support his family since their arrival to Diyarbakır in the early 1990s.  The 
list echoes Nimet’s work history.  He sold packs of tissues and gum on the city streets.  
When the weather was warm, he stood outside of school playgrounds, selling popsicles.  
He shined shoes, worked as an errand boy in half a dozen restaurants and teahouses, and 
when he dropped out before completing middle school to begin his current job in this 
small neighborhood bakery, he became one of his family’s main breadwinners.  He was 
an unabashed sympathizer of the PKK, and spoke freely of his wish to join their struggle 
as a guerrilla, if only he were not so responsible for his family’s wellbeing.  As for 
school, he echoed Nimet’s political take on education, but along different lines.  The 
problem for him was in part the ideological content of instruction. 
Already when you look at it, schools just teach you always the aspects where 
Turkey was in the right.  It’s always, ‘Atatürk did this and that, he attacked them 
like that, we did this to them, we battled’, things like this.  But these don’t show 
their true aims.  I mean, I’m saying for example, I mean, this is valid for all 
people and for all states they always try, when actually in the wrong, to do every 
kind of effort to show themselves in the right. 
 
Equally irritating for this young man was the simple fact of having to use a language 
different from his mother tongue in school.  “Why do we always have to use their 
language and express ourselves like Turks?”  It was for reasons of having to support his 
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family that he cut his education short after middle school, but perceptions of education as 
a part of a Turkish nationalist system he saw as discriminating unfairly against Kurds 
convinced the baker that non-participation was the right choice in a system that, to his 
mind, only offered him a viable future if he were to accept the assimilationist logic he 
saw as embedded in national education. 
 Beyond overcrowded schools, or schools that students’ families simply could not 
afford to have them attend (since they could also be working and bringing in much-
needed household income) there is another path of education open to young men in the 
southeast: boarding schools.   Journalist and scholar Aliza Marcus, in her exceptional 
history of the PKK, which builds on extensive research and interviews with ex-PKK 
members, describes the political logic motivating the creation of boarding schools.  
“Ankara hoped that offering educational opportunities to Kurds would hasten their 
assimilation by teaching them the Turkish language and history as if it were their own. In 
1961, special regional boarding schools were established to remove Kurdish children 
from their home environment and educate them in a wholly Turkish one” (Marcus 2007: 
26-27).  Yet, as she and other analysts have noted (McDowall 1996), in many instances 
this had the effect of in fact strengthening Kurdish identity, as students traveled, studied, 
and met other Kurds in educational exile with whom they could discuss their experiences.   
 In Aziziye, a neighborhood described in the previous chapter, I met a number of 
young men of migrant families who had attended boarding schools.  One of them—call 
him Mustafa—was around 18 at the time of our series of four interviews.  He was then 
working full time in his older brother’s vegetable stand, having recently dropped out of a 
school in İzmir.  The basic reason for his relocation was a crisis in the family.  The death 
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of his eldest brother—the main breadwinner—from chronic kidney disease had put the 
family in a difficult financial situation. Mustafa felt obliged to return to Aziziye and help 
his family.  In our interviews and, more, in our countless unrecorded exchanges spread 
across more than 18 months—I spent many hours sitting outside his shop, talking with 
the group of young men who congregated there most evenings—he often returned to his 
conflicted feelings on having left the school.  On the one hand, there were pleasurable 
aspects of his life in İzmir and joyous memories; the school had a motor scooter, for 
instance, that he was allowed to use on occasion, which he often took to the seaside, or 
used to visit local street markets, where he was amused by the language and the habits of 
the pastoral nomads (yörük) who came down from their mountain camps to buy 
provisions.  Mustafa described their manner, dress, and ways of talking as rough and 
uncivilized, and joked that if Turks want to criticize Kurds as backwards or as speaking 
improper Turkish, they should first look inside their own geographies and at “their own 
people”.   He recalled his days in boarding school as marked by no worries about the 
need to work; he was able to devote himself fully to schoolwork, and had good relations 
with one teacher who had encouraged him to consider going to university for something 
related to computer maintenance.   
 On the other hand, Mustafa complained bitterly about other students’ taunts.  
Every time there was resurgence in violence in the southeast, he was called a terrorist, 
and students would ask him what he thought were racist questions such as whether it was 
true that Kurds have tails or that their blood runs another color.  (Similar myths also 
surface in the oral accounts collected in the journalist Nadire Mater’s masterful 
Mehmedin Kitabı (1999), a once-banned book of interviews with soldiers conscripted to 
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fight in the 1990s in the southeast.)   Otherwise less political than many of his peers, 
Mustafa said that he had seriously considered joining the PKK a number of times because 
of this treatment.  Although, having come to know him fairly well by the end of my 
research, I have doubts as to whether he would have carried through on this, doubtless 
this experience contributed greatly to his sense of being different from the rest of Turkey 
on account of being a Kurd.   
 Nevertheless, his time in İzmir had left Mustafa with doubts as to his working 
future.  At least, as he repeatedly put it to me, he felt that he had acted morally by 
returning to help his family.  But comparing his possibilities for future work with the 
trajectories of his older brothers, Mustafa often wondered whether he had made a mistake 
in choosing a life almost assured to be defined by long work hours and sub-minimum-
wage pay.   
 Sensitive and sometimes pensive, Mustafa’s moods swung from despondency to 
flashes of excitement, as in when he would explain fictional plots he had in mind for 
television scripts or short stories, a particular favorite involving a retired boxing 
champion who was conscripted and sent to fight in the southeast and, scarred after having 
seen something terrible in battle, married a woman in Diyarbakır fleeing a life of 
prostitution and decided to stay in the city.  He seemed, in other words, caught between 
difficult conditions and dreams of something else.  
 But we are getting ahead, as this last matter—dreams of escape—is the subject of 
the next chapter.  Here, the effort has been to show, through ethnographic detail, the ways 
in which discourses about livelihood and how to create a viable working future are “shot 
through”, in Bakhtin’s phrase, with moral and political evaluations of the state as an 
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unjust actor.  
	   151	  	  
CHAPTER 5 
BUILDING A FUTURE II: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND 
FANTASIES OF ESCAPE 
 
 Reading through most any local government or NGO report on the challenges of 
Diyarbakır’s post-displacement urban economy, one is likely to find a section entitled 
something along the lines of ‘recommendations and solutions’.  In light of the fact of 
wide agreement that unemployment and poverty are among the city’s most pressing 
problems, it is probably not surprising that one of the most common proposals offered in 
these reports is for expanded opportunities for mesleki eğitim, or vocational training.  In 
fact, in Sarmaşık’s A Map of Urban Poverty, “opening vocational training courses” was 
the top demand among households surveyed (2009: 41). 
 Researchers at the International Labor Organization agree with Diyarbakır’s 
displaced and dispossessed about the importance of vocational training.  A 2008 report 
makes the point that although in impoverished geographies people may lament the lack of 
work, this should not be interpreted to mean that people are not working.  The question is 
rather one of quality and productivity of work.  “The problem in many developing 
countries is not the absence of work, but rather the prevalence of work that is 
insufficiently productive to yield a decent income” (ILO 2008: 5).  Framing the problem 
of economic inequality and problems in finding work as in part one of the differential 
productivity of forms of work, the report advocates vocational training in impoverished 
spaces as a way of encouraging, over time, a shift of labor power from, in the ILO’s 
terms, the informal to the formal economy by making laborers more “employable”.   
 Vocational training enjoys support in many economic geographies marked by 
problems of decent incomes, with World Bank funds and technical support available for 
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“VET”—the institution’s acronym for vocational education and training—which the 
Bank sees as an important step in market “integration” in “low- and middle-income 
countries” (Gill et al. 2000).  Back in Diyarbakır, in 2006 MEKSA, a self-described 
public benefit foundation (kamuya yararlı vakıf), established an office in the city.  A 
national foundation—as of 2011, it had 22 training centers in 13 of Turkey’s 81 
provinces—MEKSA brings together a range of public and private actors (state 
employment and education ministries, trade unions, state-private institutions set up to 
encourage so-called SMEs, or small to medium sized enterprises, KOBİ’ler in Turkish, a 
catchphrase of neoliberal visions of economic development (see Elyachar 2005)) with the 
stated aim (note the use of World Bank language) of “achiev[ing] a connection between 
VET and employment” (MEKSA n.d.).  Much of the foundation’s funding is secured 
through support from private companies in Germany and Switzerland and from a 
combination of EU, ILO, World Bank, and UNDP grants.  Founded in 1985, a short time 
after a military coup that initiated a series of changes, some swift and some taking longer 
to enact, to the role of the state in the intervention in and regulation of economic life in 
Turkey, which generally led to the transfer of many state functions to private or semi-
state/semi-private institutions, there are reasons to apply the label of neoliberal to 
MEKSA’s birth.   
 Yet labeling an initiative neoliberal in its general features is, as James Ferguson 
has suggested in a compelling article on the potentials of various ‘neoliberal’ poverty 
relief programs in southern Africa (Ferguson 2007), a separate matter from assessing and 
understanding practical consequences.  On the surface, vocational training would seem to 
be a beneficial step in economic rebuilding in Diyarbakır, since, for reasons explored 
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above, few of the children of migration follow state formal education beyond middle 
school or high school.  This combination of little formal education and few jobs—or, as 
the ILO would have it, few jobs with decent incomes—tends to push young willing 
workers into off-the-books economic sectors.  As one young program participant 
summarized things, sounding very much like the other young man quoted in the epigraph,  
“If you don’t study, either you have to go outside of Diyarbakır and work in, for example 
Ankara or Istanbul, or you stay in Diyarbakır and you have to deal with whatever job you 
can get, whether it’s construction work or a coffeehouse.”  What vocational training 
would seem to offer—if training were targeted to work with assured demand—is to help 
alleviate this situation of migrant labor in temporary and informal economies, and to 
allow people to build viable livelihoods—to build futures—while staying in Diyarbakır.  
What it also may amount to is the creation, a generation down the line, of a class of 
proletarianized Kurds from the aftermath of dispossession.54  
 In any event, even if at a small scale, vocational training is underway.  MEKSA, 
once opened, began cooperating with local governmental and non-governmental 
institutions to offer vocational classes in computer skills, automotive maintenance, and 
natural gas line maintenance.  Sarmaşık, a non-governmental organization described in 
earlier chapters, was an important agent in helping to direct applicants to MEKSA.  As 
far as I witnessed the process, families would visit Sarmaşık to inquire about enrolling for 
access to the NGO’s low-cost subsidized food bank, but were found, however clearly in 
need of assistance, to be ineligible according to the organization’s criteria, the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 This is a thorny question; how to make sense of calls by people for what might amount to their own 
exploitation, particularly if the alternative—constant economic precariousness—is perhaps even more 
undesirable?   
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important of which is that there should be no adult men in the applicant’s household who 
could (at least hypothetically) work.  Such applicants were forwarded to MEKSA and 
assisted in the application process.  Others showed up by word of mouth to apply.   
 Applying for a position in MEKSA involved passing a determination of need 
followed by a written exam covering fundamental literacy and analytical skills.  Then, 
however many positions were open for a particular program, that many top scorers on the 
written exam were offered spots.   
 An interesting aside is that MEKSA was furthermore co-opted, in a rather 
harmless sense of the term, by local politicians, in an instance of the politics of poverty 
recognition and poverty relief.  The mayor of the city, for instance, in a press release 
announcing the publication of Sarmaşık’s “A Map of Urban Poverty” and describing the 
organization’s work along the lines of enrolling Diyarbakır’s urban poor in the training 
program, drew a clear distinction between an approach to poverty relief through 
vocational training that this initiative represented and what he described as the failed 
limits of extant state policies of poverty relief:   
It’s clear that the approach we’ve grown familiar with, the attitudes, actions, and 
understandings of assistance, have not brought many results.  Doubtless, state and 
government institutions are responsible to the first degree in terms of finding a 
solution for the macroeconomic problems of unemployment and poverty, the 
authority having been granted to them.  And it is clear that our region and our city 
are critically in need of employment.  But up to this point, the things that state and 
government institutions have done are not to open employment areas, but to put 
the region’s and the city’s people into the position of consumer or dependent with 
their ‘charity’ (hayır) policies.  
 
The mayor and other local officials frequently summed up the aim of this project and its 
not-so-subtle jab at the policies of the national government under the leadership of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP by its Turkish acronym) through a cliché 
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international in scope: rather than giving people fish, we are teaching them to fish.  The 
same cliché caught on among some of the program participants I spoke with.  Said one 
young participant: 
Veysel: I mean, if they [the central government] sincerely wanted to help, if they 
sincerely wanted to develop this region, I mean, forget about washing machines, 
forget about macaroni, forget about social assistance.  You give these, but to what 
end?  How far can a guy go with that?  But give a guy an opportunity in a 
vocation? Something he can develop, something he can live on? 
 
Will: Something he could continue with? 
 
V: Yeah, I mean, you know my story, I went to the natural gas course, and the 
director said a nice thing.  He said, here we teach you to fish.  And so we say, 
thanks to them we’re eating the bread of this [program].  
 
But beyond the clichés and the political framing of such programs, their implementation 
remains complicated. Mesleki eğitim necessarily is nested in local contexts and local 
political economies of labor.  In the ILO’s general formulation, providing low-earning 
laborers in informal sectors with job skills is seen as a means to help them transit from 
the so-called informal economy.  And indeed this may happen in certain economic 
contexts.  But what is accomplished by vocational training without a wider infrastructure 
of capitalist investment and employment opportunities in the so-called formal economy?  
That is, in the era of cities competing for private capital investment, is being able to show 
a workforce with a certain set of vocational skills enough to attract employers to cities?  
If you build it, will they come?  If they do not, are such programs not then simply 
preparing skilled labors who will leave the region for other geographies of labor? 
 Consider the trajectory of one young man—call him Serhat—who applied for the 
natural gas line maintenance program.  Natural gas was just arriving to Diyarbakır in the 
late 2000s, and to Serhat and others, it seemed to offer a promising trade. His village 
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outside of Lice was, like Nimet’s in the previous chapter, evacuated and partially 
destroyed by military forces in 1993.  Since coming to Diyarbakır, he had dropped out of 
school after receiving his middle school diploma and had been working for five years 
alongside an older brother, a glasscutter.  Also like Nimet, Serhat had re-started his 
schooling, and was among the oldest students in his sophomore class.  He had heard of 
MEKSA from a friend and, living in an apartment with his parents and four of his 
unmarried older brothers in Bağlar, not far from Sarmaşık’s office, the two young men 
went together to apply.  On the exam, they placed 61st and 62nd, with his friend just one 
point ahead of him.  This put them well below the natural gas line maintenance training 
class’s cut-off line of the top twenty.  As it turned out, a second section was opened and 
enough people declined the offer of admission such that Serhat’s friend received a call.  
The friends met and talked about who should enter the course, and as a result Serhat’s 
friend informed MEKSA that he would rather Serhat join the class about which he had 
heard him talk so enthusiastically and which the friend felt would mean so much to 
Serhat’s family’s budget. Such was how Serhat was offered a spot.   
 The course met five times a week for one hour.  The schedule meant that Serhat 
could still help out in his older brothers’ various enterprises—in addition to the 
glasscutter, one was a salesman at a small neighborhood shop selling inexpensive 
bathroom fixtures.  In those first months of the course, doing what I did with Serhat—
spending time with him while he was at work carrying new sinks or preparing a mirror or 
a window—he was clearly physically exhausted. It was no surprise, then, when after a 
few weeks he called at a time when I knew he should otherwise have been at school and 
suggested we take a stroll around the city walls.  Explaining that he had thought a long 
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time before taking his decision—“that way if someone asks you to explain yourself, you 
won’t be stuck”—and had chosen in the end to leave school and devote himself entirely 
to vocational training, he said: 
Vallahi, I said, shall I go to my MEKSA or shall I go to school? And I said, I’ll 
see it to the end, whichever one takes.  But valla, there was a period, the day 
started at eight, and then I’d go from school to MEKSA, weekdays five days, five 
hours.  Then I’d go, running, to school, then I’d go straight to my big brother’s 
workplace and work until one or two in the morning, and I was lucky if I slept 
four or five hours.  Vallahi, for three months, it was running about and misery, 
running about and misery.  And so I said, if I’m going to give [MEKSA] five days 
and five hours, then I have to earn this document [a certificate of mastery in gas 
maintenance].  Of course there’s no guarantee of that…But I went and I passed 
the first test. 
 
When at work in his brothers’ shops, in his free time, Serhat would practice and 
demonstrate for me the skills of pipe maintenance he had learned in the course.  He 
would commandeer whatever objects were around and explain the lessons he had had 
regarding tapping and affixing gas lines, and would rehearse the moves he had yet to 
master. Many weeks passed with him especially concerned with the final test at the end 
of the first three-month section, the so-called yellow line test that involved tapping a 
main and having three engineers certify its safety. 
 A few weeks into the course, Serhat came to learn that his physical education 
teacher from high school was also participating in the course, in an alternate section.  
Serhat had made plenty of enemies, he said, in his high school before leaving, but he was 
on very good terms with his PE teacher.  Although as a state civil servant his teacher was 
legally barred from opening a shop of his own, he intended—in a fairly common way of 
bypassing the paperwork required to participate in the registered economy—to arrange 
for a nephew to use his certificate and open a small natural gas heater installation and 
maintenance shop.  The teacher suggested Serhat work alongside his nephew, which for 
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some time made Serhat overjoyed:  “Now I’ll be of use at home.”  The would-be job 
promised health insurance, use of a company mobile phone, and wages at 600 lira (about 
350 USD) lira a month, right around minimum wage at the time.  “For Diyarbakır, hele 
hele, for a kid like me, this is a very, very good wage.”  However, things did not turn out 
as planned.  Serhat did end up working for his ex-teacher’s relative some time before he 
received his final certification.  But few of the promised work conditions materialized: 
months passed before his first wages were paid, and he never received health insurance.  
Then came an unexpected contingency of life.  Only a short time into the job (which, 
however questionable in its start, Serhat was willing to give a chance), he was called for 
18 months of mandatory military service required of nearly all males in Turkey.  He 
counted himself lucky that he was able to obtain his certificate from the course before 
leaving, and luckier still that, after a brief training period in Ankara he was stationed not 
to the southeast but to northern Cyprus.  His boss meanwhile had promised work upon 
return.  Yet a little more than a year after completing fieldwork, when I returned to 
Diyarbakır and visited Serhat’s brother’s shop and followed up on his work trajectory, he 
explained that he had returned from military service and had visited the same workplace 
only to encounter a wholly different agreement: no insurance, no telephone, and two-
thirds the original pay.  He began working, but soon quit, frustrated and disappointed.   
 Serhat was initially enthusiastic about the program, seeing it as a multiplying 
force of economic development for Diyarbakır:  
Think, if there are 20 guys like me, if they do the program and get the certificate.   
And if I open a workplace, I’ll bring two or three guys and the next guy will do 
the same.  So you multiply that 20 by a few and things grow, and a whole 
branch…I mean, natural gas is coming and who is going to eat its bread?  The 
engineer will eat its bread, the master alongside will eat its bread as will the 
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apprentice alongside the master, and the pipe maintenance man will eat its bread 
as will his apprentice, the tester. 
 
As of 2011, however, Serhat was without the promise of a viable “formal” work future.  
Still he said he was very satisfied that he had a certificate in hand (more below on the 
certificate as a highly symbolic piece of material culture), but said that he had gone 
through some “very hard days” after returning from military service, expecting good 
work but finding himself in a less secure place than when he left.  His rationalization, in a 
telephone exchange in 2011, was, “at least I’m not in debt to anyone and I haven’t broken 
anyone’s heart.”  But there was a sense in which his general view of his chances for 
building a future in Diyarbakır had dimmed.  “You look at Diyarbakır’s economy, and 
you think, five years later there will be no difference between here and South Africa.”55  
Whereas before, the arrival of natural gas and the fact of his certificate in hand seemed to 
spell a secure future, Serhat more recently talked about “doubts regarding the future”.  “I 
wonder, will I be like my brothers?  Will I be like my father?  I don’t have to be!  I won’t 
accept being unemployed.”  In another post-fieldwork, follow-up interview, he continued 
on the theme of age and the future: 
Come what may, if I’m to succeed, if I’m to do something, anyway it will have to 
be while I am young.  If, at 30 or 40, if I’m still looking for work and I say, take 
me on, they’re going to say, what’s your profession?  And if I say, I don’t have a 
profession, they’ll say, what are you going to do for me at this age?  Right now 
I’m young, almost 20, life’s most productive period, right?   And right now I trust 
myself a great deal.  I believe I can achieve something.  Already after a certain 
age, around 30 or 40, the body starts to deteriorate, the brain slows down.  At least 
natural gas is a job with social insurance, a clean job.  Already my parents are 
quite old, and I won’t be able to benefit from their support.  If I can at least get 
something from natural gas, at least I can save my own life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 It is unclear why he chose this particular reference.  It would seem to blend two images.  One is the 
association of Africa with poverty, which we shall see in a later ethnographic passage in this chapter.  The 
other probably refers to debates that were circulating in the media at the time of this interview suggesting 
that the trajectory of Kurdish-Turkish inter-communal and state-citizen relations in Turkey were moving in 
the direction of apartheid. 
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Not unlike the young men in vocational training courses profiled in a recent New York 
Times article in the wholly different cultural context of America’s geographies of 
marginal employment, where “without high school, much less college, many young 
people — particularly men and members of minority groups — end up doing low-skill 
work, relying on their youth and brawn” and where “job prospects often fade altogether 
as workers age” (NYT: 2011), Serhat felt a clear pressure to enter into a technical career 
path while still in full possession of his own youthful brawn.  However, the unregistered 
and unprotected work agreement he entered into—informality being both redeemer and 
ruin of Diyarbakır’s displaced labor economy—meant that he would have to postpone his 
search for “clean” (Tr. temiz, meaning in this context, secure, insured, good conditions) 
work. 
 What to make of his experience?  The point is not to use Serhat’s troubles in 
securing work to make broad generalizations.  Yet his experiences suggest that there are 
reasons to question whether greater economic regulation and the formalization of 
informal economic relations are truly the keys to securing viable working futures.  I heard 
many voices in city local government and NGOs make the argument for greater 
formalization of economic relations—greater enforcement of commercial licenses and tax 
payment to cut down on the number of unregistered businesses and more oversight of 
workplace practices to reduce the regularity of work with no guarantee of the sort that 
landed Serhat in his precarious position.  Established, formalized shopkeepers also tend 
to call for greater regulation of kaçak (roughly, unsanctioned; see the following chapter 
for a discussion of this concept) economic ventures as a reactionary measure against the 
changes to the urban economy that displacement brought and for the protection their own 
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established livelihoods.  The story of Serhat or other participants I met who also 
struggled to secure decent work should not be taken as evidence to impugn MEKSA or to 
discredit vocational training’s promise.   
 Nevertheless, there is an undeniable impasse facing such programs in the 
contemporary political-economic conjuncture, when conditions of labor would seem to 
not allow for the realization of their aims. Aspects of the rhetoric of Diyarbakır’s mayor 
cited above are too geared to the requirements of making the headlines to be of much 
analytic use, but the broader critical point that he and his party have been upholding is 
valid: although the national state has the most power to bring greater opportunities for 
employment to the southeast, across successive governments—not just AK Party rule—
there has been little serious commitment shown towards transforming the structural 
conditions of the unequal distribution of wealth and work opportunities across the diverse 
economic geography of Anatolia.  In such conditions, programs such as MEKSA, 
however laudable and practically grounded as they may be, remain only as effective as 
the wider context of day-to-day working conditions allows.  Because of Diyarbakır’s 
precarious working conditions, Serhat and other program participants, many of them 
children of migration whose households arrived at their impoverished present as a result 
of the political violence and uprooting of the early 1990s, encountered in mesleki eğitim 
something ambiguous.  Largely unable to enter university and counting themselves 
fortunate to have finished high school, vocational training would seem to provide the 
promise of a viable work future, which was the express preoccupation of so many of the 
young men I met for this study.  A certificate of completion from MEKSA seemed to 
promise a relatively stable, relatively decent paying job, social insurance, and the 
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possibility of establishing an independent household.  But the work future of vocational 
training can only go as far as the forms of work the city’s economy allow.  Thus the 
collision of such a political-economic context with the temporal imagination of young 
men looking to build a future and to work their way to basic wage security ended, in 
Serhat’s case as in others, in disappointed expectations.  Again, recalling the previous 
chapter’s critique of youth bulge theory, this situation yielded not criminals or terrorists, 
but, at least in my experience, a swaying between disappointment and redoubled resolve 
to find a way out of the conditions of a lack of decent, sustaining work, and an 
augmented perception of the state as the agent behind their struggles. Which leads us to 
the second ethnographic theme of this chapter: the visions, schemes, and plans that many 
of the young men of displaced families whom I met cultivated and shared. 
 
PERPETUAL MOTION MACHINES, BURIED TREASURE, AND THE PURSUIT OF SERTIFIKA 
 For all the reach of formal sites of preparation (education, vocational training), I 
encountered more young men who were trying to create a future by other means, some by 
entering into labor hierarchies of apprenticeship leading to craft mastery, and some by 
less specifiable practices of nurturing dreams of an escape from the dilemmas of a 
depressed urban economy.  This escape was sometimes articulated in very literal terms as 
an escape from the city itself, and from the dead-end work paths that many young 
migrant men’s backgrounds, when fit with the local political economy of labor, made all 
but inevitable.  Interestingly, as we will see, the endpoint of this imagined escape was 
usually articulated, in the late 2000s at least, as not to another city in Turkey, but 
overseas, which is likely a reflection of the fact that increasingly Kurds migrating, 
seasonally or otherwise, to the west of Turkey were encountering forms of local hostility 
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and violence summarized by independent scholar, critical political economist of the 
southeast, and journalist Mustafa Sönmez in this way: “In Diyarbakır, on this my fourth 
trip to the city this year, from the Diyarbakırites I met and talked with, the words I heard 
most were these: things here are good, here we feel secure and calm.  It may come as 
ironic, but despite all the poverty and unemployment and the conflict environment, they 
have ceased migrating from the region” due to the violence they encountered in other 
cities (2012).  It seems to have been more available to thought, in other words, in such a 
climate to imagine leaving Diyarbakır for Amsterdam than for Adana.     
 Other times, this escape took a less literal form.  The aim was not to escape a city 
to which many residents express a deep attachment.  As one young man said, “Diyarbakır 
is beautiful, vallahi billahi go and find the most beautiful and most abundant cities of 
Turkey and still you won’t find anything beyond it.” Rather, the aim was to devise a 
means to escape the working futures that many young men witnessed in their older 
siblings and peers. 
  Take Bawer.  Bawer was not, technically, a child of forced migration, but nor is 
his trajectory separate from the events of the 1990s.  His parents were born in a village 
outside the small city of Silvan.  Thought to be one of the key regional population centers 
in northern Mesopotamia many centuries ago—perhaps the center of early Armenian 
kingdoms—by the twentieth century, Silvan was an impoverished space, something 
between a city and a town, of mostly Kurdish shopkeepers and traders and surrounded by 
Kurdish shepherding and farming villages. Bawer’s natal village’s inhabitants mostly 
made a living from agriculture and animal husbandry.  In Silvan, there was a state-
established tobacco processing plant, where Bawer’s parents, having grown up 
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cultivating and processing tobacco, found work.  They moved the family from the village 
to the town when Bawer was very young, and as employees of a state factory, his parents 
looked forward to living on a modest but sufficient pension in the small house they had 
built in Silvan.    
 Political history intervened.  Silvan was one of the centers of the violent religious 
paramilitary organization known as Hızbullah, to which the state turned a blind eye in the 
early 1990s. Bearing no links with the similarly named movement in Lebanon—the 
southeastern Anatolian movement is sometimes called Kurdish Hızbullah to avoid 
confusion—the movement emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Diyarbakır, with 
religious bookstores providing its early organizational bases, and was committed to the 
overthrow of the secular Turkish state.  The reason that the Turkish state turned a blind 
eye, at a point, to Hızbullah’s activities was that it was hoped that the group might act as 
an effective counterinsurgency measure to the PKK.  But the group quickly spiraled out 
of control, and led to, among other things, the assassination in 2001 of the popular 
Diyarbakır police chief Gaffar Okkan.  Bawer recalled meetings like those he attended as 
a young teenager as filled with talk about Iran as an important model for revolutionary 
theocratic political movements, though he added that almost no one present had been to 
Iran nor knew much about the context or consequences of its revolution.  As the 
movement shifted its base from Diyarbakır in the 1980s, Silvan and Batman became 
important centers of operation.  Bawer was nearly shot in a street battle and shortly 
thereafter decided to leave the organization.  That decision, however, put him in a state of 
constant paranoia on Silvan’s street.  By a path that he declined to explain in detail, after 
a few years of looking constantly over his shoulder he found himself gravitating to the 
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PKK, to the extent that he claims to have made all the arrangements with the local 
recruiters and gone to the bus station in Silvan to meet the men who were to escort him to 
a training camp in northern Iraq.  The men were late to arrive and Bawer’s relatives, 
suspecting something, came to the station and ushered him home. 
 If political history had made life in Silvan troubling for Bawer and his family, 
personal history also intervened.  An elder brother of Bawer’s had fallen in love with a 
young woman and eloped.  The bride’s family approached Bawer’s parents and asked for 
a significant sum of money—an ex post facto bride wealth meant to smooth over the 
potentially explosive breach of custom.  Having little choice but to agree, the family, 
lacking such a high sum and with no access to family loans or any other means of credit, 
went to a man at a known table in the neighborhood coffeehouse, the only source they 
knew: a tefeci, a loan shark.  Tefeciler are scorned but common figures across Turkey’s 
informal economic spaces. The rate of interest they charge on loans is high, and after a 
certain period of non-payment the original starts to compound rapidly and threats of 
violence increase.  Though I have been unable to locate a study to confirm this, many 
people I spoke with about tefecilik claimed that the phenomenon grew rapidly across the 
period of dispossession and widespread economic deterioration of the 1990s.  In any 
case, such was Bawer’s family’s situation.  They lost their savings and soon had to sell 
their house to escape the threats of their shady creditors.   
 Bawer meanwhile had left high school in Silvan when things became too tense.  
“The environment was spoiled”, as he put it, by constant fighting and threats between 
students sympathetic to the PKK and those with ties to Hızbullah.  Particularly after he 
left Hızbullah, returning to school was, he felt, too risky.  By his telling, for his father it 
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was a combination of a sense of shame at having lost everything and his worry that, with 
a growing number of extrajudicial killings and disappearances on the streets of Silvan, his 
sons would be in danger that drove the family to leave Silvan for Diyarbakır.  Thus, the 
family arrived to the city around the same time as thousands of forced migrants, as 
uprooted and dispossessed as them, but by different means. And once in Diyarbakır, with 
the family stripped of its home and holdings and now required to pay rent, for Bawer, 
returning to school was less a priority than working to contribute to the family’s 
livelihood.  Effectively, in other words, Bawer found himself in roughly the same 
economic position as many of the sons of forced migration. 
 Shortly after we met through a mutual friend, and after Bawer had shared with me 
the details of his family’s trajectory, I asked him to bring me to Silvan, walk me through 
the town, and explain his memories by pointing out the streets and schoolyards he had 
mentioned in his recollections.  Our friend, present when I asked, suggested that we 
might also arrange some interviews with displaced villagers now living in Silvan, which, 
he proposed, could make for an interesting comparison to Diyarbakır.   
 The trip resulted in no helpful interviews, but was revealing nonetheless.  We 
agreed on a time and met early the next morning in a coffeehouse by the intra-province 
bus terminal for a quick breakfast of tea and simit before boarding an extended van bound 
for Silvan.   Our mutual friend was accompanying us, too, but called to say that he would 
be late.  Sensing an opportunity in our time alone, Bawer reached into his bag and 
produced a small notebook and asked if I would allow him to “hurt my head” and to 
explain to me some of the ideas he was working on.  I had no idea what to expect, as up 
to this point, I only knew that he was working part time in an internet café with an 
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unsavory reputation.  I knew he was anxious to find new work, as on two previously 
meetings he had invited me to accompany him as he visited shop spaces for rent, hoping 
to open his own internet café and hinting that he was looking for investors.  Opening the 
notebook, he leafed through the first dozen pages, which were filled with sketches of 
what resembled a hula-hoop set inside a cake pan, with a few small rods jutting out from 
the outer rim of the pan at acute angles.   He then explained his plan to solve the 
“problem that none of the great scientists, not even Einstein, could solve”.  He asked 
rhetorically, “What is that problem, do you know”, and leaned in dramatically to reveal 
the secret: “A perpetual motion machine, hocam”.   
 He flipped quickly through pages of drawings that I could not decipher, and said 
without irony that he had figured out everything but how to make the hoop spin on its 
own without an injection of external energy.  He talked about emailing physics professors 
at universities in Istanbul and Ankara to no avail, and asked, could I perhaps contact 
someone back in Cambridge?   
 Soon we were on our way to Silvan.  We walked the streets and saw the 
schoolyards he mentioned, and we stopped in a coffeehouse with the intent of talking to a 
few of Bawer’s old acquaintances and neighbors.  But only one acquaintance showed up, 
and he had little to say beyond a few ezber,56 or rote, lines of Kurdish nationalist 
discourse.  We left, and Bawer suggested that I might like to see the remains of an old 
water-powered stone flour mill on the outskirts of town and perhaps climb a hill to get a 
better sense of the city’s layout.  On the walk down a tree-lined road and up a path 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ezber is a Persian-rooted word meaning literally from memory, but in pragmatic usage in Diyarbakır 
it is often used to refer disparagingly to the habit of some people to repeat the messages of Kurdish 
nationalism without thinking more carefully about their meanings or practical implementation, or to engage 
in self-critique (öz eleştiri).  
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flattened by sheep hooves and dotted with their droppings, we were joined by another 
friend of Bawer’s, who talked (echoing the rural idyll described in an earlier chapter) of 
the “oxygen”, the trees, the brook, the flocks, and the fresh air as the “true natural 
setting” for Kurds.  He broke off a switch from a young willow tree, walked far ahead of 
us, and sang, in the open air and at the top of his lungs, a sung/spoken poem in Kurdish 
about an early 20th-century Kurdish rebellion against the nascent Turkish nation state.  
We passed a few cows in a pen, one of which had a collar of green, yellow and red: the 
colors of Kurdish nationalism.  Bawer joked that in Silvan, even the cows are patriotic.57   
 At the peak of the hill, Bawer and I sat on the sun-yellowed grass while our 
companion took a stroll on his own, smoking, strolling along the sheep paths, and 
keeping on with his song.  Bawer seized on the moment to make another proposition.  He 
pointed to the remains of the Hasuni Caves in the distance, for centuries used as places of 
residence, worship, and work, but long abandoned.  He explained that as a teenager he 
and his friends had thought of going into the caves to explore their depths, but could not 
muster the courage.  The reason for his interest, it turned out, was the widespread myth of 
buried treasure—gold, in particular—in the depths of the caves.  He told a string of 
stories about how his childhood passed with rumors of people finding pieces of gold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Red, yellow, and green objects have an intriguing social life in southeastern Turkey, and across the 
country more generally.  Newroz celebrations involve thousands and thousands of flags, handkerchiefs, and 
costumes in these colors.  Weddings in the southeast often end in a string of cars driving through the city or 
town with people waving small red, yellow, and green handkerchiefs.  Landscaping arrangements of 
flowers in these colors, as mentioned elsewhere, have, in Diyarbakır and in Ankara, attracted police 
attention and lawsuits.  Small trinkets (earrings, bracelets, pins) in red, yellow, and green are created by 
political prisoners and sold in small shops in cities across the southeast.  In 2009, when teaching in 
Istanbul, I observed a protest related to cultural and linguistic rights for Kurds where a group of young 
women were wearing red, yellow, and green football jerseys from a west African country (clear to 
everyone protesting, but presumably a good legal defense).  And though I am unable to track down the 
precise reference, there was a newspaper article in the pro-Kurdish Özgür Gündem at some point during my 
fieldwork that featured a photograph of one of Hakkari’s world-famous upside-down tulips (the image was 
clearly altered) that the article alleged had naturally bloomed in red, yellow, and green. 
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coins or jewelry and hiding the treasure away in their homes with the intent of finding a 
buyer, only to eventually get rid of the objects, fearing they might carry a curse and bring 
bad luck, and as before, he quickly came to the point:  did I happen to know anyone with 
access to a ground penetrating radar machine?  Would I be interested in going in on a 
treasure-hunting mission?   
 After our trip to Silvan, I lost contact with Bawer; he cut off contact with all of his 
friends, in fact, and rumors spread of his involvement in ever-shadier business ventures.  
Although his perpetual motion machine sketches were, at least in my experience, Bawer’s 
own idiosyncratic preoccupation, his interest in buried treasure—“another city under the 
city”, as one Diyarbakır shopkeeper put it to me—were rather widespread.  I first heard 
of ground penetrating radar from Bawer, but by the time I left the city, the term had 
surfaced in at least half a dozen exchanges.  One such instance recorded in my field notes 
happened during an interview with a shopkeeper in Japan Passage, a cluster of semi-legal 
electronics shops in Balıkçılarbaşı, an intersection at the economic heart of Diyarbakır’s 
old walled city center. The shopkeeper in question dealt mostly in kaçak electronic 
goods, as did most of his neighboring shopkeepers—an open secret, like most kaçak 
marketplaces in the city.  If you wanted to save on a digital camera or a cellular phone, 
most of them smuggled across the Iraqi or Syrian border, Japan Passage was the place.  
During the interview, the shopkeeper inquired delicately but with persistence and about 
my home academic department.  How many archaeologists are there?  And do they know 
how to use radar machines?  Do they have access to them?  I confessed ignorance to the 
finer details of his questions and, as it seemed (at the time, at least) tangential to the 
interview, I carried on and eventually left the shop without asking more about the 
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unexpected request.  But as I came to hear more of these stories and was able to question 
friends about them, it became clear that what this shopkeeper and others had in mind was 
buried treasure, which, in and around Diyarbakır, usually refers to urban myths of 
Armenian gold left behind or buried at the last minute during the violent population 
evictions around World War I.  A tailor in Suriçi I interviewed a number of times claimed 
not to believe in these myths and explained their ubiquity as nothing but fantasies of easy 
money, but in the same exchange, he also relayed a rumor about “a friend of a friend” 
who had occupied an abandoned historical home in the historic city center after having 
been displaced from a nearby village in the 1990s, and who, upon knocking down a wall, 
discovered a great deal of gold jewelry.  The hope of finding buried treasure speaks to the 
same basic economic conditions that Bawer’s sketches of a perpetual motion machine do: 
work scarcity.58  However pipe-dreamish they may first appear, such acts of imagination 
have to be taken seriously as products of a political-economic context wherein building a 
viable livelihood future is a fraught venture.  
 A similar problematic is present in the widespread everyday chatter that surfaced 
often in this research regarding obtaining some sort of certificate.  Certificates and 
certification are fascinating cultural objects and practices for economic anthropology, and 
should be approached through the same lens of estrangement and defamiliarization as 
anthropologists have viewed Kula exchange.  One man I had interviewed about his work 
as a temporary worker in a canteen at the local university called me late one night and 
invited me to his home in Aziziye, which, the reader will recall from chapter two’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This recalls Wacquant’s work on the value of games of chance (1999) in the United States’ urban 
geographies of displacement, dispossession, and relegation—or, in Wacquant’s terminology, “advanced 
marginality” (2007). 
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profile of Z, is a neighborhood built almost entirely by the displaced.  We sat in one room 
of his father’s self-built two room home, smoking, chatting quietly by a small ceramic 
space heater, and drinking tea kept warm atop the heater, as his friend, a barbershop 
apprentice with long, meticulously styled hair, opened video after video on his cell phone 
of their performances as drummer and saz player, respectively, at neighborhood wedding 
ceremonies.  “Mainly, I am a poet”, the barbershop apprentice said, as he explained how 
the barbershop work was simply something to bring in some income.  He sang and 
occasionally wrote songs for the three-man band, which played in wedding halls and in 
outdoor street weddings across the city.  Otherwise quite reserved, the videos showed 
him singing and calling out to halay dancers with great self-assurance and joie de vivre.   
 That evening, the two young men said that they had wanted to set straight 
something they had heard a third mutual friend tell me in a recent interview, which they 
happened into at the tail end of our exchange.  Their friend was explaining his belief that 
things were improving in the relations between Kurds and the Turkish state since Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party had come to rule.  The canteen worker insisted 
that I should understand one thing and one thing only: the state did not care if Kurds 
starved. “Herkes aç ama devlet umrunda değil. Everyone's hungry but the state doesn't 
care.”  The lesson he drew from this condition was that responsibility fell on the efforts 
of individuals.  When I inquired into exactly what he meant by this, conversation turned 
to what became the object of our exchange for the rest of the night: how he might secure 
some sort of certificate of his ability as a drummer that he thought might help him secure 
a working future.  Together we thought of a handful of places to which he might turn. 
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“That paper, it’s necessary, that way when you go to workplace, you have something to 
show.”   
 Certification ties together matters of value, authorization, and the socioeconomic 
lives of documents.  There are different kinds of certificates, with different criteria 
governing their issuance and different rules determining their exchange value.  The kind 
of sertifika that the young drummer was after could be issued by an NGO for 
participation in a course.  Such a certificate did not promise the same possibilities for 
livelihood as would, say, an ustalık belgesi, a certificate of mastery in a particular craft 
issued in Turkey by chambers of associated professionals (odalar) which is part of the 
documentation required for participation in the registered economy.  Certificates of the 
sort he sought had limited purchase towards decent wage-earning positions.  Unlike 
harder to come by documents such as diplomas, of which most people usually possess 
only a few, one could potentially have a wall or a CV full of certificates, as indeed a few 
civil servants I met did.   Nevertheless, for young migrant men facing underemployment 
or unemployment, limited chances in formal education, and limited job security, a 
certificate of any sort held some promise of the possibility of another future. 
 
CONCLUSION: ON THE MUNDANE ROOTS OF POLITICAL STANCE 
 When read against chapters two and three, these last two chapters raise questions 
about the different ways in which displacement, dispossession, and the destabilization of 
livelihoods have played out across generations.  If the loss of a viable way of getting by 
has left the older generation with memories of past viability and a sense of the untenable 
and unjust nature of the present, the same process has raised a different set of problems 
for the younger subjects of forced migration, whose concerns, while not entirely divorced 
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from the past, focused, to a degree unmatched in their elders, on the question of how to 
build a future and establish a viable working life in the city.  More than resignation, 
energetic, imaginative, and sometimes youthfully fantastic searches for a way out of the 
dilemma of dispossession seemed to animate their daily lives. 
 One argument made in the previous chapter was that youth bulge theory and other 
such politically motivated presuppositions about how young people, especially young 
men, might act in conditions of limited economic opportunities and high joblessness, 
need to be replaced with ethnographically grounded understandings of actual acts and 
actual lives and livelihoods.  What struck me consistently across this phase of 
ethnographic work was the sense in which young men’s anxieties over establishing a 
future are deeply colored by the widespread perception of unjust and discriminatory 
barriers thought to block Kurds, qua Kurds, from meaningful inclusion—economic, 
political, cultural—in the wider nation state—and the sense of people that this may not 
matter, that it might be time to begin thinking of another horizon of political belonging 
within Turkey’s borders yet beyond its policies of inclusive exclusion. 
 Many of the young men we met above questioned the substantive meaning of 
Kurdish belonging in Turkey with explicit reference to labor inequalities.  The simitçi, for 
instance, viewed the rest of Turkey as dependent on dispossessed Kurdish labor, even as 
Kurdish laborers are frequently the targets of quotidian acts of discrimination when they 
travel beyond the southeast.  “Truly, living standards in Diyarbakır are very hard.  The 
southeast”, he continued, searching for the right word, “is really a very poor, er, a 
country, yes, it’s a country, because it’s outside of Turkey.  Turkey doesn’t embrace it.”  
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He continued on the theme of inequality, trying to illustrate it—in a mode reminiscent of 
chapter two—through the image of sharing food: 
We want to sit at your table.  We want to eat from the food you eat, and you too 
eat from the food we eat.  Why are you making discrimination?  I mean, that’s it, 
Turks, really, they always exclude us.  And alongside that, the media, so as not to 
give us work in the west, to us—err, I mean, in the southeast, there are no 
opportunities for work, or if there are, they are really very few, very few in 
number.  When we look, there are people on this street working for a five lira a 
day.  Why?  In the name of contributing to their own household.  And the number 
of people in a house is at least seven to 10 people.  I mean, you won’t find less 
than seven.  But if we didn’t do their work, they would die from hunger. Really!  
If we didn’t do the Turks’ work, they would die from hunger.  Because, today, er, 
be it their hazelnuts or their pistachios, their cotton, their this or that, Kurds do it 
all. 
 
His assessment of the political economy of dispossessed Kurdish labor, based on his own 
work picking hazelnuts and cotton across Turkey, and in struggling to find work at a 
living wage in Diyarbakır, paints a picture of Kurds compelled into circuits of temporary 
and seasonal labor at low wages and being exploited by the rest of Turkey. 
Their aims are to keep us out of the west.  Let me give an example, Alanya59 [a 
Mediterranean city with a sizeable displaced Kurdish population]…They gathered 
people from [various cities in western Turkey] to attack and drive out Kurds from 
Alanya.   I mean, these are real things.  They do what they can to drive Kurds out 
of the west.  They bombed and burned their shops, they burned their houses. 
 
We are always ground down, we are always working, but they are always 
benefitting.  Even though they shoot at us, we still go and do their labor for them, 
because we have to, we have no choice, we must fill our bellies and clothe our 
families.  We must look after our own.  And without that labor, that won’t 
happen.  They shoot us and kill us, and we go and do their work…That’s how it is 
brother, how else shall I put it?   
 
Such stories of unequal treatment in trying to sell one’s labor proliferate.  The son of one 
of the older men we met in the previous chapter described spending his childhood going 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Presumably a reference to the October 1992 events in Alanya, wherein after a slain soldier’s body 
was brought back to the city for burial a mob gathered and attacked a number of shops and houses known 
to be Kurdish owned.  See Milliyet Gazetesi (1992). 
	   175	  	  
to the Black Sea to harvest hazelnuts—a common job for dispossessed Kurds, and one 
that virtually every young man we met in this chapter had talked about doing.  He 
recalled one incident from his time there: 
One thing I’ll never forget in Sakarya, people used to go and come from the city 
to their village [on minibuses], the villagers there.  Never was there a search [of 
the vehicle by the gendarmerie], nothing, as if the state didn’t exist in their lives.  
Once when we were harvesting hazelnuts, I looked at the other people working.  
The women were just like us, they too were villagers, but they were Turkish 
villagers.  I got on the minibus at night, and one woman, she looked at me in such 
a way that if I were a dog or a non-believer she’d probably look upon me more 
lightly, just like that. I paused and said, yaw what am I?  What am I not?  At that 
moment I wanted to die. 
 
The same young man, now working as an errand boy in a coffeehouse for well below 
minimum wage, repeatedly underlined in our exchange a commonly held thesis in 
Diyarbakır: that keeping Kurds impoverished was part of an orchestrated political project 
to depoliticize the southeast.  He claimed that, though he wanted to play a greater role in 
the ongoing political movement for Kurdish liberation, what he said was one of the main 
conditions for the possibility of organized politics, the ability to envision another future, 
was, he felt, robbed from him and his peers, who he said were too caught up in the day-
to-day struggle to get by to think beyond present worries.  
Part of this widely shared sense of inequality, of living in another Turkey, is 
generated out of work experiences.  But part of it, too, comes from less easily classifiable 
experiences—the ordinary events of everyday life.  A creative conflation of experiences 
in different aspects of daily life makes up this sense of difference and discrimination.  
One evening, for instance, a young man of around 20, the nephew of a çavuş—a word 
that means, in this context, a middleman linking seasonal migrant laborers with factories 
and fields—had just come back from Erzurum, a city some 150 miles north-northeast of 
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Diyarbakır, where his father had arranged for him to work in a small cheese factory, and 
had decided to visit his friends, who hung out many nights on stools outside the 
aforementioned neighborhood bakkal in Aziziye.  He had no complaints about the labor 
itself; he had, since coming of age, been working in this or that seasonal agricultural-
related job, all off-the-books.  He further expressed a sentiment that many young migrant 
workers echoed: someone has to do it.60   
The job involved collecting milk from the dwindling number of his family’s 
relatives still living in their partially evacuated village on the slopes of Karacadağ, 
driving it to a dairy processing facility in Erzurum, where his uncle had friends, having 
spent some time there before he left university due to political tensions around the time of 
the 1980 military coup, and working for several weeks to process the milk into cheese 
before selling it back in Diyarbakır.  His uncle, it seems, had grown curious about the 
political climate of the city on this last journey and had talked one night, with his host 
family, about paying a visit to the DTP (now BDP) party headquarters.  The host 
reportedly urged him against it, fearing negative responses from the police and from 
neighbors.  But the uncle did eventually visit party headquarters, and shortly after he and 
his nephew were asked to vacate the house.  They were also suddenly charged higher 
than normal prices in the neighborhood corner store when purchasing cigarettes, and 
were made to feel unwelcome in the neighborhood coffeehouse.   
When I expressed surprise at these forms of everyday discrimination and asked if 
they were particular to Erzurum, a friend of the cheese maker dismissed my surprise.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Paul Willis might appreciate the tension that surfaced here, as in so many exchanges with young 
working men from displaced families, between, in Willis’s terms, “penetration” and the “reproduction of 
inherited structural relations” (1977). 
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“You don’t know. We ate plenty of punches”, he said, smiling broadly and pointing 
across the two-lane road dividing where we sat from a nearby cluster of apartment 
complexes where people with regular incomes lived—a comment that brought smiles and 
nods of agreement from his friends.  Particularly in the early days of migration, they told 
me, venturing to the other side of the road to hang out on its park benches, stroll its 
streets, play on its soccer field, or even to simply walk on the sidewalk on that side of the 
road was, for a young man from the migrant neighborhood, sufficient to attract the 
attention of the police, and to then be brought to the nearest station and roughed up.  The 
cheese maker pointed to the other side of the road and said, “If that’s Europe, this is 
Africa.”   
Another young man—call him Ali—chimed in with his own take on everyday 
discrimination in the city.  He pointed to his small, inexpensive Şahin sedan, which had 
dark tinted windows and silver stickers spelling out various kitsch phrases (“The more 
the days pass, the more I understand why babies cry at birth”).  Ali was comparatively 
fortunate; he had a certificate of mastery in plumbing. A few years ago he was working in 
Istanbul and making good money.  However, the construction crew he had gone to work 
for disbanded, he could no longer find work, and thus could no longer afford to live in 
Istanbul.  He returned to Diyarbakır to his family, and had found work in the city, though 
at a significant pay cut.  Meanwhile, he used some of his earnings in Istanbul to buy his 
car.  With it, he picked up friends and cousins from Aziziye and drove them to 
coffeehouses in other neighborhoods where they could smoke and play games in peace, 
knowing their older brothers would not be there.  Or more often, after work many nights, 
he would enjoy what he described as his biggest pleasure in life: opening a fresh pack of 
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cigarettes, turning on his favorite music, and driving slowly around the outskirts of the 
city, stopping at certain lookout points to enjoy views of the winding Tigris and the old 
city walls.  But he complained that the police would frequently stop his vehicle and do 
thorough searches of the car.  In part, he chalked this up to the model of car, which, 
particularly with its tinted windows and stickers, was indexical of young lower-class 
men.  He also cursed his lack of foresight while in Istanbul, where he could have bought 
a car with non-Diyarbakır plates (on the troubles of having a Diyarbakır number 21 
license plate and the lengths that people go to acquire a car with other plates, see Diken 
1998).   
 Ali said that he had heard from relatives who had immigrated to Holland that in 
the EU, borders had been eliminated. In Diyarbakır, though, “in my own homeland”, Ali 
complained that he couldn’t go a week without being pulled over by the police and 
having his vehicle searched. “Here, there’s nothing but borders.”61  When he made these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 On the evening that this young man shared these stories of being pulled over and having every inch 
of his vehicle searched at least once a week, there were a few young men present who had arrived on foot 
from the neighboring salaried settlement (the Europe to the cheese maker’s Africa), looking to buy a few 
bottles of cola and some sunflower seeds from a nearby bakkal for an evening of hanging out on benches 
and chatting in the moderate weather.  They sat down on the stools on the sidewalk where the sedan driver 
and I sat, and listened to Ali’s stories.  One of the young men, a confident and articulate high school 
graduate who had taken a year off to study and sit the national university entrance exam a second time, 
unsatisfied with the choice of departments available to him after his initial scores, showed visible irritation 
about such accounts of mistreatment and discrimination against Kurds purportedly because they were 
Kurds.  He clarified that his own family was descended from the few thousand Turcophone Bulgarians who 
were purposefully resettled in the Kurdish-majority southeast of Turkey in the early years of the republic, 
around the same time that a number of Kurds from Dersim and other southeastern geographies were being 
relocated to western Turkey, all part of an explicit project to assimilate Turkish national identity in Kurdish 
people and geographies.  He insisted that Kurds are not the only ones who suffered, and who have been 
discriminated against.  His grandfather, he told us, was driven off the land the state granted him by a 
powerful local Kurdish landlord, but before this happened his grandfather apparently sensed something 
afoot and sold nearly all of his animals and crops, and with that money opened a small shop in the 
neighborhood of Bağlar in Diyarbakır, close to the train station.  Thanks to his practical intelligence, he 
said, the family was saved from the poverty of living under a landlord, but today, he said, he feels out of 
place in Bağlar.  He told a story about trying to help an older woman carry her shopping bags from the 
market to her home in Bağlar, but when she realized that he didn’t speak Kurdish, she apparently cursed 
him and asked, What kind of a Diyarbakırite doesn’t speak Kurdish?  Similarly, he talked about visiting 
relatives in Bursa, a city in the west of Turkey with a large number of migrants from the southeast, and 
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remarks, I happened to have responded with a memory from one of my earliest trips to 
Diyarbakır when, on a long bus ride from Ankara, next to a retired teacher with a history 
of leftist Kurdish political involvement in the various movements preceding the PKK, we 
had awakened around sunrise outside of Malatya to find military officers collecting 
passports.  He leaned over as we were waiting to get our documents back and said, “So 
now you understand we’re in a different country.”  I shared this remark with the young 
man in the white sedan, and he replied, “Valla, the man’s right.”   
 Thus for young men, if in a different mode than their parents, experiences of 
livelihood and of everyday life in the wake of displacement and dispossession are 
perceived and rendered through discourse into everyday signs of injustice and inequality.  
They, too, practice the creative conflation of economic and political life in contemporary 
Diyarbakır that is an overarching social reality in the contemporary city, and that is at the 
heart of this study.  In this chapter, we see some of the additional ways in which ordinary 
daily objects are appropriated—certificates, ground-penetrating radar, perpetual motion 
machines—and made to play a part in moral and political condemnation and the 
articulation of political stance of dissent towards past and present policies of the state in 
the wake of displacement and dispossession.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
meeting a group of young men from Diyarbakır, whom he claims to have asked for a light and tried to 
engage in conversation only to find himself threatened with a beating when they learned he wasn’t Kurdish.  
Whether or not these stories are apocryphal is beside the point.  I am more interested in them as evidence of 
a symbolic habit in Turkey, surprisingly common among otherwise sympathetic figures, of refusing to 
recognize Kurdish experience as exceptional.  It is a trite way of thinking among leftists who lived through 
the 1980 military coup in Turkey, and one that I heard a number of times during my fieldwork, on trips to 
Istanbul for library research or when journalists or delegations visited Diyarbakır, to recognize that Kurds 
have suffered, but to insist that this was no more than any other social or political sub-group in Turkey.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation has approached urban livelihoods in the wake of displacement 
and dispossession through a focus on discourses about ‘the economy’, or more 
specifically, about the practical challenges involved in remaking livelihoods after 
dispossession.  I have argued that the ways in which people interpret and give meaning to 
their economic lives is an important part of the everyday generation of political meaning 
in contemporary Diyarbakır.   
 This claim is important, I think, because it points to a need, in the study of Kurds 
in Turkey, to push the analysis of politics in the context of the so-called Kurdish question 
beyond the predominant concern with those designated to speak in the name of 
‘politics’—elected officials, people with claims to expertise or qualification—and 
towards an approach to politics that is closer to Ranciere’s use of the word: the struggle 
of those who are not ‘supposed’ to speak on such matters, their irruption into everyday 
space of struggle, their efforts to make their presence and their demands visible and 
sayable in questioning the order of the “distribution of the sensible” (Ranciere 2010).  
And, we should add, it suggests a need to do so in ways that move beyond alarmist 
accounts.  Rather than assume we know what people subjected to injurious political 
histories and living in conditions of economic relegation think or how they act, I have 
tried to suggest that we should simply listen to what they have to say.   
 The constant talk about matters of livelihood in the southeast seems to me an 
instance of ordinary displaced Kurds insisting that their experiences and their fight for 
viable livelihoods and fair work conditions not be rendered beyond the sensible.  It is also 
is, I think, an instance of what David Graeber has described as the politics of value—
	   181	  	  
active deliberation over “what it is that makes life worth living” (2001:88)—at work, as 
an integral part of the lively conversational life of a city where political critique is an 
everyday activity. 
 I want to return to the overarching argument of this dissertation in light of the 
research presented above, and to revisit the argument outlined at the outset of this study 
regarding the political significance of discourse about the economy.  There are at least 
two senses in which I think this discourse matters, and is deserving of scholarly attention.  
One has to do, as I suggested above, with expanding the political scope of contemporary 
scholarship on the so-called Kurdish problem.  The other has to do with the significance 
of economic life at this conjuncture in Diyarbakır’s history. 
 On the first matter, one reason for taking this approach has to do with the 
contributions of a growing body of scholarship on the Kurdish question.  As Joost 
Jongerden and Ahmet Akkaya note(2012:2), much of the available literature in Kurdish 
studies has focused on official discourse and security policy as a means of understanding 
the politics of the present.  Understanding official pronouncements and military practices 
is no doubt an important element in making sense of the history and evolution of events 
in Kurdish Turkey’s recent history.  But one wonders if this captures ‘the political’ in all, 
or even in its most important, senses.  In this study, I drew on another approach to 
politics, one wherein the political is at base a matter of who has a say in the determination 
of a particular arrangement of the social or the communal. Politics happens, in this 
framework, when the non-elected force their way into the aesthetic space of visibility and 
audibility. Akkaya and Jongerden are right to suggest that Kurdish studies could use to 
pay more attention to politics beyond the sense of state officials and military acts, but 
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could we also add to this, beyond the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) 
officials, Democratic Society Congress members, and PKK leaders?  This is a more 
complicated matter, as in many ways these groups are themselves the result of a politics 
of irruption that altered who has a say in the so-called Kurdish question.  BDP, for 
instance, is central to the project of trying to build autonomous democratic spaces within 
the existing space of the Turkish-state, a project that does not rely on state official acts of 
recognition—what Akkaya and Jongerden summarize under the term radical democracy. 
The evolution of the PKK’s vision after the 2000s, in other words, can be seen as 
example of “the potential of social movements to alter power structures in a given polity” 
(Gambetti 2009: 44). This situation would seem to be close to Ranciere’s idea of politics.  
But is there not another space of politics to consider as well, the analysis of which might 
complement the growing number of studies of Kurdish parties and civil society 
organizations?  Here I have in mind the politics of ordinary experiences of ordinary 
Kurds.  I use ‘ordinary’ not in a populist way that celebrates the ordinary as the source of 
what is good and true, but in the simple sense of people not occupying a position that 
officially designates them to speak in the name of politics.  
 One way to read this dissertation, then, is a call for greater attention to popular 
instantiations of politics, in Ranciere’s sense, in the study of Kurds in Turkey.  “Politics 
and police”, writes Ranciere, “refer…to two distributions of the sensible, to two ways of 
framing a sensory space, of seeing or not seeing common objects in it, of hearing or not 
hearing in it subjects that designate them or reason in their relation” (2010:92).  The fact 
that the people I met in Diyarbakır so often used the medium of everyday speech to fill it 
with references to the perceived wrongs of displacement and dispossession and the 
	   183	  	  
injustices of inclusive exclusion can be read as an effort to render these experiences a 
more salient part of the sensory space of post-displacement Diyarbakır.   
 Which leads us to the second matter.  It seems to me that the political future of the 
city has much to do with how people’s claims for more equitable opportunities and more 
jobs at decent pay will be answered.  This is not to confirm the ruling party’s thesis that 
the Kurdish question is at heart a matter of economic development stripped of politics—
as in the ex-governor of Diyarbakır’s 2008 remarks that “the agenda of the people is 
economic; the agenda is sustenance. Any other claims are political” (see Day 2008).  
Rather, I mean to underscore that the economy is always already a space of politics, a 
space of defining the contours of a particular arrangement of the social.  Such a political 
economy is not the only element of the Kurdish struggle, but I want to suggest that it is 
an important one, and deserves perhaps more careful attention than it receives.  Scholars 
may be reticent to approach the question of economic life in the southeast, given the 
degree to which economic matters are associated with state efforts to silence or dismiss 
the politics of Kurdish dissensus as irrelevant to the ‘more important’ matter of 
humanitarianism: Kurds as apolitical humanitarian subjects, whose political claims will 
disappear if only economic development can be brought to the southeast and more jobs 
can be created.  To that end, I have tried to provide a way of approaching the economy as 
always already a terrain of politics. 
 Still, questions remain as to the extent to which, in this iteration of the research, I 
have been able to achieve what I set out to do.  I have tried to show how my interlocutors 
in Diyarbakır, in discussing matters of economic life—unstable jobs, low pay, unsecure 
futures, the lackluster nature of labor in the city versus labor in the country, even with all 
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the latter’s inequities—insisted on linking these discussions to questions of inequality, 
perceived abuses of power, and a whole range of other events identified as unjust.  They 
insisted that economic life can and should not be divorced from questions of power, 
morality, and justice, and in so doing, they staked out a political stance of dissensus.  But 
would a more robust argument not require further research into the question of how these 
discourses circulate and are performed in settings beyond talking to the anthropologist?  I 
tried in the introduction to suggest that talk about the economy is not a question of 
playing it safe, but is a ubiquitous popular language of politics.  To strengthen this 
argument, however, there is a need for further research into how politicized accounts of 
the economic operate at a wider social scale.  At the same time, there is a need to show, at 
a more linguistically fine-tuned level of analysis, how these accounts of the economy are 
made socially legible and culturally convincing.  I tried to open these questions in the 
third chapter, where food signs are analyzed in rhetorical terms.  But there is more to do 
along these lines.  Beyond the mere insistence on the inseparability of the economic and 
political, there is a need to dig more deeply into how, at a subtler level, discourse about 
the economy works as politics. 
 A final line of questioning begging for further consideration in later iterations of 
this research has to do with geography, with questions of space.  Readers of this study 
have pointed out that while geography—specifically, police acts that transform 
geographies—is an implicit theme throughout this ethnography, there is little explicit 
theoretical discussion of geography and space. I have come to agree with this criticism, 
yet I’ve done so too late in the game to make the theoretical overhauls that this would call 
for.  Doing so in later iterations of this work might resolve my analytic discomfort, 
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voiced in the introduction, with Ranciere’s defense of his thesis that politics is, with 
Aristotle, at base a matter of speech, of language.  Who can engage in debate, in speech: 
these are the critical questions for Ranciere, whereas exciting work, both in geography 
and in some of the interdisciplinary work under the rubric of so-called ‘new 
materialisms’ (Bennett 2010, Coole and Frost 2010), raises important questions about the 
need to push not just beyond the linguistic and conceptual, but beyond the human to 
understand the constitution and dynamics of politics. 
 That said, the research in its current state does, I think, provide a novel approach 
to economic life (dispossession and livelihoods by way of discourse), and a cogent 
argument as to why looking, at this conjuncture, at the politics of economic life in 
Diyarbakır matters.  As the project of actualizing radical democracy unfolds, many of us 
will look on with great interest on the economic transformation of Diyarbakır and other 
southeastern cities.  Kurdish political leaders have written a declaration, mentioned 
earlier in this study, that outlines the vision as to the kind of economic arrangement they 
would like to see emerge from contemporary negotiations.  Whatever one’s stance, there 
are undeniably some ideas worth considering in this document: for instance, the 
rebuilding of rural villages for forced migrants who wish to return, yet along the lines of 
ecologically sound farming practices that would both reverse the damages to the land in 
the southeast caused by dam building and large-scale industrial agriculture and provide 
locally-sourced, healthy food; the restructuring of a tax system that places heavy burdens 
on the working class while many top earners find ways to evade giving a part of their 
income to the state; the encouragement of very small-scale manufacturing, and the 
rejection of large-scale monopolistic enterprises.  Yet as the document writers themselves 
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readily admit, most of these ideas remain at the stage of abstract proposals, with the 
practical means of implementation rather under-thought.  For instance, how exactly 
would a ground-up, locally based democratic movement—even if, as is the case in 
Diyarbakır and many southeastern municipalities, it has a sympathetic ear in local 
government and parliamentary representatives—effect an alteration of national tax 
policies?  Who would pay for the reconstruction of villages (no meager price)?  And to 
whom would the organic agricultural goods be marketed, if, considering the high input 
costs of organic farming, it is unlikely that most of the people who shop from agricultural 
street markets in Diyarbakır—which is where many in the city shop for produce—would 
be willing or able to pay for organic products?    
 Working out practical answers to the details of these proposals would seem to be 
a crucial step in addressing the important matter of rebuilding economic life in 
southeastern Turkey.  If the Kurdish movement is committed at a deep level to what it 
now claims—radical democracy that initiates imaginative projects without waiting for 
state policies of recognition (with all their complications and limits) and decision making 
at a local scale—these proposals are in need of grounding in the intertwined material and 
semiotic conditions of the city’s displaced, dispossessed economic geographies.
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